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I am involved in a legal battle with Blue Cross and Blue Shield...
which has denied coverage for my wife's bone marrow transplant
for advanced breast cancer.... Now, when we need insurance the
most, Blue Cross has turned its back on us. Unless the case is
settled soon in our favor, I will be forced to sell my house, borrow
from friends and relatives, and mortgage my children's future.
Blue Cross's position has created a huge financial, emotional and
physical burden for my wife, my family and me.
Robert Russo, husband of breast cancer patient, March 1994.1
[Insurers] do not believe that it is appropriate or feasible for them
to cover the patient care costs of individuals who are hospitalized
for the sole purpose of research ... .2
It is not the role of insurance to finance research.3
John Cova, Health Insurance Association of America, 1992 & 1993.
1. Robert Russo, I'll Have to Sell the House to Pay for Treatment, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1994, at
A26 (letter to editor).
2. John L. Cova, A Swift Response to a "Modest" Propoat 84J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 744, 744
(1992).
3. Mark Freedman, When Insurers Refuse to Pay: Experimental Surgical Procedures, 93 BESr's
REv.-LIFE-HALTH INs. ED.,Apr. 1993, at 38,39 (quotingJohn Cova, former director of medical
technology assessment for Health Insurance Association of America). Cova asserts that until
there is evidence of the safety and clinical effectiveness of therapies, insurers cannot be expected
to pay for them. I.
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[There is a growing and confusing body of case law that addresses
whether [high dose chemotherapy - autologous bone marrow
transplants are] experimental procedure[s] for purposes of
insurance coverage. The courts that have struggled with the issue
have reached different outcomes.
U.S. Circuit Judge Kenneth F Ripple, writing in Harris v. Mutual of
Omaha Cos., 1993.4
INTRODUCTION
Every reader of this Comment knows of at least one woman' who
currently has, or has had, breast cancer.6 One woman out of nine
will develop breast cancer in her lifetime.7 In 1995, an estimated
46,000 women will die from this devastating disease.'
Public awareness of this disease has heightened in recent years,
largely due to the relentless efforts of breast cancer patients.9 Breast
cancer support networksI0 and advocacy groups," as well as educa-
4. 992 F.2d 706, 713 n.4 (7th Cir. 1993).
5. Because breast cancer patients are overwhelmingly female, this Comment will refer to
them using feminine gender language. & lNL MARAr# REmEZ.Y& PAULA DRANOV, RF.UcNG
YouR HEREDrrARY RISK: BREAST CANCER AND OvARIAN CANcER-BE4XGNO THE ODDS 7 (1992)
(noting that although about 900 men develop breast cancer annually, vast majority of breast
cancer victims are female); US. DF'T OF COMIERCE, STATJnAL AaSTrcT OF ThE UNITED
STATES 1994, at 143 thl. 213 [hereinafterSTATsTICALABS Cr] (estimating that 1000 males had
breast cancer in 1993).
6. Breast cancer is the most common type of cancer among women in the United States.
See NATIONAL INSiS. OF HEALTH, NATIONAL CANCER lNST., WHAT You NEED TO KNOW AEotr
BREAsT CANCER, Pub. No. 94-1556, at 1 (1993) [hereinafter WHATYoU NEED TO KNoWArotr
BREAST CANCER]. More than 1.6 million women alive in the United States today have been
treated for breast cancer. SeeNATIONAL AUjANCE OF BREAST CAN EF ORGS. (NABCO), BPRAsr
CANCER RESOURCE LIST 19 (1994-95 ed.) [hereinafter RESOURCE LIST].
Some well-known women who have publicly acknowledged their breast cancer includejustice
Sandra Day O'Connor, Nancy Reagan, Rep. Mfarilyn Llo)d. Olivia Newton-John, Shirley Temple
Black,Julia Child, and Betty Ford. Id. "Hardly a person among us has not been touched either
directly or indirectly by the occurrence of this virulent disease in themselves, a family member,
friend, or loved one." Harris v.Mutual of Omaha Cos., No. 92-1089-C, 1992 WIL 421489, at *1
(S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 1992).
7. See Kekis v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utica-Watertown, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 571, 573
n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); KEENY & DRANOV, supra note 5, at 5; sa also STATIS=TCAL ABSrIACT, supra
note 5, at 143 tbL 213 (estimating 183,000 new cases of breast cancer in 1993); Michael
Waldhoh, Feud Brewing Over Brast-Cancer Gene Patent, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 1994, at B1
(mentioning that approximately 185,000 new cases of breast cancer arise each year).
8. AMEaiCANCANcERSoC YCANCER FACTS&Fi IGURES-1995,at 10(1995);sabsoMdinda
Beck et al., The Politis of Breast Cance, NEIWEEK, Dec. 10, 1990, at 62 (explaining that more
than one quarter of 150,000 women diagnosed with breast cancer ill die from that disease).
9. Segeneray Beck, supra note 8, at 62-65 (describing breast cancer survivors who have
spoken out to increase awareness); see also Proclamation No. 6739, 59 Fed. Reg, 52,231 (1994)
(declaring October 1994 as National Breast Cancer Awareness Month).
10. SeeRES URCE LST, supra note 6, at 22-39 (listing more than 300 regional breast cancer
support groups nationwide). In addition to regional support groups, there are several national
groups that provide support, counseling, and information. They are Y-ME National
Organization for Breast Cancer Information and Support, American Cancer Society, National
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tional and research databases12 have sprouted throughout the nation.
Pressure on lawmakers has led to federal and state funding for re-
search to find new therapies-and improve old therapies-for treating
and curing breast cancer."3
Breast cancer patients have met with less success, however, when
dealing with their insurers. 4 Insurers have in many cases refused to
pay for high dose chemotherapy-autologous bone marrow transplants
(HDG-ABMT(s)), 5 which are used to treat women with advanced
Alliance of Breast Cancer Organizations (NABCO),The National Breast Cancer Coalition, Reach
to Recovery, and The Komen Alliance. Id. at 17-20.
11. See, eg., THE NATIONAL BREAST CANCER COALITION, THE NATIONAL BREAST CANCER
COALITION (1994) (on file with The American University Law Review) (describing National Breast
Cancer Coalition as group founded in 1991 to effect public policy for breast cancer research).
12. See ELEANOR NEALON, WHAT ARE CLIICAL TRIALS ALL ABOUT? A BOOKLET FOR
PATIENTS wrrH CANCER 22 (National Insts. of Health Pub. No. 92-2706, reprinted June 1992)
(describing Cancerfax, which facilitates access, via fhx machine, to National Cancer Institute's
Physician's Data Query (PDQ) system, which in turn provides prognostic, stage, and treatment
information for ongoing clinical trials nationwide). There are also breast cancer patient
oriented computer bulletin boards that can be accessed through CompuServe, an on-line service
that offers cancer-related public forums. See RESOURCE LIST, supra note 6, at 16.
13. See National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-43, § 403,
107 Stat. 122, 157 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 285a-8 (Supp. V 1993)) (appropriating
$1 million for fiscal year 1994 and such sums as may be necessary for 1995 and 1996 for research
concerning causes, prevention, detection, and treatment of breast cancer); see also Keelyn
Friesen, Non-Passage of the Women's Health Equity Act: Inaction May Lead to Cancerous Results, 14
HAMLINEJ. PUB. L. &POL'Y243, 243 (1993) (advocating increased government funding to foster
research for breast cancer via Women's Health Equity Act). But see Twentieth Anniversary of thd
National Cancer Act 1991: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1991) (statement of Hon. Thomas P. O'Neill) (claiming that in decade
preceding 1991, funding for cancer research had decreased by 6,2%, while funding on all other
medical research programs had increased by 27%).
14. See Beck, supra note 8, at 65 (discussing some insurers' willingness to approve certain
procedures for treatment of leukemia and lymphoma, but not for breast cancer).
15. There are two types of bone marrow transplants. In an allogeneic transplantation, also
called a syngeneic transplantation, a patient's bone marrow is replaced with marrov, from a
donor. See NATIONAL CANCER INST., BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION: RESEARCH REPORT 16
(National Insts. of Health Pub. No. 92-1178,1991) [hereinafter BMT RESEARCH REPORT]. In an
autologous transplantation, in contrast, the replacement marrow is from the patient herself. Id,
at 7. The benefit of this procedure is that the patient is less likely to reject her own marrow as
opposed to marrow from a donor. Id. Autologous bone marrow transplants are used for
treating breast cancer. See SUSAN STEWART, BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTS: A BOOK OF BASICS FOR
PATIENTS 28 (1992).
Another name for HDC-ABMT is high-dose chemotherapy with autologous bone marrow
rescue (HDC-ABMR). See, e.g., Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Cos., 992 F.2d 706, 709 (7th Cir.
1993) (using HDC-ABMT and HDC-AMBR interchangeably). Another method used to
regenerate bone marrow is high-dose chemotherapy with peripheral blood stem cell transplant
(HDC-PBSCT), also called peripheral blood stem cell rescue (HDC-PSCR) or peripheral stem
cell transplant (HDC-PSCT). See Calhoun v. Complete Health Care, 860 F. Supp. 1494, 1496-97
(S.D. Ala. 1994) (noting that, with ABMT, stem cells are removed from bone marrow white
patient is under general anesthesia, whereas with PSCT, stem cells are removed from patient's
blood via catheter in neck with no anesthesia); Hasty v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest
Areas Health & Welfare Fund, 851 F. Supp. 1250, 1252 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (explaining five stages
of HDC-PSCR treatment);Jaecks v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers Health Benefit Plan, No.
93-C-6855, 1993 WL 498286, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 1993) (distinguishing HDC-ABMT from
HDC-PSC7); PatriciaJassak & Mary Beth Riley, Autologous Stem Cell Transplant, 2 CANCER PRtAC,
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breast cancer, because, according to insurers, this treatment is
"experimental," "investigational," "not medically necessary," "not
medically accepted," or any combination thereof 6 Insurers argue
that their purposes are to ration health care costs and to protect
policyholders from wasteful, and even harmful, treatments, 7 rather
than to serve as charities or research institutions.18 Accordingly,
insurers insist that they are not obligated to fund "experimental"
medical treatments.'9 Critics, however, accuse insurers of exploiting
exclusionary provisions in their policies as a pretext for eliminating
expensive treatments." This debate between insurers and their
critics centers on the issue of whether a patient's medical treatment,
such as HDC-ABMT for breast cancer, is truly "experimental" as
defined by her health insurance policy."
As a result of this conflict, women with breast cancer, while trying
to fight their disease, are simultaneously embattled with their
insurers.' Breast cancer patients have become not only angry,
141,141-44 (1994) (explaining and comparing HDC-ABMT and HDC-PBSCT); se also Thomas
R. Klumpp, Autoogous Peripheral Blood Stern Cell Transplantation Vmus Auloogaus Bone Ar=ow
Transplantation: WMich is Better?, 2 HIATOLOGY/ONCOLOGYANNAIS 80, 31 (1994) (comparing
advantages and disadvantages ofusing either HD C-ABfT or HDC-PBSMT. For purposes of this
Comment, all of these treatments will be considered together as HDC.ABMT(s).
16. This Comment uses "Experimental Exclusion" to refer to all exclusionary language
embodied in health insurance policies.
17- See Gary Taylor, Insurers Deny Coverage; Cancer Trratment Focus of Suit 15 NAT'L LJ. 3,3
(1993) (emphasizing insurance industry's responsibility to all policyholders and to safety of
individuals seeking treatment).
18. See Freedman, supra note 3, at 38.
19. See Robert B. Koegel, InuringEffective Therapjfor Brast Cancer, N.Y. J,, Dec. 7, 1992,
at 1, 4 (arguing that insurers should not have to pay for treatments that lack solid scientific
proof of beneficial results). But see Freedman, supra note 3, at 40 (mentioning National
Insurance Consumer Organization president's belief that insurers should be in forefront of
finding cures); Mary McCabe & Michael A. Friedman, Impact of Third-Party Rdmbursexnt on
Cancer CGinical Investigtio" A Consensus Statement Coonlinated by the National Cancer Institut 81
J. NAT'L CANCER INsT. 1585, 1585-86 (1989) (reporting that representatives of major oncology
organizations recommend third-party coverage of patients' costs in research protocols for cancer
treatments).
20. See Beck, supra note 8, at 65 (asserting that insurers are shying aimy from treatments,
not because of their experimental nature, but because "the universe of potential breast cancer
patients is so much larger" than that for other types of cancer for which insurers are uilling to
pay treatment costs); Michael Friedman & Mary McCabe, Assig ing Care Casts Associated uith
Therapeutic Oncology Research: A Modest Proposal, 84 J. NAT'L CANCER INSmT. 760, 761 (1992)
(declaring that insurers deny coverage for treatments under investigation not to protect public
health, but for legal and fiscal reasons).
21. Se4 eg., Dahl-Eimers v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 1379, 1382 (11th Cir.
1993) (identifying as major issue definition of phrase "considered experimental" and whether
HDC-ABMT fits definition); Holder v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 951 F.2d 89, 91 (5th Cir.
1992) (same).
22. See Beck, supra note 8, at 65 (discussing increasing number of breast cancer victims
spending their "last precious months in court or on picket lines7).
23. See, eg., Health Care Crisis Human Impact of Insurance Company Ahuse Heating of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Roures 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1992) (hereinafter Health
Care Ciisis] (statement of breast cancer patient Patricia Geiger). Geiger told the commiue:
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but also active.24 This time, they are seeking remedies through the
courts.' Some breast cancer patients can afford to hire private
attorneys,26 while others rely on pro bono legal assistance3 7
Increases in breast cancer patient litigation against insurers have
forced courts to decide the experimental status of particular medical
treatments, ultimately having broad implications on health care
policy.28 Courts, however, are ill-equipped to make these deci-
sions.29  Even the most well-intentioned judge lacks the knowledge
and training necessary to determine whether a new medical treatment
is experimental, safe, or superior to conventional treatments.
8 0
Rather, the legislature is the most appropriate mechanism for
[I am] determined to get better. Through will power and love and belief in my
physicians, I'll make it happen. But I must tell you that as I sit here today, I feel great
anger toward Prudential Insurance Company. I feel as if the insurance company
played with my life. Their delay may have cost me the best medical chance I had to
cure this disease.
Id.
24. See eg., id. at 9-11 (describing breast cancer patient Geiger's battle with Prudential
Insurance and her effort to persuade Senate to take active role in proscribing congressionally
mandated responsibilities for insurance companies).
25. See Robert Bazell, Topic of Cancer, NEv REPUBIUC, Dec. 31, 1990, at 9 (stating that more
and more women with breast cancer are filing suits demanding that their insurance companies
pay for HDC-ABMT).
26. See Gina Kolata, Patients'Lauyers Lead Insurers to Pay for Unproven Treatmnts, N.Y. TtIES,
Mar. 28, 1994, atAl (stating that average lawyer charges approximately $10,000 for litigation on
behalf of breast cancer patients, win or lose). But see Karen L. Gallinari, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5,
1994, at A26 (letter to editor) (claiming that lawyers who represent breast cancer patients do
not collect large profits).
27. SeeMartin Fox, Women Judges, LaVers Mobilize on Breast Cancer, N.Y. LJ.,June 29, 1992,
at I (discussing large number of legal organizations supporting breast cancer education,
detection, treatment, and research and assisting in related breast cancer legal matters); Rhea
Mandulo, Lawyers Tapped to Aid Breast Cancer Patients, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 23, 1992, at 1 (describing
Lawyers Breast Cancer Alert and Breast Cancer Legal Advocacy Project, groups formed to assist
breast cancer patients who have been denied medical coverage); Lisa Beth Pulitzer, Legal Aid
for Breast Cancer Queries, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1992, at L15 (reporting establishment of lawyer
referral service to assist breast cancer patients); Faye A. Silas, Lawyers Take the Offense in Defense
Against Breast Cancer, BAR LEADER, Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 9 (describing activism for breast cancer
issues by bar associations nationwide).
28. See infra Part II.B (discussing cases where policyholder prevails); infra Part lI.C
(discussing cases where insurer prevails).
29. See Bechtold v. Physicians Health Plan of N. Ind., 19 F.3d 322, 328 (7th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Chesterfield Smith, former American Bar Association president as stating "courts are
being asked today to solve problems for which they are not institutionally equipped"); Fuja v.
Benefit Trust Life Ins., 18 F.3d 1405, 1412 (7th Cir. 1994) (articulating view that larger social
questions raised should be decided by other government branches that benefit from public
opinions and hearings); Hasty v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Health & Welfare
Fund, 851 F. Supp. 1250, 1259 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (admitting that insurance coverage for breast
cancer treatments raises social reform and public policy issues better suited for other branches
of government). See generally Richard S. Saver, Reimbursing New Technologies. Why Are the Courts
JudgingExperimentalMedcine?, 44 STAN. L REV. 1095, 1113-16 (1992) (explaining how courts are
not equipped to make determinations as to what medical technology is experimental).
30. Saver, supra note 29, at 1106-11 (describing approaches followed by judges in
determining whether specific treatments should be excluded from coverage, and resulting
inconsistent decisions in different jurisdictions).
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meaningful resolution of such disputes."1 The legislature, unlike the
judiciary, can benefit from public hearings and lobbying efforts, and
can respond, on a large scale, to the needs and concerns of the
community.
This Comment recommends that legislation, in order to be most
effective, must take into account the competing interests of both
breast cancer patients and the insurance industry. On the one hand,
a breast cancer patient should reasonably expect that her health
insurance will cover a treatment that has been recommended by her
physician and that could save her life. On the other hand, health
insurers should be permitted to avoid wasteful, fraudulent, and
medically unproven treatments so that insurance rates are affordable.
Legislation that emphasizes solely the needs of breast cancer patients,
and disregards insurers' concerns, is a setback for containing health
care costs. At the same time, containing costs must not come at the
expense of breast cancer patients' lives.
In the absence of legislation, however, courts must be prepared to
resolve disputes over the "experimental" status of new medical
treatments. To date, the federal district courts 2 and the various
federal circuit courts of appeals are split on whether or not insurers
must pay for HDC-ABMT for breast cancer ss  The Fifth 4 and
31. &e Heath Care Crisis supra note 23. at 1 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (discussing
necessity for legislative action in patient/insurer disputes); .e= also infra Part I (dscussing
legislative response to health care crisis).
32. Many federal district court cases have found in favor of insurance companies on this
question. SP ag., Lowery v. Health Chicago, No. 92-C-7657, 1994 WL 194265 (N.D. Il May 16.
1994);Jaecks v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers Health Benefit Plan, No. 93-06855, 1993 WL
498286 (N.D. IIk Dec. 1, 1993); Uhrich v. Caterpillar Inc., No. 93.C-5271,1993 WL 478990 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 18, 1993); Roseberry v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Neb., 821 F. Supp. 1313 (D. Neb.
1992); Dahl-Eimers v. Mutual Omaha Life Ins. Co., 812 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Fla. 1992); Lehman
v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 806 F. Supp. 859 (D. Ariz. 1992); Arrington v. Group Hospitaliza-
tion & Medical Servs., 806 F. Supp. 287 (D.D.C. 1992); Sweeney v. Gerber Prods. Co. Medical
Benefits Plan, 728 F. Supp. 594 (D. Neb. 1989); Thomas v. Gulf Health Plan, 688 F. Supp. 590
(S.D. Ala. 1988).
Other federal district courts have ruled in favor of breast cancer patients Se4 eg., Frenderis
v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 94-C-6690, 1995 WL 12662 (N.D. II. Jan. 12, 1995);
Bailey v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Va., 866 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Va. 1994); Calhoun v. Complete
Health Care, 860 F. Supp. 1494 (S.D. Ala. 1994); Scalamandre v. Oxford Health Plans (N.Y.),
Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Kekis v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utica-Waterto;im,
Inc., 815 F. Supp. 571 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); Nesseim v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 792 F. Supp. 674
(D.S.D. 1992); Wilson v. Group Hospitalization & Medical Sens., 791 F. Supp. 309 (D.D.C.
1992); Kulakowski v. Rochester Hosp. Serv. Corp., 779 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); White v.
Caterpillar, 765 F. Supp. 1418 (W.D. Mo. 1991); Bucd v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Conn., 764
F. Supp. 728 (D. Conn. 1991); Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Md., 757 F. Supp. 661 (D.
Md. 1991); Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Va., 741 F. Supp. 586 (E.). Va. 1990).
33. Seegmeraly Robin E. Margolis, Tide Tw-ingAgainsiAutod, B=Ae famw Trans-tania-
to in Federal Appellate Court 6 HEALTH SPAN 21 (1993) (discussing differing viesvs of federal
district and circuit courts regarding experimental status of HDC-ABMT for breast cancer).
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Seventh 5 Circuits have characterized the treatment as experimental
and have upheld insurers' denial of coverage. In the Third Circuit, 6
a three-judge panel reached the same conclusion, but the decision
was later vacated en banc based on a wholly unrelated legal technicali-
ty." The remaining circuits have not yet ruled on the issue.M
A starting point for such litigation is that a health insurance policy
is a contract.8 9 Courts have traditionally approached litigation
between policyholders and insurers as a contract dispute. 0 Because
each insurance company's policy is unique, courts must analyze the
specific contractual language on a case-by-case basis.4 Nevertheless,
general guidelines can assist the determination of whether or not a
new medical treatment is "experimental" under the terms of a given
insurance policy.' Courts have found the following conditions to be
essential components in resolving disputes over insurance coverage for
breast cancer treatments:
(1) the policy must contain sufficient, objective criteria for
defining "experimental;""
34. See Holder v. Prudential Ins. Co., 951 F.2d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that at time
of plaintiff's illness, HDC-ABMT was experimental under health insurance policy).
35. See Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1405, 1412 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding
insurance company's denial of coverage for HDC-ABMT because policy was not ambiguous).
36. See Clark v. K-Mart Corp., No. 91-3723, 1992 WL 106935, at *6 (3d Cir. May 22, 1992)
(concluding that HDC-ABMT for breast cancer has not been proven to be beneficial), vacated
on rehg, 979 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that insurance company's
challenge to preliminary injunction ordering it to pay for breast cancer patient's HDC-ABMT
was moot because insurance company had complied and patient did not receive treatment
again).
37. Clark, 979 F.2d at 968 (holding that only full hearing by district court could determine
whether insurer acted arbitrarily and capriciously).
38. Cf Caudill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.C., 999 F.2d 74, 80 (4th Cir. 1993)
(upholding language of health insurance policy covering only specifically listed ABMTs, which
did not include ABMT for breast cancer); Dahl-Eimers v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 986
F.2d 1379, 1383-84 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that health insurance policy language was
ambiguous, but not reaching factual question whether HDC-ABMT for breast cancer was
experimental); Farley v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 653, 657 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding
that HDC-ABMT was medically necessary for advanced cancer, but was not medically necessary
for melanomas).
39. See 44 CJ.S. Insurance § 253 (1993) (stating that insurance policy is written contract and
is governed by standard contract principles).
40. See, eg., Bechtoldv. Physicians Health Plan of N. Ind., 19 F.3d 322,325 (7th Cir. 1994)
(explaining that dispute over insurance policy coverage "is a matter of contract interpretation").
41. See generally Stuart Bass, Strict Construction of Health Insurance Contracts, LAB. L.J, Feb.
1994, at 90, 91-95 (discussing ways courts have interpreted insurance contracts on case-by-case
basis). For an explanation of how courts have been reluctant to issue sweeping pronouncements
on whether treatments are experimental, see Nina Martin, Cancer in Court: Wave of Litigation
Tests How Much a Lif is Worth, L.A. DAILYJ.,Jan. 4, 1993, at 1, 8.
42. See infra Part IV.
43. See Bechtod, 19 F.3d at 326 (holding that because policy was clear and unambiguous as
to what was covered, company was entitled to deny coverage).
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(2) the insurer must not operate under a conflict of interest;"
and
(3) the insurer must undertake reasonable efforts in making its
coverage determination.'
This Comment recommends that courts should not uphold an
insurer's refusal to pay for HDC-ABMT in the treatment of breast
cancer unless all three of these conditions have been satisfied.
While this Comment focuses on HDC-ABMTs for breast cancer, the
issues and suggestions presented are an appropriate model for other
emerging medical treatments.' Part I discusses the background of
HDC-ABMT for breast cancer. It presents the approaches of both the
medical community and the insurance industry in defining experi-
mental treatments, both generally and as applied specifically to HDC-
ABMT. Part II surveys various courts' approaches to determining
insurance coverage for breast cancer treatments. Further, it analyzes
appropriate standards of review and relevant case law, including
claims based on gender discrimination and breast cancer syndrome.
Part I reviews both state legislation and federal policy concerning
insurance coverage for HDC-ABMT for breast cancer. Finally, Part IV
makes recommendations for legislatures and for courts to follow when
resolving health insurance coverage disputes over experimental
treatments.
I. BACKGROUND OF HDC-ABMT FOR BREAST CANCER
Medical professionals sometimes disagree over the effectiveness and
safety of newly emerging treatments.47  HDC-ABMITs, which have
been used in recent years for treating breast cancer,4 s are no
exception. Although HDC-ABMTs have unquestionably proven
effective for treating certain types of cancer, such as leukemia 9 and
44. Cf. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (199) (explaining that if
administrator is acting under conflict of interest, "that conflict must be weighed as a factor in
determining whether there is an abuse of discretion").
45. See Pitmian v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Okla., 24 F.3d 118, 122 (10th Cir. 1994)
(refusing to grant summaryjudgment to insurer and implying that reason vas lack of any proof
of insurer's reasonable efforts to reach fair decision).
46. See infra notes 150-61 and accompanying text (citing cases inohing insurance
companies' denial of coverage for HDC-ABMiTs in treatment of cancers and AIDS on ground
that they are experimental).
47. Some examples of newly emerging treatments whose effectiveness is contested are
genetic therapy, small bowel with liver transplants, and intravascular ultrasound for imaging
blood flow. See Dave Lenckus, Venture to Evaluate Nwew Medical Technog-,, BUS. I, Sept. 13,
1993, at 45.
48. Sce STEvART, supra note 15, at 28-29.
49. SeeLynna M. Lesko et al., Long-Term Ps'chokeal Adjustmen of Acute LeL-mia Sunrtr"
Impact of Bone Marro Transplantation Versus Conventional CzemotaP,. 54 P S3HOSOMTrc MED.
30,32 (1992) (stating that use of chemotherapy combined with bone marrow transplants affords
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lymphoma, ° their effectiveness for treating breast cancer remains
promising, but ultimately unclear."1 Some physicians recommend
the procedure, while others condemn it, thus rendering HDC-ABMT
for breast cancer one of the most controversial issues in the medical
community today.52
Both proponents and opponents of the procedure agree, however,
that HDC-ABMT for breast cancer involves high technology, high
costs, and high risks. 3 Yet, to a woman with metastasized breast
cancer,' it offers high hopes,55 as she knows she will almost certain-
ly die without it.56 This chance for survival has motivated thousands
of women in the United States to undergo HDC-ABMT,57 while
leukemia patients greater likelihood of lengthened disease-free survival); see also Bechtold v.
Physicians Health Plan of N. Ind., 19 F.3d 322,324 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that HDC-AB IT has
proven effective in treating leukemia).
50. See Clark v. K-Mart Corp., No. 91-3723, 1992 WL 106935, at *2 (3d Cir. May 22, 1992)
(stating that HDC-ABMT is no longer experimental for treating Hodgkin's disease, lymphoma,
and acute leukemia), vacated on reh)g, 979 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1992).
51. SeeBMT REsEAcH REPORT, supra note 15, at 5 (explaining that efficacy of bone marrow
transplant is still being evaluated for treatment of breast cancer).
52. See William P. Peters & Mark C. Rogers, Variations in Approval by Insurance Companies of
Coveragefor Autologous Bone Marrow Transplantation for Breast Cancer, 330 NEWv ENG. J. MED. 473,
473 (1994) (remarking that ABMT for breast cancer has been controversial in medical
community due to high costs, frequency of disease, difficulty of procedure, and lack of
completed randomized trials); Gary Spitzer, Autologous Bone Marrow Transplantation in Solid
Tumors, 3 CURRENT OPINION IN ONCOLOGY 238,238 (1991) (describing bone marrow transplant
as most controversial topic in North America in 1991); Marilyn Chase, Medical Quandary: Breast-
Cancer Patients Seeking New Therapy Face Tough Obstacles, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1993, at Al
(discussing difficulty in coming to rational decision on this controversial topic).
53. See Don Colburn, Bone Marrow Transplants: A Tough C oice, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1994,
(Health), at 10.
54. Breast cancer is classified into four stages, according to the extent of the disease. In
Stage I, the tumor is less than one inch and is considered small. In Stage II, the tumor Is larger,
approximately one to two inches, and the cancer has spread to the axillary lymph nodes. In
Stage llI, the tumor is greater than two inches and is adhering to the chest wall. In the most
advanced stage, Stage IV, the cancer has "metastasized," meaning it has spread to other organs
or parts of the body, such as the liver, bone marrow, or brain. MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS
AND THERAFY 2076 (14th ed. 1982); see also WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT BREAST CANCER,
supra note 6, at 18-19.
55. See generally Transplants Offer Hope to Breast Cancer Patients, BMT NEWSLETTER, May 1994.
56. See Lois Ayash et al., A Perspective on Dose-Intensive Therapy with Autologous Bone Marrow
Transplantation for Solid Tumors, 5 ONCOLOGY 25, 26-27 (1991) (noting that with conventional
chemotherapy breast cancer patients are incurable and have median survival rate of two years).
57. SeeNationalAlliance of Breast Cancer Orgs. (NABCO), BoneMarrow Transplantation and
Peripheral Stem Cell Transplantation for Breast Cancer (Feb. 1994) (draft, on file with The Amrican
University Law Review) [hereinafter NABCO Draft] (citing North American Autologous Bone
Marrow Transplant Registry for proposition that 893 HDC-ABMTs were performed on breast
cancer patients in 1992, compared to 258 in 1989); see also Clinical Data for Breast Cancer and
Leukemia: American Society of Clinical Oncology Annual Meeting, CANCER RESEARC ER WKLY., May
23, 1994, at 8 (same).
The Autologous Blood & Marrow Transplant Registry (ABMTR) contains data for 15,277
patients receiving autotransplants. Of these, 4380 (29%) patients received transplants for breast
cancer. Fax from ABMTR (Apr. 1995) (on file with The American University Law Review).
Autotransplants for breast cancer have increased over the past several years: 279 were
performed in 1989,347 in 1990, 681 in 1991, 1024 in 1992,1062 in 1993 (data incomplete), and
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enduring its inherent risks' and its severe side effects.59
The main purpose of HDC-ABMTse is to enable a breast cancer
patient to tolerate much higher doses of chemotherapy 1 than
would otherwise be possible.62  In theory, these higher doses will
destroy more cancerous cells, more effectively,' thereby increasing
a patient's potential for remission or even cure. Complications arise,
however, because chemotherapy not only destroys cancerous cells, but
also damages and destroys red blood cells, white blood cells, and
platelets' found in healthy bone marrow.1 This impairs the body's
immune system, subjecting the vulnerable patient to infection.' A
HDC-ABMT allows a patient to receive far greater doses of chemother-
apy than she could tolerate under conventional treatment, 7 without
damaging her healthy bone marrow.
HDC-ABMT is a complicated medical procedure. A patient's bone
marrow is removed, through a process known as "harvesting," and it
is then frozen." While the marrow is being stored, the patient is
992 in 1994 (data incomplete). Id ABMTR estimates that these figures represent about half
of alI breast cancer transplants in North America during this time. Id Many hospitals and
medical centers do not report transplants performed for breast cancer to ABMTR.
58. See Geoffrey Cowley et al., In Punuit ofa TribieKi!er, NEME, Dec. 10, 1990, at 66,
68 (stating that 5-10% of HDC-ABMT breast cancer recipients die from complications of
treatment).
59. See BMT RS.RCH REPORT, supra note 15, at 14 (explaining that in addition to side
effects of standard chemotherapy, HDC-ABMT creates huge risks of post-procedure infections).
Vomiting, nausea, severe skin bum, hair loss, and mouth sores are among the possible side
effects of standard chemotherapy. Sregmffall SUSAN L LOVE, DR. SUSAN LOVE'S BREAsTBoOK
319-23 (1990).
60. For a detailed discussion of this medical procedure, see generally SMVwAr, supra note
15; BMT RESEARCH REPORT, supra note 15.
61. Chemotherapy is a systemic (Le., throughout the body) chemical treatment in which
drugs are injected into the bloodstream to destroy cancer cells. S-eKTYLATOUR, THE BREAST
CANCER COMPANION: FROM DIAGNOSIS THROUGH TREATMENT TO RECOVEm E-ERrTHING YOU
NEED To KNOW FOR EVEY STEP ALONG THE WAY 132 (1993).
62. SeeNABCO Draft, supranote 57,13 (stating thatwith increased doses ofchemotherapi,
amount of drugs administered must be balanced against patient's tolerance of those drugs).
63. SeeAyash, supra note 56, at 25 (stating that most drugs used in chemotherapy exhibit
steep dose-responsive curve in laboratory models, meaning that "twofold increase in dose can
result in a tenfold increase in tumor cell kill"); Karen Antman & Robert Gale, Addumd Brat
Cancer High-Dose Chemotherapy and Bone Marrom Autotransplants, 108 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 570,
570 (1988) (asserting that response of human breast cancer to drugs is dose-dependentL with
higher doses producing disproportionally higher increases in response rates).
64. Platelets and red and white blood cells aid in the body's fight against infection. Se
STvEART, supra note 15, at 11. Red blood cells carry ox)gen to, and remove uaste products
from, organs and tissues; white blood cells directly fight infection; and platelets allow blood to
dot. I&
65. See Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Md., 757 F. Supp. 651, 664 (D. Md. 1991);
Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Va., 741 F. Supp. 586, 588 (E.D. Va. 1990).
66. See Adams, 757 F. Supp. at 664.
67. See STEVAxR, supra note 15, at 29.
68. See Adams, 757 F. Supp. at 664; STvART, supra note 15, at 13-14 (explaining bone
marrow harvest procedure and noting that marrow is stored at temperatures between -80 and
-196 degrees centigrade until day of transplant).
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administered high, almost lethal, doses of chemotherapy." The
frozen marrow is then thawed and reinfused into the patient in a
process called "rescue," at which point the marrow is expected to
begin manufacturing new, healthy blood cells.7"
Aside from being complicated, a HDG-ABMT is exceptionally
expensive.7 The cost of HDC-ABMT can be over $100,000 per pa-
tient,72 but varies depending on the type and amount of drugs used,
medical complications, and the length of the hospital stay." Experts
claim, however, that costs will decrease over time as the procedure is
refined.74 Some medical centers are already reducing costs by
offering the treatment on an outpatient basis, allowing patients either
to return home or to stay at a nearby hotel during treatment, rather
than paying the additional expense of inpatient care.
75
69. See Adams, 757 F. Supp. at 664; Pirozi, 741 F. Supp. at 588 (revealing that some doses
administered during HDC-ABMT procedure exceed 1000 times standard low-dose treatment).
70. See Adams, 757 F. Supp. at 664.
71. See Bruce Hillner et al., Efficacy and Cost-ffectiveness of Autologous Bone Marrow
Transplantation in Metastatic Breast Cance, 267JAMA 2055,2059 (1992) (showing that, compared
with standard chemotherapy, HDC-ABMT for breast cancer increases life expectancy by six
months, but at cost of $115,800 per year of life gained); Daniel Haney, Weighing Cost and Pain
of Marrow Transplant, L.A. TUsES, Oct. 13,1991, atA13 (revealing that cost of HDC-ABMT equals
$1 million for each life saved); see also Kekis v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utica-Watertown,
Inc., 815 F. Supp. 571, 575 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that standard chemotherapy costs
significantly less than HDC-ABMT).
72. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Dynamic Eng'g, 850 F. Supp. 459,462 (E.D. Va. 1994) (stating that
HDC-PSCR costs between $90,000 and $150,000); White v. Caterpillar, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1418,
1419 (W.D. Mo.) (estimating cost of HDC-ABMT at $195,000), afftd, 985 F.2d 564 (8th Cir
1991); Taylor v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Mich., 517 N.W.2d 864, 867 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994)
(estimating costs of plaintiffs HDC-ABMT at between $144,000 to $200,000); see also Dave
Lenckus, Cancer Coverage Dispute; Court Says Policy Void if Procedure Is Part of Research, BUS. INS.,
Apr. 11, 1994, at 2,86 (stating that breast cancer patient's medical bill for HDC-ABMT totalled
$486,000).
73. See NABCO Draft, supra note 57,1 10 (claiming that most HDC-ABMT expenses result
from lengthy hospitalization in isolated rooms).
74. SeeYASHAR HIRSHAUT & PErER PRESSMAN, BREAST CANcER: THE COMPLETE GUIDE 188
(1992) (noting that costs for bone marrow transplant procedure could be cut by one-third due
to drugs called "colony stimulating factors" that hasten recovery); LAToUR, supra note 61, at 194-
95 (explaining that growth factors are products of recombinant DNA technology that stimulate
bone marrow cells to proliferate, enabling faster marrow engraftment after transplant, thereby
reducing hospital stay). Companies are now developing stem-cell technology that will allow
doctors to isolate cells from the patient's blood, instead of having to invade the bone. NABCO
Draft, supra note 57,11 7-9. This reduces both the length of hospitalization and the likelihood
of relapse, and thus saves costs. Id. 1 6.
75. SeeJassak & Riley, supra note 15, at 143.44 (predicting shift of care from hospitals and
medical centers to ambulatory or home settings); Marilyn Chase, Researchers Se"- Ways to Cut Cost
of Transplants WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1993, at A9 (reporting that outpatient treatment and new
stem-cell technology further reduce costs of transplant).
BREAST CANCER PATIENTS V. THEIR INSURERS 2041
A. Defining ExperimentaL The Medical Community's Perspective
The progress of medicine depends on research, experimentation,
and data collection.76 On one level, an experiment is defined as "a
procedure done in order to discover or to demonstrate some fact or
general truth."" On another level, experimentation represents a
departure from standard medical practice, and is designed to test a
hypothesis with the further goal of developing new knowledge;78 the
experimental treatment has unproven efficacy and is performed for
the sole purpose of obtaining scientific data, with no therapeutic
intent for the patient.79
When and how an experimental procedure becomes standard
treatment is often the crux of the debate over insurance coverage for
any emerging medical treatment, including HDC-ABMT for breast
cancer.'0 Medical research for new drugs and treatments is conduct-
ed in four progressive phases of clinical trials,"1 classified according
to research objectives and methodology 2 Progression to the next
phase indicates that results from the previous phase were favorable
and no serious adverse reactions occurred.'
In Phase I studies, the new drug or treatment is adminisered to
humans for the first time, usually to healthy males between the ages
of eighteen and forty-five.' The purpose of Phase I studies is to
determine where, if at all, toxicity appearsPss In Phase II, known as
clinical investigation, the drug or treatment is dispensed to actual
76. Cf. Holder v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 951 F.2d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 1992) (remarking
that "it is the nature of medical research that what may one day be experimental may the next
be state of the art treatment").
77. DoRLAN'S ILLUsTxrFn MEDICAL DInoNARY 558 (25th ed. 1974).
78. SeeDale H. Cowan, Innovative Therapy V1ssExpeiimentation, 21 TORT&Its. I 619.622
(1986) (distinguishing experimentation and innovative therapy).
79. Ad.
80. Chase, supra note 52, atA1 (noting that researchers must decide whether experimental
treatment becomes standard therapy while facing growing public debate on rising health care
costs).
81. Clinical trials are medical experiments conducted iith human subjects. S&eDahl-Eimers
v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 812 F. Supp. 1193, 1195 (ND. Fla. 1992).
82. e i&. (describing methodology used in conducting clinical trials).
83. See Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir. 1994) (detailing
objectives of four phases of clinical cancer trials). Some medical professionals refer to only
three phases of medical trials. S4 ag., Reger v. Espy, 836 F. Supp. 869, 872 (ND. Ga. 1993)
(describing "Phase I" as final stage of clinical trial, which compares results of e-perimental
therapy to standard accepted therapy); Lloyd K. Everson, The Calkngefor Cfnizol Research in
Community Oncolovy Progra"m, ONCOLOGY ISSUES, JulyAug. 1994, at 21. S&egceraly HIRSHAUr
& PRE.sM N, supra note 74, at 260.62 (describing phases of clinical trials and offering adice for
patients participating in such trials).
84. CHARLES CRAIG & ROBERT STITZEL, MODERN PHAPRMLCOLOGY 131-32 (4th ed. 1994).
85. XL
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patients and monitored for its effectiveness, in order to establish an
optimal dose rate.8 Phase III trials evaluate effectiveness with larger
numbers of patients, who are closely observed for adverse side effects
not apparent in the earlier trial phases.8 7 Finally, Phase IV consists
of randomized clinical trials,' with the goal of determining whether
apparently promising treatments are actually superior to conventional
treatments.89 Even after a treatment is accepted into the medical
mainstream, however, trials may still be conducted in order to refine
and improve it.9" Conversely, classifying a particular treatment as
part of an earlier trial phase does not automatically mean that it is
experimental;91 though a particular treatment has not completed all
trial phases, it may still be considered state-of-the-art medical
treatment and be used by the finest medical centers and hospitals.9"
The medical profession's endorsement of HDC-ABMT for breast
cancer, although forthcoming, is encountering resistance from some
health professionals." In the late 1980s, consistently stagnant and
poor results seen in patients receiving conventional chemotherapy
9 4
drove medical researchers to seek alternative treatments, such as
HDC-ABMT. With HDC-ABMT, more promising results began, and
have continued, to appear.96
86. Id.
87. Id. (noting that Phase EI studies may involve several hundred to several thousand
subjects, depending on drug being tested).
88. Id. at 131. Patients who participate in these types of clinical trials are randomly divided
into two groups: one half of the participants, called the control group, receives the standard
treatment for the disease being studied, while the other half receives the newer treatment being
tested. See Gina Kolata, Women Resist Trials to Test Marrow' Transplants, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1995,
at C3.
89. See Everson, supra note 83, at 21 (explaining last phase of clinical trials where drug Is
compared to current therapies).
90. See Bucci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Conn., 764 F. Supp. 728, 731 (D. Conn. 1991)
(noting that continuous evaluation of medical procedure does not bar its acceptance).
91. Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Md., 757 F. Supp. 661, 675 (D. Md. 1991) (finding
fact that treatment had not completed Phase III studies did not necessarily mean that treatment
was experimental). This demonstrates how use of the term "experimental" differs between the
medical community and the insurance industry, and thus leads to litigation.
92. See Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Va., 741 F. Supp. 586, 591 (E.D. Va. 1990)
(listing 15 major medical centers that use HDC-ABMT to treat breast cancer).
93. See infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
94. See Karen Antman et al., Dose Intensive Therapy in Breast Cancer, 10 BONE MARIOW
TRANSPLANTATION 67, 67 (Supp. 1 1992) (stating that two-year median survival rate for women
with metastatic breast cancer had not changed in five decades).
95. See Taylor v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Mich., 517 N.V.2d 864, 867 (Mich. Ct. App,
1994) (commenting that medical profession began using HDC-ABMTs for treatment of breast
cancer in late 1980s).
96. See Wy Are We Losing the War on Breast Cancer?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aging of
the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 38, 43 (1991) (prepared
statement of Dr. Daniel Ihde, Deputy Director of National Cancer Institute) (stating that for
patients with Stage IV breast cancer, trials of high dose chemotherapy followed by ABMT had
shown encouraging results);Jacob Bitran, The Article Reewed, 5 ONCOLOGY 33 (1991) (stating
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Those promising results have been tempered, however, by other
studies that show that breast cancer patients may not need HDC-
ABMT to achieve long-term survival.9 7 For that reason, the medical
debate over HDC-ABMT for breast cancer focuses on whether the
treatment is more effective than conventional chemotherapy 3
Phase IV randomized clinical trials of HDC-ABMT for breast cancer
are ongoing' and thus far indicate that HDC-ABMTs deliver higher
complete response rates"'0 than does conventional chemotherapy.
Citing these results, proponents argue that HDC-ABM1T is superior to
that after three years of treatment, 15-20% of Stage IV breast cancer patients who received
ABMT were alive, disease-free, and did not require therapy); William A. Check, Bone Marrm=
Transplantation; Slowly GainingFavoras a Supportive Measure with Intensive Chemotherapy, ONCOLOGY
TWMES, Dec. 1990, at 16 (discussing fact that oncologists are becoming increasingly convinced
of benefits of ABMTs for breast cancer patients); Frank R. Dunphy et al., Treatlent of Estragen
Receptor-Negative or Hormonally Refractory Breast Cancer with Doule High-Dose C=othera
Intensfiration and Bone Maronw Suppor4 8J. CLINIc.4L ONCOLOGY 1207, 1215 (1990) (reporting
favorable complete remission rates and proportion of disease-free survivors beyond two years
with high-dose chemotherapy and bone marrow support); M.John Kennedy et al., High-Dos
Chemotherapy with Reinfision of Pinged Autologous Bone Marrow Follwing Dosenteise Induction as
Initial Therapy for Metastatic Breast Cancer, 83J. NAT'L CANCER INs. 920, 920 (1991) (indicating
that reinfusion of purged autologous bone marrow yields high response rate in women %ith
metastatic breast cancer);John S. MacDonald, Peripheral Blood Stem UC lnfusions: A Suces Stor
in Applied Technology in Hematoloo and Oncology, 2 HEMATOLOGY/ONcoLoGY ANN.uS J.
CONTINUING EDUC. HEiATOLOGY& ONCOLOGY 12, 13 (1994) (mentioning that peripheral blood
stem cell transplantation shows promise for treating breast cancer); Jacob M. Rowe et al,
Recommended Guidelinesfor the Management ofAutolg us andAllgenUei BoneMarow Transplantation;
A Reportfirom theastern Cooperative Oncology Group (ECOG), 120 ANNALS IMERNAL ME. 143,143
(1994) (reporting that patients in advanced stages of breast cancer have achieved long-term,
disease-free survival through ABMT); Spitzer, supra note 52, at 239 (noting that studies of
ABMTs for Stage IV breast cancer indicate 10-15% increase in proportion of long-term, disease-
free survivors); Stephanie Williams et al., High Dose Consolidation Therapy with Autlogous Stem Ce1
RescueinStageIVBreast Cancer, 7J. CLNCAL ONCOLOGY 1824,1829 (1989) (expressingbelief that
ABMTs might be curative in women with Stage TV breast cancer).
97. See, eg., Bruce Cheson, Clinical Tias, 5 ONCOLOGY 55, 58 (1991) (cautioning that
although HDC-ABMT has frequently been used for treating metastatic breast cancer, in some
patients its efficacy is unclear when compared to standard chemotherapy).
98. See i4 at 55 (explaining that although ABMTs are being conducted more frequently in
breast cancer treatment, direct comparison with standard chemotherapy has not yet been
conducted). Preliminary data does indicate that high dose chemotherapy alone, requiring
neither hospitalization nor ABMT, may be more effective than standard treatments. Id.
99. Physician Data Query (PDQ) of the National Cancer Institute (July 5,1994) (computer
database printout on file with The American Uniersity Law Rview). The University of
Pennsylvania Cancer Center, the Mayo Clinic, the San Antonio Cancer Institute, and the New
England Medical Center are currently performing randomized trials. Id. The stated objectives
are to:
L Compare time to failure and overall survival of patients with metastatic breast
cancer ... who are randomly assigned to ... conventional maintenance
chemotherapy... vs. high-dose chemotherapy.., followed Ir autologous bone
marrow and peripheral stem cell rescue.
IL Compare the toxicity of these 2 regimens.
1I. Compare the financial costs of these 2 regimens.
IV. Evaluate the quality of life associated with these 2 treatments.
Id.
100. Response rates measure the degree in which a tumor shrinks in size or stops gro.ing
altogether.
2044 THE AMERICAN UmmVERSITY LAW RmEW [Vol. 44:2029
conventional chemotherapy. 1 ' To buttress this claim, proponents
further argue that rates of morbidity02 and mortality,'013 as well as
medical costs, have been substantially reduced over time,1' 4 due to
improvements in the HDC-ABMT procedure.0 5
Other experts are more skeptical and emphasize that trials have not
yet yielded any definitive proof that HDC-ABMT is superior to
conventional chemotherapy. 11 Moreover, they argue that the
101. Karen K. Fields etal., Ifosfamide, Carboplatin, and Et opsidein CGtbination for Induction and
High-Dose Chemotherapy: Focus on Breast Cancer and Lymphoma, 10 HEMATOLOGICAL ONCOLOGY 61,
71 (1992) (stating that HDC-ABMT appears to be superior to standard chemotherapy); Edward
A. Stadtmauer, Peripheral Blood Stem Cell Transplantation in Breast Cancer, 2 HEMfATOLO-
GY/ONCOLOGYANNALS: J. CONTINUING EDUC. HEIAATOLOGY & ONCOLOGY 61, 63 (1994) (noting
that 10-20% of HDC-ABMT patients have two-year relapse-free survival, suggesting that HDC-
ABMT is superior to conventional dose chemotherapy, for which two-year relapse-free survival
is rare); Bone-Marrow Transplants Increase Survival for Breast Cancer Patients, CANCER WELY., May
25, 1992, at 10 ("'It is clear from these studies that high-dose chemotherapy supported by bone-
marrow transplantation is superior to current conventional treatments for high-risk breast cancer
patients.'" (quoting Dr. Rein Saral, Emory University School of Medicine)); Chase, supra note
52, at Al (reporting National Cancer Institute official's remark that rate of early and complete
remissions following HDC-ABMT treatment surpasses that for conventional care).
102. The "morbidity rate" refers to the proportion of patients with a particular disease during
a given year per given unit of population. STEADMAN'S MEDICAL DIGTIONARY 1067 (22d ed.
1972).
103. The "mortality rate" is the ratio of the total number of deaths to the total population
of a given community. Id.
104. LoisJ. Ayash, High Dose Chemotherapy with Autologous Stem Cell Support for the Treatment of
Metastatic Breast Cancer, 74 CANCER 532 (Supp. 11994) (reporting findings of prolonged disease-
free survival with HDC-ABMT for breast cancer). But cf Trial Brief for Defendant at 8 n.9, Fox
v. Health Net (Riverside Super. Ct. of Cal. 1993) (No. 219692) (responding that even though
improvements in HDC-ABM1T procedure have lowered mortality rate from 10-15% to 5%, it is
still substantially higher than that for standard chemotherapy, which is zero).
105. Hematological support, which includes blood stem cells and colony stimulating factors,
helps improve the overall effectiveness of the HDC-ABIT procedure. See HItSHAtrr &
PRESSMAN, supra note 74, at 188; see also Chase, supra note 75 and accompanying text.
106. Karmen Wong & Craig Henderson, Management of Metastatic Breast Cancer, 18 WORLD J,
SURGERY 98, 105-06 (1994) (finding that data on efficacy of HDC-ABMT is insufficient to
conclude that it is better than, or even as good as, conventional chemotherapy in improving
survival and quality of life of breast cancer patients).
Some consider Dr. David Eddy of Duke University to be an expert in the use of HDCABMT
in the treatment of breast cancer. See Clark v. K-Mart Corp., No. 91-3723, 1992 WL 106935, at
*6 (3d Cir. May 22, 1992) (stating that medical community has relied on Dr. Eddy's work in this
area), vacated on reh g 967 F.2d 841 (3d Cir. 1992). In 1990, the Blue Cross/Blue Shield
Association retained Dr. Eddy to study the available literature and studies on HDG-ABMT for
treating breast cancer. Dr. Eddy ultimately concluded:
High-dose chemotherapy with ABMT has a higher treatment mortality and morbidity
than conventional dose chemotherapy. The available evidence indicates that high-dose
chemotherapywith ABMT delivers higher complete response and overall response rates
than does conventional dose chemotherapy. However, there is no evidence that these
superior response rates imply longer survival, or a higher probability of a cure.
Not only are there no controlled trials that address this question, but a comparison
of clinical series does not indicate that median disease-free survival, median overall
survival, or actual survival is superior with high-dose chemotherapy and ABMT versus
conventional dose chemotherapy.
The best that can be said with the available evidence is that the effect on survival of
high-dose chemotherapy with ABMT, compared with conventional dose chemotherapy
is unknown. This is the essential of [sic] criterion for determining if a treatment Is
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apparently higher response rates for HDC-ABMT may be the result of
bias caused by the selection of patients who have previously been
medically tested to have particularly responsive cancers."°7 Finally,
they argue that it is still too early to know whether these superior
response rates imply longer survival or a higher probability of
cure.s For these reasons, some within the medical community still
view HDC-ABMT for breast cancer as experimental. °9
Yet all parties agree that further randomized control trials are
necessary to determine the true value of BD G-ABMT for breast cancer
as compared with conventional chemotherapy. °10 The major draw-
back of formal controlled trials, however, is that women do not vrant
to be randomized into the control group, which receives conventional
chemotherapy, a treatment that offers virtually no chance for a
cure.'
11
The lack of definitive scientific proof on the overall effectiveness of
HDC-ABMT, when measured against the physician's deeply rooted
"investigational"; the available evidence does not permit conclusions about the
effectiveness of the treatment compared with its alternative. Additional research from
well controlled clinical trials will be required to determine if high-dose chemotheralr
with ABMT is superior to, equal to or worse than conventional dose chemotherapy.
Il But cf Clanh 1992 WL 106935, at *9 n.2 (SciricaJ., dissenting) (stating that Dr. Eddy not
only relied on dated materials, but also was financed by Blue Cross); Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue
Shield of Md., 757 F. Supp. 661, 671 (D. Md. 1991) (noting that Dr. Eddy is a biostatistician. not
a practicing physician).
107. SeeWong & Henderson, supra note 106, at 105.
108. See Insurance Companies and Experimental Cancer Trcatmen NPR. Feb. 16. 1994. availabde
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NPR File (broadcasting Dr. David Eddy's statement that "falt present
there are no completed randomized control trials thatshow that [HDC-ABMT for breast cancer]
is superior to conventional-dose chemotherapy"); se also David M. Eddy. -igh-Dase C herzctihrafq
wsh Autologous Bone Marrow Transplantation for the Treatment of Aletastatic Breast Cancer. 10 J.
Cun cAL ONCOLOGy 657, 666 (1992) (concluding that e'isting evidence does not demonstrate
that ABMT is superior to conventional-dose chemotherapy for treatment of metastatic breast
cancer).
109. See ROBERT BEsOIW zr As., MmCR MANUAL OF DiAGNOSIS AND MTERAFY 363(16th ed.
1992) (claiming thatABMT should be considered experimental in treatment of breast cancer).
110. See David M. Eddy & Bruce E. Hillner, HiFgh Dose Chemotherapy with Autlogous Bone
Marrow Transplantation for Metastatic Breast Cancer, 268 JAMA 2055, 2055-56 (1992) (letter to
editor) (attempting "to reconcile apparently different conclusions" concerning HDC-ABMT for
breast cancer); sea also Stadtmauer, supra note 101, at 63 (noting necessity for randomized trials
because HDC-ABMT involves substantial short-term costs and morbidity, while long-term costs
and toxidties are unknown); ancerFacts, Autologous Bone Marrow Transplantation in the Treatment
ofBreast Cancer (National Cancer Inst., Bethesda, Md.), Mar. 1991, at 1 (emphasizing importance
of formal, clinical trials to determine effectiveness and toxicity of HDGABMT in breast cancer
patients).
111. SeeKoegel, supra note 19, at 4 (mentioning that national trials are progressing slovly
because women do not want to risk being randomized into standard treatment); Ted Wieseman,
Suing Insure: Litiation Over Autologous Bone Marrow Transplants and Breast Cancer 1991
ONcOLOGY ISSUES 7,11-12 (identifying ethical issue for NCI trials that place patients in low-dose
chemotherapy group when there is no chance for cure); Kolata, supra note 88, at C8
(mentioning that clinical researchers are concerned that, because breast cancer patients do not
want to be randomized, there are no proper studies for determining if treatment is better than
standard treatment).
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obligation to provide the best treatment for his or her patient,11 2
presents difficult challenges for oncologists treating women with
breast cancer. A 1991 study reported in the Jour al of Clinical Oncolog
found that the majority of oncologists polled would recommend HDC-
ABMT for their breast cancer patients."1 Is widespread use of
HDC-ABMT for breast cancer by specialists in the field evidence that
it is no longer experimental? s4 Some profess that such evidence
does not automatically render it non-experimental. Instead, they
argue that institutions and specialists may utilize HDC-ABMT for
ulterior motives, namely to gain directly through profits, research, and
prestige.
15
B Defining Experimental: The Insurance Industry's Perspective
Health insurers will pay for medical treatments that are scientifically
proven to be safe, effective, and necessary,"6 but will refuse to pay
for procedures that have no definite scientific value." 7 Through
112. See Chase, supra note 52, atA1. The notion that physicians cannot ethically allow their
patients to receive an inferior treatment is deeply rooted in the tradition of medicine, &eReger
v. Espy, 836 F. Supp. 869, 872 (NJ). Ga. 1993) (stating that physicians may ethically perform
clinical trials only if it is unclear whether experimental or standard treatment is superior); Brief
of Amid Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant Mary Dahl-Eimers at 23, Dahl-Eimers v, Mutual
of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1993) (No. 92-1158) (advocating HDC-ABMT
as best available treatment for breast cancer and stating that "ethically, doctors do not have the
luxury of waiting until a treatment is beyond further study before adopting its use").
In the Oath of Hippocrates, the physician swears to "follow that system of regimen which,
according to my ability and judgment, I consider for the benefit of my patients." BARES I.
FuRiOW Er AL, BIOETHcs: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS § 1, at 29-30 (1991). The 1980
Principles of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association state that a physician should
be "dedicated to providing competent medical service" and The Declaration of Geneva of the
World Medical Association states that a physician's first consideration must be the health of the
patient. I& at 31-33.
113. Daniel Belanger et al., How American Oncologists Treat Breast Cancer An Assessnnt of tha
Influence of Clinical Trials, 9 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 7, 15 (1991). The increasing number of
oncologists who support HDC-ABMT for breast cancer could mean that an oncologist's failure
to recommend or present this procedure to a patient is unethical and represents a departure
from medical custom, and therefore is medically negligent.
114. Decisions as to whether HDC-ABMT should be used for treating breast cancer may
depend on the patient's wishes, the physician's experience, the physician's age (younger
physicians tend to use more aggressive treatments), and the results of published clinical trials.
Id, at 13, 14.
115. See, eg., Cova, supra note 2, at 745 (accusing medical institutions of offering treatments,
such as HDC-ABMT for breast cancer, before they have completed clinical trials, in order to
compete for patients). Seegeneraly Bazell, supra note 25, at 9-12 (criticizing doctors for charging
exorbitant fees for this procedure).
116. See Cova, supra note 2, at 744 (arguing that insurer's role is not to fund research).
117. See Reger v. Espy, 836 F. Supp. 869, 871 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (mentioning that insurer
excluded HDC-ABMT for breast cancer because of its conclusion that HDC-ABMT is not
superior to standard chemotherapy, not for economic reasons). See generally MIRAM MiLLs &
ROBERT BANK, HEALTH INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY xiii (1992) (arguing that making
assumption that everyone has right to unlimited medical care is societally disastrous because of
limited resources);James Cline & Keith Rosten, The Effect of Policy Language on the Containment
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that practice, insurers protect patients from unsafe, ineffective, and
wasteful treatments,"1 and curb premium costs for all plan partici-
pants." 9 In an age of escalating health costs," legitimate efforts
to ration make good policy.
121
Insurers avoid paying for medically unproven treatments through
exclusionary language written into their policies.12 The exclusions
in any particular policy can vary."z Among the most frequently
of Health Care Cost, 21 TORT & INS. U. 120, 131 (1985) (noting that medical profession
acknowledges health insurers' role in eliminating worthless treatments by refusing to pay for
them); Grace Monaco & Rebecca Burke, Insurer as Ga.ceeper-Part T49: Poliy Obstades in
Unproven Methods Litigation, 20 FORUM 400, 404 (1985) (insisting that health insurers have
responsibility to separate legitimate claims from illegitimate claims).
118. Se Zuckerberg v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., 108 A.D.2d 56, 62 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1985) (stating that denial of coverage by insurer for cancer treatments wvith no proven
value will "have the desirable effect of affording greater protection to the general public and,
in particular, cancer patients who are especially vulnerable to unfounded claims of miraculous
cures"), af'd, 499 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1986); Barbara A. Fisfis, MW Should Rghtfuly Dedde $$utthera
Medicl TreatmewNesaily Incwred Should BeExcludedfrom Coverag Undera Halth Inwance Pofiy
Pro Wion WdchExdudesfroam Coverage "cxeximenta Afedical Treatments?, 31 DUQ. U REV. 777, 779
(1993) (discussing reasons why insurers exclude experimental medical treatments); cf. Bazell,
sup ra note 25, at 10 (describing Halstad radical mastectomy, a pre-1970s procedure for treating
breast cancer that proved to be unnecessarily harmful to patient). The Halstad radical
mastectomy is often cited by those who advocate coverage denial for treatments ith no
scientific proof. Se, eg., i&. This procedure, which removes not only the breast tissue but all
of the chest muscle and lymph nodes, was performed fora period in the earlier part of the 20th
century, ending in the mid-1960s. Id. Later, it was discovered that removing only the breast
tissue and diseased lymph nodes was just as effective. Id.; s.e alsoJohn Ferguson et al., Cour-
Ordered Rdemurseent for Unproven Medical Tahnoogy, 269 JAMA 2116, 2121 (1993) (criticizing
courts for ordering insurers to pay for medical technologies that had not been adequately
assessed or had been found to be unsafe or ineffective, such as laetrile treatments). But c.
Friedman & McCabe, supra note 20, at 761 (claiming that insurers refuse coverage of treatments
not to protect public health but for fiscal reasons).
119. SeeScalamandre v. Oxford Health Plans (N.Y.), Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1050, 1062 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (referring to insurer's memorandum that argues that health care plans "were developed
expressly to control health care costs by preventing unnecessary and expensive procedures" like
HDC-AB'r); Cova, supra note 2, at 744 (declaring that coverage of expensive unproven
technologies increases health insurance premiums, imposing adverse consequences for lower
income individuals).
120. See Ellen H. Moskowitz, Access to LfeProlonging Care TIAL, Aug. 1994, at 16, 18
(discussing rising costs of health care nationwide).
121. See generally Fisfis, supra note 118, at 778-79 (suggesting policy reasons for insurers
excluding experimental medical treatments from coverage). But o. Malcolm Gladwell, How Safe
Are Your Breasts?, Noy REPUBI.C, Oct. 24, 1994, at 22, 22-28 (suggesting that National Cancer
Institute's decision not to formally recommend mammograms for younger women may be cost-
conscious medicine, but is not necessarily good policy).
122. Se- PaulJ. Molino, Rdmb zent Diute Invodving Epeirntal MediwlTrT ent, 24J.
HEALTH & HosP. L 329,329 (1991) (discussing reasons for exclusionary language in insurance
policies). Some insurers have mistakenly paid for experimental treatments. Se Grace Powers
Monaco, MovitngAhead in Cancer Rs arcv Wio Paysfor Pa&nl Supporthie Carefoartipation in
Efperimental/Investfgatonal Tials, 9 CANCER INvESnGATION 85, 88.89 (1991) (noting that
erroneous payments made for experimental treatments based on misconception that they are
standard will not compel insurers to continue to pay).
123. In addition to Experimental Exclusions, policies sometimes contain "not medically
necessary" exclusions. Medical necessity exclusions address whether the treatment is appropriate
for a given diagnosis. MaLy Ader, Managing Emerging Technologies 6 (1993) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the NationalHealth Laa jersAssodation (1993)). Experimental Exdusions,
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employed options are provisions excluding a particular medical
treatment from coverage (Specific Exclusions) 24  and broader
provisions that exclude coverage for all medical treatments that are
experimental (Experimental Exclusions).12
Specific Exclusions tend to be easily defensible in court because
they are clearly stated for the policyholder to evaluate upon pur-
chase.126  There are, however, several disadvantages to Specific
by contrast, address safety and efficacy. Id. at 6-7. See also Christine Woolsey, Medical Care
Advances Pose Tough Decisions for Se-Insurem Bus. INs.,June 22, 1992, at 3, 14 (discussing why
insurance companies should separate "not medically necessary" exclusion from "experimental"
exclusion).
124. See Blue Cross of the Rochester Area & Blue Shield of the Rochester Area, Basic
Hospital, Basic Medical and Preferred Blue Million Insurance Contract, at 23 (on file with The
American University Law Review) [hereinafter Blue Cross of the Rochester Area Contract]
(containing specific exclusions for acupuncture, sex hormones related to sex transformation
surgery, hypnosis, and marital counseling services). There is a great variety of Specific
Exclusions. E.g., Blair v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 1219, 1220 (10th Cir. 1992)
(dental services); Dvorak v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 965 F.2d 606, 606 (9th Cir. 1992)
(custodial care); Thomas v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 568 N.E.2d 937,940 (ill. 1991) (cosmetic
surgery, unless performed to repair disfigurement caused by accidental injury or birth defect);
Dobias v. Service Life Ins. Co. of Omaha, 469 N.W.2d 143, 145 (Neb. 1991) (rehabilitation
services).
Many health insurance plans contain Specific Exclusions for HDG-ABMT In the treatment of
breast cancer. See eg., Hawkins v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, No. 1:94CV6, 1994 WL 214262,
at *3 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 28, 1994) (noting specific exclusion set forth in health insurance policy,
which stated that: "s]ervices or supplies for or related to surgical transplant procedures for
artificial or human organ/tissue transplants not specifically listed as covered, such as autologous
bone marrow transplants for breast cancer" were not covered);Jaecks v. National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers Health Benefit Plan, No. 93-C-6855, 1993 WL 498286, at *3 (N.D. l. Dec. 1, 1993)
(quoting insurance policy as specifically excluding "[a]utologous bone marrow transplants for
the treatment of solid tumors, such as breast cancer").
Conversely, some health insurance policies contain specific inclusions of covered medical
treatments. When a particular medical treatment is not expressly included in such a list,
however, courts may infer that itwas purposely excluded. As such, the failure to Include an item
in a list indirectly has the effect of a Specific Exclusion. For example, in both Caudill v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of N.C., 999 F.2d 74, 80 (4th Cir. 1993), and Arrington v. Group
Hospitalization & Medical Servs., 806 F. Supp. 287, 289 (D.D.C. 1992), the health insurance
policies specifically stated that ABMTs were covered for acute lymphocytic or non-lymphocytic
leukemia, advanced Hodgkin's lymphoma, advanced non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, advanced
neuroblastoma, and testicular, mediastinal retroperitoneal, and ovarian germ cell tumors.
Because breast cancer was not expressly included in this list, the courts concluded that HDG'
ABMT for breast cancer was not covered and held for the insurer. Caudill, 999 F.2d at 80
(stating "language makes it clear that unlisted transplants and related high dose chemotherapy
are specifically excluded from the policy"); Arrington, 806 F. Supp. at 290.
125. See infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text; see also infra Part II.
126. SeeCaudill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.C., No. 92-94-CIV-7-F, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21448, at *13 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 24, 1992) (upholding insurers' decision to deny coverage based
on exclusion in policy), aff'da 999 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1993). But see Ponder v. Blue Cross of S.
Cal., 193 Cal. Rptr. 632,643 (Ct. App. 1983) (rejecting insurer's coverage denial because specific
exclusion of disease, temporomandibularjoint syndrome, was not worded in layperson's terms).
See generally Frank P.James, The Experimental Treatment Exclusion Clause, 12J. LEGAL MED. 359, 365
(1991) (arguing that insurers' policy of clearly listing specific exclusions in policies is completely
defensible under contract law).
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Exclusions." First, insurers will face administrative difficulties and
costs because they must periodically reevaluate and update their list
of Specific Exclusions."2 Second, state insurance commissions"
tend to disfavor Specific Exclusions as a matter of policy.'-' Third,
growing lists of Specific Exclusions may induce legislative intervention
to mandate coverage in certain areas,' a prospect that insurers
view as undesirable. 2 Finally, insurers risk having to cover all new,
unproven treatments claimed by policyholders.tm A policy that lists
Specific Exclusions may give rise to the inference that any treatment
not expressly excluded should be covered; in the absence of any
Specific Exclusion, a court may presume that the insurer made an
affirmative choice not to exclude the treatment at issue.'34
More prevalent than Specific Exclusions are Experimental Exclu-
sions.ls A broad Experimental Exclusion clause simply states that
any experimental treatment will be excluded from coverage. While
some Experimental Exclusions do not define "experimental," those
that do are generally more defensible in court
Insurers have developed various criteria for defining the experimen-
tal status of medical treatments and procedures.'i 6 These criteria
127. SeeAolino, supra note 122, at 329-34 (describing limitations and difficuldes for insurers
that arise from specific exclusions).
128. See Lee N. Newcomer, Defining Fxperimental Tera p--A Third-Party Pajer's Dlenna, 323
NEv ENG. J. MEn. 1702, 1702-03 (1990) (noting that with continually expanding medical
technology, specific exclusions expose insurers to risk for new treatments and procedures
created between renewal periods, thus requiring continuous updates); Ader, supra note 123, at
22.
129. State insurance commissions regulate insurers doing business within the state. 43 A,.L
Jun. 2D Insurance § 22 (1982). These insurance commissions have the power to approve or
disapprove any policy or practice by the insurer in that particular state. I. § 24.
130. Ader, supra note 123, at 22.
131. Ader, supra note 123, at 22.
132. See infra notes 530-31 and accompanying text.
133. See Molino, supra note 122, at 331-34 (discussing risk that courts will conclude that
treatment in question is covered under policy because language on exclusion is not specific
enough).
134. See Cline & Rosten, supra note 117, at 135-36 (stating that "lists ofproscribed treatments
would be helpful, although it must be recognized that coverage will undoubtedly be extended
to any treatment not on the list); Newcomer, supra note 128, at 1702 (recognizing risk, but
arguing that this risk may be negligible if renewal period is short enough).
135. SeegeneralyJennifer Belk, UndefinrdExperimentai TmttrntExdtwsions in Health Insuran=e
Contracts: A ProposalforJudida Response, 66 WASH. L REV. 809, 809 (1991) (stating that most
health insurance contracts exclude experimental treatments).
136. The Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, based in Chicago, developed the
Technology Evaluation Criteria (TEC) program in order to assess emerging medical
technologies.
According to the TEC, procedures are considered experimental unless they meet the
following five criteria:
1. The tahnology must havefinal approvalfrom Uh appropr gom-raen reghl'tog tdtei
This criteria applies to drugs, biological products, devices and diagnostics. A drug or
biological product must have final approval from the Food and Drug Administration.
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may relate to one or more of the following categories: scientific
criteria, research criteria, and professional criteria. Insurers often
consider any medical procedure that fails to meet any one of the
criteria set forth in its policy as experimental."8 7
In a scientific category, insurers may require that the proposed
treatment reach a certain percent-success ratio," successfully
complete various levels of clinical trials,89 be well-received in peer-
reviewed literature,"4 or be superior to all existing procedures.14'
A device must have final approval from the FDA for those specific indications and
methods of use that the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association is evaluating, Any
approval that is granted as an interim step in the FDA regulatory process is not
sufficient.
2. The scientific evidence must permit conclusions concerning the effect of the technology on hcalth
outcomes. The evidence should consist of well-designed and well-conducted investiga-
dons published in peer-reviewedjournals. The quality of the body of studies and the
consistency of the results are considered in evaluating the evidence. The evidence
should demonstrate that the technology can measure or alter the physiological changes
related to a disease, injury, illness or condition. In addition, there should be evidence
or a convincing argument based on established medical facts that such measurement
or alteration affects the health outcomes. Opinions and evaluations by national
medical associations, consensus panels or other technology evaluation bodies are
evaluated according to the scientific quality of the supporting evidence and rationale.
3. The technology must improve the net health outcome. The technology's beneficial effects
on health outcomes should outweigh any harmful effects on health outcomes.
4. The technology must be as beneficial as any established alternatives. The technology
should improve the net health outcome as much as, or more than, established
alternatives.
5. The improvement must be attainable outside the investigational settings. When used under
the usual conditions of medical practice, the technology should be reasonably expected
to satisfy criteria #3 and #4.
Technology Evaluation Criteria, Blue Cross & Blue Shield Association (on file with TheAmesican
University Law Review); see also Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Md., 757 F. Supp. 661, 673
(D. Md. 1991) (holding that HDC-ABMT for breast cancer satisfied five scientific criteria
developed by Blue Cross' Technology Evaluation Committee). See generally Lenckus, supra note
47, at 45 (noting that TEC is not influenced by cost-related issues). This program only provides
recommendations for insurers, however, which are free to follow the criteria or to develop their
own policies. Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Va., 741 F. Supp. 586,590 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1990).
137. See infra Part H1.
138. See, eg., Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 846 F.2d 416,423 (7th Cir.)
(noting that insurer determined success rate for in vitro fertilization to be less than 50%, and
thus considered procedure experimental), cert denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988).
139. See, e.g., Harris v. Mutual of Omaha Cos., 992 F.2d 706,708 (7th Cir. 1993) (mentioning
that insurer excluded from coverage all medical treatments that are in "on-going phase I, II, or
III clinical trials").
140. See, eg., Dozsa v. Crum & Forster Ins., 716 F. Supp. 131, 135 (D.NJ. 1989) (mentioning
that insurance company covers those treatments for which there is clear consensus in peer-
reviewed medical literature); Rollo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of N.J., No. 90-597, 1990 WL
312647, at *3 (D.NJ. 1990) (noting that insurance company considered peer-reviewed literature
in its review process for coverage of medical treatments). Peer-reviewed literature is an
"objective forum in which specialists and researchers may relate their data and findings, after
being assessed and evaluated for authenticity and accuracy by their peers, to further the progress
of science." James, supra note 126, at 408.
141. See eg., Davis v. Selectcare, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 197, 199 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (noting
insurance company's claim that disputed treatment for prostate cancer was not superior to
conventional treatments).
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The research category focuses on the administration of the treatment,
whereby insurers, when making coverage determinations, may
consider consent forms,142 research protocols, 143 or clinical trials
as indicia of a treatments experimental nature. t ' In the profes-
sional category, insurers place great emphasis on the consensus of
medical professionals."4 Insurers may insist that the treatment be
the standard, accepted practice among medical professionals either
nationally or within a designated geographic area. 46  Some insurers
further require that the treatment be officially endorsed by a
nationally recognized medical organization or a governmental
body. 4
7
142. See Hanis, 992 F.2d at 709 (indicating that insurer, when denying coverage, considered
informed consent statement signed by policyholder); Davis, 834 F. Supp. at 200 (rejecting
insurer's claim that policyholder's signing of informed consent form established that HDC-
ABM1 is investigational).
143. See Harri 992 F.2d at 708, 710 (indicating that insurer considered written treatment
protocol in denying coverage); McLeroy v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Or., 825 F. Supp. 1064,
1072 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (noting policy language as excluding all services performed under written
research protocol); Sweeney v. Gerber Prods. Co. Medical Benefits Plan, 728 F. Supp. 594, 596
(D. Neb. 1989) (finding use of research protocols for HDC-ABMT for breast cancer to be
evidence that treatment was experimental); f. Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Md., 757 F.
Supp. 661, 675 (D. Md. 1991) (explaining that many accepted medical treatments are
administered as part of protocol, and thus existence of protocol does not necessarily mean
treatment is experimental).
144. SeeGripkeyv. Mail Handlers BenefitPlan, No. 3.94-378-0,1994 WL276265,at
5 2 (D.S.C.
1994) (noting that insurer cited ongoing clinical trials as evidence that HDGPSCR is
experimental); Leonhardt v. Holden Bus. Forms Co., 828 F. Supp. 657, 658 (D. M nn. 1993)
(noting that insurer mentioned clinical trials as reason for denying coverage for HDC-ABMT for
multiple myeloma).
145. But cf. Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 846 F.2d 416,427 (7th Cir.)
(Posner,J., dissenting) (commenting that it is natural for patient's physicians, who are specialists
in treatment area, to want to encourage use of exciting and promising treatment), rt. denid,
488 US. 856 (1988); Ader, supra note 123, at 8 (noting that professional consensus standard
risks becoming consensus of relevant professionals, and hence consensus of treatment's
proponents).
146. Se4 eg., Adams, 757 F. Supp. at 664 (explaining that provision in health policy
specifically excluded services that are not "accepted medical practice by the suitable medical
specialty practicing in Maryland").
147. Se4 e.g., Lowery v. Health Chicago, No. 92-r-7657,1994 WL 194265, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May
13, 1994) (quoting provision in insurance policy providing that e.xperimental procedures are
determined "in conjunction with appropriate medical technology assessment bodies, or the
National Institute of Health"); White v. Caterpillar, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1418, 1420 (W.D. Mo.)
(noting that reports from American College of Physicians and American Medical Association
should be used as guides to determine which procedures are medically accepted), afjF4 985 F.2d
564 (8th Cir. 1991); Waldrip v. Connecticut Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 556 So. 2d 434, 435 (La. Ct.
App.) (noting that insurance company policy defined "experimental" to mean treatment not
approved by American Medical Association, U.S. Surgeon General, U.S. Department of Public
Health, or National Institutes of Health), cert. den& 571 So. 2d 650 (La. 1990).
There are several problems with this approach: the entity relied upon may not offler an
official position on a given medical treatment; its official position may be outdated; or its
position may be in conflict with that presented by other similarly situated entities. &SzKaren L
lluzzi Gallinari, How Coufts View ExPerimental TrtWment J. HEA TH CARE BENEFITS, Ma)-June
1994, at 37, 42 (noting that reputable doctors across country often use excellent methods that
are not formally approved by National Cancer Institute (NCI), but are consistent with NCI
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In recent years, some health insurance companies have designated
independent committees, comprised of experts, to assess which
treatments are experimental under the policy's criteria. 148  Relying
on one or more of the three categories of criteria, health insurers or
these independent committees either approve or deny coverage for
a policyholder's medical treatment.149
Denying coverage for unproven scientific treatments is easily
justified in cases involving what are popularly known as "quack
therapies."15° But most newer medical treatments fall within the
nebulous area between quack therapies and accepted, mainstream
treatments.
Insurers have refused to cover HDC-ABMT for various cancers,
including ovarian cancer,"' testicular cancer,1"2 multiple myelo-
ma, 53  cervical cancer,"M melanoma, 15 5  lung cancer,' brain
protocols).
148. See Cherly Weinstock, Lawyers Debate the Insurability of Bone-Marrow Transplants, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1994, at 18 (mentioning that insurers such as Aetna, Prudential, and Travelers
subscribe to Medical Care Ombudsman Program, which provides fast, authoritative reviews or
treatment decisions); see also William T. McGivney, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1994, at A20 (letter to
editor) (stating that Aetna Health Plans cover proposed treatment if one of three independent
oncologists believes it is likely to be effective for specific patient).
149. See infra Part II.
150. See, e.g., Zuckerberg v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., 108 A.D.2d 56, 61.62
(N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (upholding insurer's denial of coverage because there was no scientific
proof that dietary treatment, known as "Gerson therapy," could cure cancer), afid, 67 N.Y.2d
688 (1986). Zuckrberg was a classic "quack therapy" case. The cancer patient, following his
doctor's advice, consumed fruits and vegetables at a Mexican medical clinic in an attempt to rid
himself of the disease. Id.; see also Barrie R. Cassileth et al., Contemporary Unorthodox Treatments
in Cancer Medicine, 101 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 105, 105-12 (1984) (discussing widespread use
of unorthodox therapies by patients who are terminally ill).
151. See, eg., Mire v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Fla., 43 F.3d 567, 568 (11th Cir, 1994)
(finding that plain meaning of insurance exclusion eliminated coverage for ovarian cancer),
Fenio v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 868 F. Supp. 318, 319 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (discussing insurers'
denials of HDC-ABMT treatment for ovarian cancer); Berry v. Blue Cross of Wash. & Alaska, 815
F. Supp. 359, 360 (W.D. Wash. 1993) (reviewing health plan provider's denial of coverage for
bone marrow transplant).
152. See; e.g., Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129, 131 (9th Cir. 1993) (dismissing
negligence claim brought against insurer who had denied coverage for HDC-ABMT to patient
who subsequently died of testicular cancer), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1612 (1994); Cole v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Mass., 738 F. Supp. 42, 44 (D. Mass. 1990) (granting preliminary
injunction to policyholder seeking coverage for HDC-ABMT to treat refractory testicular cancer).
153. See, e.g., Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Okla., 24 F.3d 118, 120 (10th Cir. 1994)
(discussing insurer's refusal to cover ABMT for treatment of multiple myeloma); Doe v. Group
Hospitalization & Medical Servs. Inc., 3 F.3d 80, 82 (4th Cir. 1993) (discussing decision by
insurer to deny coverage for ABMT for multiple myeloma); Leonhardt v. Holden Bus. Forms
Co., 828 F. Supp. 657, 673 (D. Minn. 1993) (ordering insurer to pay for HDC-ABMT In
treatment of multiple myeloma); Lehman v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 806 F. Supp. 859 (D,
Ariz. 1992) (considering HDC-ABMT for multiple myeloma experimental); Schnitker v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Neb., 787 F. Supp. 903, 906 (D. Neb. 1991) (holding that denial of
coverage for HDC-ASCR for multiple myeloma was not arbitrary and capricious); Dozsa v. Crum
& Forster Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 131, 140 (D.N.J. 1989) (enjoining insurance company from
rejecting coverage for bone marrow transplant for patient with multiple myeloma). Multiple
myeloma is a blood cancer present in the bone marrow. Pitman, 24 F.3d at 119 n,1.
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cancer,57 soft tissue cancer,15s prostate cancer,,59 and colon can-
cer,' as well as for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
(AIDS).'6 ' When applying the above-mentioned criteria, insurers
have argued that HDC-ABMTs for these particular diseases were
experimental." Insurers deny coverage for HDC-ABMT for breast
cancer, however, more often than for other cancer therapies."t
Some insurers argue that HDC-ABMT is still subject to clinical trials
and protocols, and therefore is not yet regularly practiced by the
mainstream medical community." Other insurers cover HDC-
ABMT only if it is performed in a medical center affiliated with the
National Cancer Institute (NC!)." Still other insurers, however, do
154. See, eg., Evans v. HMO Colo., No. 91-CV-3797 (Colo. Dist. Ct. City & County of Denver,
June 14,1991) (upholding HMO's exclusion of benefits for cervical cancer), did inAder, supn2
note 123, at 1-13.
155. See, eg., Farley v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 653, 654 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding
that HDC-ABMT was not"medically necessary" for policyholder's malignant melanoma); Coryea
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of S.C., No. 91-377 (D.S.C., Mfar. 30, 1992) (upholding insurer's
denial of benefits for HDC-ABMT treatment of melanoma on ground it was experimental), died
inAder, supra note 123, at 1-13.
156. See, eg., Hendricks v. Central Reserve Life Ins., 39 F.3d 507,510 (4th Cir. 1994); Snell
v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. CWV. A. 93-0001, 1993 WL 274240, at *1 (EI. Pa.June 30, 1993).
157. See, e.g., McLeroy v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Or., 825 F. Supp. 1064, 1074 (NJ). Ga.
1993) (denying preliminary injunction against insurerwho refused to pay for ABMTfor 18year-
old boy with brain tumor); Hansen v. Ring County Med. Blue Shield, No. 92-450C (W.D. Wash.,
Mar. 26, 1993) (involving denial of coverage for HDC-ABMT on experimental grounds for
policyholder with brain cancer), cied in Ader, supra note 123, at IV-1.
158. See, ag., Helman v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 166 Health & Welfare Trust, 803 F.
Supp. 1407, 1408-09 (NJ). Ind. 1992) (noting that plaintiff's insurer denied coverage for HDC-
ABMT for treating rhabdomyosarcoma, cancer of soft tissue rarely found in adults).
159. &e, ag., Davis v. Selectcare, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 197, 198 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (noting that
plaintiff's HMIO denied coverage, claiming HDC-ABMTfor prostate cancer was "investigational").
160. Se, ag.,Thrasher-Meyers v. Ring County Medical Blue Shield, No. 92-451 (W.D. Vash.,
Mfar. 17, 1993) (involving insurer's denial of benefits for HDCABMT for colon cancer on
grounds that treatment was experimental), dited inAder, supra note 123, at IV-6.
161. See, ag., Bradley v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 562 N.Y.S.2d 908, 910-11 (Sup. Ct.
1990) (holding that chemotherapy and bone marrow transplant were not experimental for
treatment of AIDS).
162. See supra notes 151-60.
163. See eg., Nesseim v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 995 F.2d 804, 805 (8th Cir. 1993)
(discussing health plan denial of treatment for plaintiffs breast cancer); Harris v. Mutual of
Omaha Co., 992 F.2d 706,711 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing letter from Mutual of Omaha stating
that HDC-ABMT's "efficaciousness in the treatment of breast cancer has not been established,
and thatitis still in the experimental/investigative stage"); Dahl-.Eimers v. Mutual of Omaha Life
Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 1379, 1382-83 (11th Cir. 1993) (reviewing insurer's coverage denial for breast
cancer treatment).
164. See Holder v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 951 F.2d 89, 89 (5th Cr. 1992) (affirming
lower court's decision to deny coverage because treatment as "'experimental in nature' and
had not yet been 'recognized throughout the medical profession'").
165. See Scalamandre v. Oxford Health Plans (N.Y.), Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1050, 1061 (E.D.NY.
1993) (discussing whether cancer center ias NCI.approved institution). In return for certain
benefits, an NCI-approved institution must provide statistical data to NCL id. at 1061 n.11.
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not view HDC-ABMT for breast cancer as experimental, and therefore
provide coverage unconditionally."
Although insurers honor requests for coverage of HDC-ABMT for
breast cancer in a large number of cases, 67 nearly one-quarter of
such requests are denied, primarily because of the experimental
nature of the treatment." In fewer instances, denials have been
based on Specific Exclusions.'69 Despite some favorable instances
of insurance coverage, commentators charge that insurers' coverage
decisions are inconsistent and are made in a medically careless
manner.' ° Given the high incidence of breast cancer and the
exorbitant costs of HDC-ABMT, many critics believe that denials based
on "experimental" grounds are really a pretext for insurers to evade
coverage.1
II. THE COURTS' APPROACHES: Is HDC-ABMT FOR
BREAST CANCER EXPERIMENTAL?
The formulation of health care policy is outside the province of the
judiciary.Y Yet, courts are being asked to determine the experi-
mental status of medical treatments. Ideally, sympathies-either for
the insurance company attempting to make rational decisions in a
climate of escalating medical costs, or for the policyholder who is
fighting against her tragic disease-should play little, if any, role in
166. See Bucci v. Blue-Cross Blue Shield of Conn., 764 F. Supp. 728, 731 (D. Conn. 1991)
(noting that 38 health insurers have committed to University of Nebraska and 32 insurers have
committed to Duke University to provide coverage for HDC-ABMT to breast cancer patients);
Insurance Update, BMT NEWVSLELE 4 (Nov. 1992) (quoting, in pertinent part, text of letter from
Independent Blue Cross (IBC) of Pennsylvania to policyholder, which read "'[IBC] has reviewed
the most recently published literature in peer-reviewed medical journals and has determined
that high dose chemotherapy with autologous bone marrow rescue for women with stage IV
metastatic breast cancer has therapeutic efficacy. Therefore, IBC no longer considers this
treatment experimental and will cover the treatment rendered to your wife.'").
167. See Peters & Rogers, supra note 52, at 476 (reporting on study that found 77% of all
requests to insurance companies for coverage of HDC-ABMT for breast cancer were approved);
see also Kolata, supra note 26, atAl (noting insurers' willingness to settle claims in order to avoid
costs of litigation and large damage awards).
168. Peters & Rogers, supra note 52, at 474 (describing results of study concerning effect of
insurance approval on receipt of treatment).
169. Peters & Rogers, supra note 52, at 474; see supra note 124 and accompanying text,
170. Peters & Rogers, supra note 52, at 476; see also Kolata, supra note 26, at Al (discus ing
reasons behind insurers' denial of coverage). One critic of insurance companies remarked that
insurers use four criteria when deciding whether to deny payments: "'Does this person have a
lawyer? Is this person articulate? Have we already tried to say no at least once? Is this a person
who can muster sufficient resources to give us a hard time, by getting media attention or starting
a letter-writing campaign?'" Kolata, supra note 26, at All (quoting Dr. Arthur Caplan).
171. See, ag., Moskowitz, supra note 120, at 19 (discussing reasons why health insurers refuse
to cover HDC-ABMT).
172. See Goepel v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, No. CIV.A.93-3711 (JEI), 1993 WL 384498,
at *9 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 1993) (stating that judiciary should defer "pain of health care rationing"
to legislature).
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judicial review."7h Rather, courts should adhere strictly to interpret-
ing the language set forth in a particular health insurance policy."7 4
Specifically, courts should approach litigation arising between a
breast cancer patient and her health insurer as a contract dispute. T5
The health insurance policy is a contract between two parties-the
insurer who designed the contract and the policyholder who
purchased it.'76 As such, coverage disputes over terms set forth in
the policy are questions of contract interpretation.1
7
Experimental Exclusions that are written into the policy in
unambiguous terms should be easily enforceable. 178 Litigation
occurs, however, when terms are ambiguous-those that are capable
173. See Comprecare Ins. Co. v. Snow, No. 92-CV-8087, 1993 WL 330929, at *8 (Colo. Dist.
Ct. Feb. 16, 1993). In Comprrrr Judge Hoffman wrote:
Of course I have sympathy for [the breast cancer patient]. I also have sympathy for
an insurance industry trying to make rational underwriting decisions in an irrational
climate of skyrocketing medical costs and rapid technological advancement. But this
case is not about sympathies. It is not about the tragedy of cancer or the hard choices
that we all face in the public health care debate. It is simply about language in an
insurance contract ....
d.; see also Arrington v. Group Hospitalization & Medical Servs., 806 F. Supp. 287, 291 (D.D.C.
1992) (stating that court's sympathy for breast cancer patient cannot be material to decision on
merits of case); Cf. Perry C. Papantonis, E rimnaExdusions: Are Insurance orrGpaniesRaly
Pre ,eds', 9 N.Y.L ScH.J. HtiL RTs. 217, 242 (1991) (stating that court's sympathies in AIDS
case created danger for insurance companies, and arguing that court should have adhered to
strict contract interpretation (citing Bradley v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 562 N.Y.S.2d 903
(Sup. Ct. 1990))).
174. See Harris v. Mutual of Omaha, No. 92-1089-C, 1992 WL 421489, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Aug.
26,1992) (discussing difficulties forjudges in balancing human compassion with duty to follow
law). In Har4% U.S. DistrictJudge John D. Tinder wrote:
Despite rumors to the contrary, those who wearjudicial robes are human beings, and
as persons, are inspired and motivated by compassion as anyone would be.
Consequently, we often must remind ourselves that in our official capacities, we have
authority only to issue rulings within the narrow parameters of the law and the facts
before us. The temptation to go about, doing good where we see fit, and to make
things less difficult for those who come before us, regardless of the law, is strong. But
the law, without which judges are nothing, abjures such unlicensed formulation of
unauthorized social policy by thejudiciary. [The breast cancer patient] well deserves,
and in a perfect world would be entitled to, all known medical treatments to control
the horrid disease from which she suffers. (In upholding the denial of coverage], no
personal satisfaction is taken, but that the law was followed.
Id.
175. SeAM.JUR. 2Dn nsurance§ 1 (1982) ("[I]nsurance is a contract bywhich one party, for
a compensation called the premium, assumes particular risks of the other party....").
176. Se supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. A significant number of individuals do
not purchase their health insurance policy themselves, however, but obtain it through their
employer. As such, a policyholder has less opportunity to select an appropriate health isurance
plan.
177. Se eg., Kekis v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utica.Watertovm, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 571,
572 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that "this litigation presents a question of contract interpretation).
178. Se Bass, supra note 41, at 99 (explaining that if policy language is dear, courts will
adhere to its terms).
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of two or more reasonable interpretations.179 Courts determine the
reasonable meanings of such terms not according to the view of the
insurance company, attorney, or physician, but according to the
meaning understood by an average policyholder."' 0 Because each
health insurer's policy is unique, the outcome in any given case is
based on a court's interpretation of the policy's terms. 8 Even so,
emerging patterns "show how courts are approaching disputes
regarding health insurance coverage for HDC-ABMT for breast
cancer.
182
The initial, and perhaps most crucial, consideration is the nature
of the insurance policy itself. This determines whether the case could
be heard in state or federal court," as well as the appropriate
standard of review. Private insurance policies, 184 plans by health
maintenance organizations (HMOs)," and government plans' 8
179. See, eg., Frenderis v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 873 F. Supp. 1153, 1156 (N.D. Ill.
1995) (stating that policy language is ambiguous if it is subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation); Shanks v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Wis., 777 F. Supp. 1444,1447 (E.D. Wis,
1991) (stating that insurance contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably and fairly susceptible to
more than one construction).
180. See43 Ar.JUR. 2D Insurance§ 271 (1982) ("In determining whether ambiguity exists in
an insurance policy, the language must be considered from the standpoint of one not trained
in the law or insurance business."). But see Dahl-Eimers v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 986
F.2d 1379, 1382 (11th Cir. 1993) (declaring that "reasonable interpretation" of what is
experimental could be made by medical specialists, standards of medical community, or national
association).
181. See, eg., Kekis, 815 F. Supp. at 573 (warning future litigants seeking relief to rely on their
own insurance policies, rather than on court's decision); Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Va.,
741 F. Supp. 586, 594 (E.D. Va. 1990) (warning that court's decision was "not a green light
signalling a general expansion of coverage" but was confined specifically to plan and expert
medical testimony at bar).
182. See supra Part II (analyzing factors that courts use when resolving coverage disputes
between insurance companies and breast cancer patients).
183. See Koegel, supra note 19, at 4 (stating that although interpretation of insurance
contract is matter of state law, some contracts are federally regulated and therefore federal
courts have jurisdiction).
184. See generaUy STEVART, supra note 15, at 124-26 (describing prevalent types of health
insurance plans). To obtain a private insurance policy, a policyholder pays a company like Blue
Cross/Blue Shield or Prudential an annual premium in exchange for reimbursement of health
care expenses. Id. at 124. Typically, the policyholder will pay a "deductible" or "copayment" on
any claim. I& Under these types of policies, a policyholder may use any physician or hospital
of her choice. Xd Private insurance policies can be purchased by either an individual or by an
employer/association on behalf of its employees/members. Id. at 125. The policies are
regulated by the individual states' departments of insurance. Id.
185. HMOs keep expenses and premiums low by referring participants to only affiliated
physicians and hospitals, which are paid a flat fee. An HMO participant pays a fixed monfltly
fee in exchange for health care services. There is no deductible or copayment requirement.
Participants are not reimbursed, however, for services received outside the plan's specified
network of physicians and hospitals. HMOs rely more on cost-containment than do private
insurance schemes. Seegenerally STEWART, supra note 15, at 125. For this reason, some doctors
may fear that they will be dropped from the network if they recommend that a woman with
breast cancer have HDC-ABMT, because they will be viewed as high-cost providers. See Marc A.
Rodwin, Conflicts in Managed Care, 332 NEV ENG.J. MED. 604, 605 (1995) (discussing financial
incentives for physicians to reduce spending).
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are subject to state law. 187 Self-insured health plans" and employ-
ee welfare benefit plans"8 are subject to federal law under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 1
A. Standards of Review
1. Health insurance policies subject to state law
State insurance contract law distinguishes health insurance policies
from other types of contracts. The concept of freedom of contract,
which holds that equal parties have negotiated, bargained, and
voluntarily entered into a lawful agreement, is not presumed to be
present in health insurance contracting.' Rather, the insurer, who
drafts the policy under the guidance of skilled lawyers, offers it to the
potential policyholder on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.' - Because there
is no real opportunity for the potential policyholder to bargain, state
courts have traditionally viewed health insurance policies as contracts
of adhesion, rather than negotiated agreements.1 93
186. A governmental plan is a health policy provided by a state or municipal employer. Id.
at 126.
187. Se Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,732 (1985) (asserting that
ifplan purchases insurance, as opposed to being self-insured, it is "directly affected bystate laiw
that regulate the insurance industry").
188. In a self-insured plan, the employer pays covered health expenses from their owm
company assets. See Wheeler v. Dynamic Eng'g, 850 F. Supp. 459, 462 nA (E.D. Va. 1994).
Claims can be processed either by a third-party administrator or by the company itself. Id; mz
also Saver, supra note 29, at 1103-04 (describing judicial consideration of "experimental
medicine" under self-insured plans, in relation to ERISA).
189. An example of an employee welfare benefit plan is the Veterans' Benefits plan, known
as CHAMPUS, which is regulated by the Department of Veterans' Affairs.
190. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). For an excellent discussion of ERISA,
see generally MARTIN WALD & DAVID E. KENTY, ERISA: A Co.uREHnsVE GUME (1991).
191. See, e.g., Wilson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 605 P.2d 1327, 1329 (OkLa. 1980) (stating that
insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion and must be interpreted in manner most favorable
to policyholder).
192. SeeSAMUEL'WILUSTONWMILLSON ON CONTRATS § 900, at 19 (3d ed. 1963) (evaluating
non-negotiable character of insurance contracts).
193. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 40 (6th ed. 1990) (defining contracts of adhesion as
"[s] tandardized contract form[s] offered to consumers of goods and senices on essentially'ake
it or leave it' basis without affording consumer realistic opportunity to bargain"). &4 eg.,
Pasteur Health Plan, Inc. v. Salazar, No. 94-738, 1995 WL 254B58, at *2 (Fla. App. 3d Dist. May
3,1995) (finding that HMO contract"bears hallmark ofa contract of adhesion"); Ponderv. Blue
Cross of S. CaL, 193 Cal. Rptr. 632, 637 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1983) (holding that health insurance
policy was contract of adhesion because it was prepared entirely by major insurance company,
and policyholders could not sit down with insurer and bargain over individual terms). But =-s
Jones v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y. of United States, 400 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Mich. App.
1986) (holding that restaurant's group health insurance policy %as not contract of adhesion
because employees had contracted for and knew terms of policy); Robin v. Blue Cross Hosp.
Serv. Inc., 637 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. 1982) (holding that group policy was not contract of
adhesion because it was product of negotiation between equally strong parties-plainirs
employer and insurance company).
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When interpreting adhesion contracts, the judiciary affords special
protection to the weaker party,"9 which in this context is the
policyholder. Ambiguous terms are strictly construed against the
insurer.95  The rule of contra proferentem' 96 broadly construes cov-
erage provisions in favor of the policyholder, and narrowly construes
exclusion provisions against the insurer."9  This pro-policyholder
methodology is bolstered by courts' predisposition to ensure that the
"reasonable expectations" of the insured are fulfilled.193
194. See Bass, supra note 41, at 91 (stating courts attempt to protect weaker party from
dominant or oppressive party in contractual agreement).
195. See 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 283 (1982) (stating general rule that ambiguities ln
contract are interpreted againstparty that drafted document); see alsoDiDomenico v. Employers
Coop. Indus. Trust, 676 F. Supp. 903, 908 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (holding that if ambiguity exists in
medical plans, terms should be interpreted favorably to policyholder); Jury Instruction No. 5,
Fox v. Health Net (Cal. Super. Ct. 1993) (No. 219262) (on file with The American Univirsity Law
Review) (instructing that "[a]ny ambiguity or uncertainty in an insurance policy Is to be resolved
against the insurer").
In an attempt to afford greater protection to policyholders, states have enacted "free look"
statutes that permit policyholders to reject a policy within a period of time-usually 10-20 days.
SanfordJ. Schlesinger et al., Planningfor the Senior Citizen, C682 AU-ABA 285, 345 (1991); see, e~g.,
CAL. INS. CODE § 10233.5 (West 1993) (requiring that insurance policy contain "free look
provision" in policy); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-26-129 (1994) (mandating that every health
insurance policy contain provision that purchaser is permitted to return it within 10 days). But
cf Falkowitz v. Monarch Life Ins., Life Health & Accid. Ins. Cas. 2d (CCH) 1363 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1985) (rejecting argument that adhesion contract should be narrowly construed against insurer
when policyholder had 10 days to examine policy, and return for full refund if not satistied).
196. The court in Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp. noted that the principle of contra
proferentem derived from the recognition that
[i]nsurance policies are almost always drafted by specialists employed by the insurer.
In light of the drafters' expertise and experience, the insurer should be expected to
set forth any limitations on its liability clearly enough for a common layperson to
understand; if it fails to do this, it should not be allowed to take advantage of the very
ambiguities that it could have prevented with greater diligence. Moreover, once the
policy language has been drafted, it is not usually subject to amendment by the
insured, even if he sees an ambiguity;, an insurer's practice of forcing the insured to
guess and hope regarding the scope of coverage requires that any doubts be resolved
in favor of the party who has been placed in such a predicament.
2 F.3d 1249, 1257 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534,
540 (9th Cir. 1990)).
197. See; e.g., Phillips v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302, 311-12 (7th Cr. 1992)
(favoring practice of narrowly construing vague provisions against insurer); Clocker v. W.R.
Grace & Co., 974 F.2d 540, 544 (4th Cir. 1992) (construing plan against its drafter where
ambiguities existed); see a/sojury Instruction No. 2, Fox (No. 219262) (instructing that inclusive
clauses be read broadly and exclusionary clauses be read narrowly when interpreting health
insurance contracts).
198. Se, ag., Wessman v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 402,404 (8th Cir. 1991)
(using Minnesota's reasonable expectation doctrine to find in favor of policyholder where
ambiguities in policy existed); Anderson v. Country Life Ins. Co., 886 P.2d 1381,1388 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1994) (stating that"even clear and unambiguous boilerplate language is ineffective if it...
contravenes the insured's reasonable expectations"); Glarner v. Time Ins. Co., 465 N.W.2d 591,
597 (Minn. Ct.App. 1991) (finding plaintiff had reasonable expectation of coverage). SeeRoger
C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO
ST. LJ. 823, 826-27 (1990) (explaining that doctrine of reasonable expectations applies to both
ambiguous and unambiguous terms in contract). But cf. Meckert v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 701
P.2d 217,221 (Idaho 1985) (rejecting doctrine of reasonable expectations); Edward Felsenthal,
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2. Health insurance policies subject to ERISA
ERISA establishes, among other things, a fiduciary's1 duties
under a health insurance policy. A fiduciary must ensure that the
policy is operating solely in the interest of its benefidaries.2  In
addition, a fiduciary has the duty to act diligently" and provide a
"full and fair review" of claim requests.2 2 From a policy perspective,
these standards serve to protect employees from unfair coverage deni-
als23 ERISA, through the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion,2° exempts self-insured group health plans from state insurance
laws, regulations, and coverage mandates.20
Rulings Support teinePrint of Health Plans WALL ST.J.,July 1,1993, at BI (reporting tendency
of courts to uphold fine print of insurance contracts and deny claims of policyholder on
technical grounds).
199. SeeBLAcd's LWDICrIONAm 625 (6th ed. 1990) (defining fiduciary as person "who must
exercise a standard of care in such management activity imposed by law or contract7). Under
ERISA, a fiduciary is the health plan administrator who makes benefits determinations. & 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (1988).
200. Afiduciary's duties and responsibilities are defined by statute as follos:
(1) [A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries and
(A) for the exclusive purpose of:
(i) providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries; and
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan;
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar uith such
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like
aims;...
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
201. Id.
202. Id. § 1133(2).
203. SeeMolino, supra note 122, at 330-32 (discussing standards fiduciaries must comply with
in determining whether coverage should be offered).
204. U.S. CoNST., art. VI.
205. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988) (stating that ERSA "supersedefs] any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan"); sealrlPilotLife Ins.
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1987) (finding that common law tort and contract causes
of action for improper processing of claim for benefits under ERISA-regulated plan were
preempted); Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Okla., 24 F.Sd 118. 121 (10th Cir. 1994)
(holding that ERISA preempted state law claim of tortious breach of contract); Reilly v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 846 F.2d 416, 426 (7th Cir. 1988) (dismissing state law
claims and demand for punitive damages due to preemption by remedial provisions of ERISA).
See generally Vicki Gottlich, ERISA Preemption." A Stumbling Bloch to State Health Care Refarm, 26
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1469, 1470 (1993) (discussingERISA preemption and its relation to state
health care reform). But cf. Meadows v. Employers Health Ins., 826 F. Supp. 1225, 1232 (D.
Ariz. 1993) (holding that ERISA does not preempt state law misrepresentation claims regarding
coverage).
Critics seek to reform ERISA's preemption capabilities. Sce Hcalth Care Crisis Huruan Impact
ofinsurance Company Abuse, Hearing of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Reeowuve 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. 31-33 (1992) (statement of Tom Gallagher, Florida Health Insurance Commissioner)
(recommending that Congress amend ERISA so that state regulation can protect consumers
from fraudulent health benefit providers).
Although ERISA preempts state law, ERISA claims may be heard in either state or federal
courts. See29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1) (1988) (granting concurrentjurisdiction to federal and state
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Two standards of review are used to assess coverage determinations
under ERISA-governed plans: (1) "arbitrary and capricious," and (2)
"de novo." 206 The Supreme Court set out the distinction between the
two standards in Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch.Y°" According
to Firestone, courts must first decide whether the health insurance plan
confers discretionary authority on its plan administrator to determine
eligibility for benefits and to construe terms of the plan. 23 If so,
the plan administrator's coverage decisions should be reviewed
through an arbitrary and capricious standard.20 Otherwise, the
courts in benefit claim cases). Insurers, however, typically remove a state court benefit claim
action to federal court. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
206. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989) (explaining and
distinguishing two standards of review).
207. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
208. Id. at 108. ERISA plans have designated plan administrators who act as fiduciaries for
the beneficiaries. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(16) (A), 1002(21)(A) (1988).
209. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110. The Supreme Court has never specifically identified the
appropriate language necessary in order for a plan to confer discretionary authority. Lower
courts, however, have held that the language must demonstrate a clear and unequivocal intent
to vest the plan administrator with authority. See, e.g., De Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180,
1187 (4th Cir. 1989) (requiring administrator's authority to clearly appear on face of
document). Courts have found that discretionary authority had been clearly granted in the
policy and accordingly have applied a deferential standard of review. See, e.g., Doe v. Group
Hospitalization & Medical Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 85 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting insurance contract that
grants discretionary authority as follows: "[Blue Cross] shall have the full power and
discretionary authority to control and manage the operation and administration of the Contract
... including, but not limited to ... [d]etermining the benefits and amounts payable therefor
to any Participant or provider of health care services ... [i]nterpreting, applying, and
administering the provisions of the Contract."); Dewitt v. State Farm Ins., 905 F.2d 798, 801 (4th
Cir. 1990) (quoting plan language as follows: "[Tihe plan administrator shall have the power
... to make all determinations that the plan requires for its administration. All such rules,
regulations, determinations, constructions and interpretations made by the plan administrator
shall be binding."); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 898 F.2d 1556, 1559 (11th Cir,
1990) (quoting plan as follows: "As a condition of precedent to coverage, it is agreed that
whenever [insurer] makes reasonable determinations which are not arbitrary and capricious In
the administration of the [plan] including... determinations whether services, care, treatment
or supplies are Medically Necessary... such determinations shall be final and conclusive."); Guy
v. Southeastern Iron Workers' Welfare Fund, 877 F.2d 37, 89(11th Cir. 1989) (applying arbitrary
and capricious standard because plan conferred "upon trustees 'full and exclusive authority to
determine all questions of coverage and eligibility' and 'full power to construe the provisions
of [the] Trust'"); Lowry v. Bankers Life & Casualty Retirement Plan, 871 F.2d 522, 524 (5th Cir.
1989) (conferring discretionary authority because plan gave "permissive authority to the
[administrators] to 'interpret and construe' the (plan] and the power 'to determine all
questions of eligibility and status'").
One commentator proposed the following model provision as sufficient to ensure that the
plan grants the administrator sufficient discretionary authority:
1. (The company name), as plan administrator, retains all final authority and
responsibility for the Health Plan and its operations and (the named fiduciary if
different from the company) is empowered to act on behalf of (the company name)
in connection with the Health Plan as expressly stated in this agreement or in writing
by (the company name) and (the named fiduciary).
2. (The company name) and (the named fiduciary) have agreed that for purposes of
[ERISA], (the named fiduciary) shall be the "appropriate named fiduciary" of the
Health Plan for the purposes of such review of claims and decisions thereon, and the
decisions of (the named fiduciary) on any claim shall be final and binding.
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court should apply de novo review.210 Although at least one com-
mentator claims that the de novo and arbitrary and capricious
standards produce similar outcomes,21' determining the appropriate
standard of review is integral to the reasoning in many cases.2t2
Under the first standard, a policyholder who has been denied a
benefit must show that the plan administrator's decision was an
"abuse of discretion" or "arbitrary and capricious," terms that are used
interchangeably by the courts. In such cases, courts are highly
deferential to the plan administrator's interpretations of the plan's
terms214 because of the administrator's express authority to control
and manage the operation and administration of the plan.
-215
Under the de novo standard, on the other hand, courts interpret the
plan's provisions without deferring to the administrator's judg-
ment.216 The court starts anew, interpreting the health insurance
3. (The company name) empowers (the named fiduciary) with discretionary authority
to determine eligibility for benefits and/or to construe the terms of the Health Plan
and/or interpret its doubtfitl or ambiguous provisions to carry out the Health Plan's
intent and purpose and to facilitate its administration.
James, supra note 126, at 410-11; cf. Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Md., 757 F. Supp. 661,
666 (D. Md. 1991) (finding that policy language, "as decided by us," was not dear and
unequivocal enough to confer discretionary authority to plan administrators). But see Bucci v.
Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Conn., 764 F. Supp. 728,729,731 (D. Conn. 1991) (finding thatpolicy
language, "not recognized by us," provided sufficient grant of discretionary authority).
In response to Fetone some insurers have amended their policies "ith the explicit goal of
clarifying the discretionary authority." Hasty v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas
Health & Welfare Fund, 851 F. Supp. 1250, 1258 (NJ). Intl. 1994).
210. See, eg., Helman v. Plumbers & Steanifitters Local 166 Health & Welfare Trust. 803 F.
Supp. 1407, 1413 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (holding that plan administrator's decision that ABMT for
cancer of soft tissue was experimental was subject to de nva review because discretion to
construe and interpret terms was not conferred upon administrator).
211. Julia Field Costich, Deial ofCoveragefor " xperimenl"MedialPrrtedure TlhePrWL-mof
DeNovoReview UnderERISA, 79 KY. UJ. 801, 822 (1990-91). But mzPapantonis, tupm note 173,
at 221 (asserting that standard of review used is often outcome determinative).
212. See, eg., Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1254-58 (3d Cir. 1993)
(discussing whether de novo standard ofjudicial review would apply to denial of benefits for liver
transplant); Hasty, 851 F. Supp. at 1254 (mentioning that both parties had discused at length
what standard of review was to be applied because this would greatly affect court's role).
213. See eg., Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 898 F.2d 1556, 1562-63 (11th Cir.
1990) (discussing use of "arbitrary and capricious" standard in revieiing administrators'
decisions); Guy v. Southeastern Iron Workers' Welfare Fund, M77 F.2d 37,39 (11th Cir. 1939)
(illustrating application of"arbitraryand capricious" standard bycourt); Bucdv. Blue Cross-Blue
Shield of Conn., 764 F. Supp. 728,731 (D. Conn. 1991) (applying"abuse of discretion" standard
to policy where court found sufficient grant of discretionary authority found given to plan
administrator).
214. SeeFirestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989) ("'When trustees
are in existence, and capable of acting, a court of equity will not interfere to control them in
the exercise of a discretion vested in them bj the instrune7 under which they act.'" (quoting Nichols
v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 724-25 (1875))) (emphasis in original).
215. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1988).
216. See Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Va., 741 F. Supp. 586, 589 (E.D. Va. 1990).
2062 TH AMEICAN UNivERsry LAw REVIEW [Vol. 44:2029
policy as it would any other non-ERISA contract.217 The court
applies rules of contract interpretation, often incorporating analogous
state law. 18
3. Comparing health insurance policies subject to state law with those
subject to ERISA
In general, ERISA has been viewed as favorable to insurers, while
state law has tended to favor policyholders. 9 One reason for this
divergence is that breast cancer patients challenging health insurance
policies under state law may have the option of a jury trial,12 ° and
juries tend to be more sympathetic to the patient than the insur-
er.221 ERISA, on the other hand, confers concurrent jurisdiction in
either state or federal court.2" Therefore, insurers often opt to
have the case removed to federal court where it will be heard solely
by a judge.s In addition, state laws allow for tort claims, such as
negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, mental
anguish, and pain and suffering, to be heard in the same action as a
coverage dispute. 24 ERISA, however, considers these claims to be
extracontractual, and therefore unavailable when recovering benefits
that are equitable in nature.2" Remedies provided by ERISA are
217. I& at 590 (holding that where do novo standard applied, court has power to make Its
own interpretation of contract).
218. See, eg., Kekis v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utica-Watertown, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 571,
583 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (applying contract principles to ERISA health insurance policy, such that
terms susceptible to multiple interpretations should be construed in favor of policyholder).
219. See generallyJ. Edward Neugebauer, Make Sure Your Plan is an ERISA Plan: A Tal of 7Wo
Beneficiari, MANAGING EMPLOYEE HEALTH BENEFTS, Summer 1994, at 83-84 (advising employers
to choose health plans subject to ERISA); Wieseman, supra note 111, at 8 (comparing state and
federal courts' treatment of health benefit claims).
220. See infra notes 341-45 and accompanying text.
221. Saver, supra note 29, at 1104 (discussing reasons insurance companies prefer federal
jurisdiction).
222. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1) (1988).
223. Saver, supra note 29, at 1104. Although the right to a trial by jury is not specifically
addressed in ERISA, the circuit courts, in applying common law of trusts, have uniformly
concluded that jury trials are unavailable under ERISA. See, eg., Blake v. Unionmutual Stock
Life Ins. Co., 906 F.2d 1525, 1526 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that under de novo standard of
review, traditional equitable relief does not come under domain of Seventh Amendment right
to jury trial); Chilton v. Savannah Food & Indus., 814 F.2d 620, 623 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating
that beneficiaries under ERISA are not entitled to jury trial); Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235,
1237 (5th Cir. 1980) (concluding that there is no right to jury trial for strictly equitable
determinations under ERISA).
224. See, eg., 37 Ins. L Rep. (CCH) 178 (June 1994) (noting that plaintiff in Fox v. Health
Net asserted intentional infliction of emotional distress claim based on HMO's coercion of
treating oncologist to withdraw his support for plaintiff's ABMT for breast cancer). But cf
Taylor v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Mich., 517 N.W.2d 864, 871 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (stating
that insurer's failure to pay contractual obligation does not amount to outrageous conduct
necessary to sustain intentional infliction of emotional distress claim).
225. See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (holding that
"Congress did not provide, and did not intend the judiciary to imply" recovery for
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limited to accrued benefits, a declaratory judgment of entitlement to
benefits under the plan, or an injunction against refusal to pay for a
treatment.2
6
B. Case Law Andysis-Poliy/wider Prevails
Both state and federal courts have ruled in favor of policyholders
challenging insurers' denial of coverage of HDC-ABMT for breast
cancer.' These courts generally approach such disputes in two
ways. In some cases, courts focus on both the terms of the health
insurance contract and the medical controversy surrounding the
treatment; they have inquired whether HDC-ABMT for breast cancer
falls within the Experimental Exclusion and whether it satisfies the
objective coverage criteria set forth in the health insurance policy.2
In other cases, courts have looked beyond the contract and focused
on the process by which insurers have arrived at their coverage
determination.' These courts have asked whether the insurer
undertook every reasonable effort on which to base its coverage
determinations, and whether the insurer had operated under a
conflict of interest while making its coverage determination.' This
Comment maintains that if insurers operate under a conflict of
interest or do not exercise reasonable efforts, then the coverage
denial should not be upheld, even if the plan decisionmaking process
is entitled to deference under ERISA. l
1. Absence of defining criteria in policy
While most health insurance policies expressly exclude coverage for
232experimental treatments, not all policies clearly define what that
extracontractual damages underERISA); but f RobertKamp, TheArgunitforfxtra.Cmnfratual"
Damages UnderERISA, 82 ILL B.J. 70 (1994) (discussing alternative legal theories under which
policyholders can offset ERISA's shortcomings).
226. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988).
227. Se, g., Kekis v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utica-Watertowrn, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 571,
583-84 (N.D.N.Y. 1993); Bucci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Conn., 764 F. Supp. 728, 730 (D.
Conn. 1991); Adams v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Md., 757 F. Supp. 661, 669 (D. Md. 1991);
Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Va., 741 F. Supp. 586, 5S9 (E.D. Va. 1990); Taylor v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Mich., 517 N.'W.d 864, 867 (Mich. C. App. 1994).
228. See infra Part ILB.1.
229. See infra Part ILB.2-3.
230. See infra Part ILB.2-3.
231. See infra Part IV.B-C. But sae Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm MUL Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (stating that Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of
administrator under arbitrary and capricious standard of re%iew); Jett v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield ofAla., 890 F.2d 1137,1140 (11th Cir. 1989) (insisting that plan administrator's decisions
must not be disturbed under arbitrary and capricious standard of review, even if eidence
supports contrary decision).
232. See supra notes 107-38 and accompanying text.
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entails. 3 Specifically, Experimental Exclusions often do not set out
objective standards for determining whether a proposed treatment is
experimental. 2  Courts consider such undefined Experimental
Exclusions to be inherently ambiguous.2
Health insurance policies subject to state laws are governed by
233. SeeAngela R. Holder, Fundinginnovative Medical Treatment, 57 ALB. L REV. 795, 800-03
(1994) (discussing experimental exclusions in health insurance contracts); see also Blue Cross
of the Rochester Area Contract supra note 124, at TR-64 (describing criteria for Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Rochester experimental exclusion). A policy clearly defines what
constitutes an experimental treatment through use of objective criteria. For example, the Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Rochester policy use3 four criteria to define its experimental exclusion:
1. Any medical device, drug or biological product must have received final approval
to market by the [FDA] for the particular diagnosis or condition ....
2. Conclusive evidence from... published peer-reviewed medical literature must exist
that the technology has a definite positive effect on health outcomes; such evidence
must include well-designed investigations that have been reproduced by nonaffiliated
authoritative sources with measurable results, backed up by the positive endorsements
of national medical bodies or panels regarding scientific efficacy and rationale.
3. Demonstrated evidence as reflected in the published peer-reviewed medical
literature must exist that the technology is at least as effective in improving health
outcomes as established technology, or is usable in appropriate clinical contexts in
which established technology is not employable.
4. Proof as reflected in the published peer-reviewed medical literature must exist that
improvement in health outcomes, as defined in paragraph 3, is possible in standard
conditions or medical practice, outside clinical investigatory settings.
Md
234. For an example of a health insurance policy where the Experimental Exclusion
adequately lists objective criteria, see the policy discussed in Bechtold v. Physicians Health Plan
of N. Ind., 19 F.3d 322, 325-26 (7th Cir. 1994). That policy read, in part:
"Experimental or Unproven Procedures" means any procedures, devices, drugs or
medicines or the use thereof which falls within any of the following categories:
1. Which is considered by any government agency or subdivision, including but not
limited to the [FDA], the Office of the Health Technology Assessment, or [Health
Care Financing Administration] Medicare Coverage Issues Manual to be:
a. experimental or investigational;
b. not considered reasonable and necessary, or
c. any similar finding;
2. Which is not covered under Medicare reimbursement laws, regulations or
interpretations; or
3. Which is not commonly and customarily recognized by the medical profession in
the state of Indiana as appropriate for the condition being treated.
Id.
235. See, eg., Dahl-Eimers v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 1379, 1380 (11th Cir.
1993) (concluding that phrase "considered experimental" is ambiguous as matter of law);
Johnson v. District 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 857 F.2d 514, 516 (9th Cir. 1988) ("In the
context of modem medicine, the term 'experimental' seems dearly ambiguous on its face,"),
Brief of Amici CuriaeforPlaintiff-Appellantat 8 n.4, Dahl-Eimers (No.92-1158) (arguing that term
experimental is "inherently ambiguous"); see also Belk, supra note 135, at 810 (advocating that
courts construe undefined experimental exclusions against insurer). See Fisfis, supra note 118,
at 795 (arguing that any undefined exclusionary clause in policy is "per se ambiguous"); but see,
e.g., Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1405, 1409 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting trial court's
finding that phrase "in connection with medical or other research" is ambiguous); Farley v.
Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 653,661 (8th Cir. 1992) (refusing to "consider the language
of any of the criteria so vague as to be ambiguous or unenforceable").
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contract principles, which construe ambiguities against insurers.
That rule of construction, however, does not necessarily apply to
ambiguities in an ERISA-governed policy that sufficiently confers
discretionary authority in its plan administrator, in such instances,
courts resolve the ambiguity,' without automatically construing it
against the insurer, by relying predominately on medical expert
testimony." 9 Because an -ERISA plan administrator's determination
is entitled to deferential review, courts have resolved ambiguities in
favor of the administrator's interpretation so long as it is reasonable
and not arbitrary and capricious.2"
This Comment, however, recommends that courts resolve ambigu-
ities about the experimental status of a treatment by making an
independent determination through de novo review, without deferring
to an ERISA plan administrator.24' Specifically, in conducting de
novo review, courts should apply a "primary purpose to benefit the
patient" standard.' In short, if the proposed treatments primary
purpose is to benefit the patient, and research is merely a secondary
purpose, courts should not regard it as experimental. Only when the
primary purpose is research related, should courts deem the
treatment experimental.
A "primary purpose to benefit the patient" standard serves the
competing interests of both policyholders and insurers. It guarantees
policyholders coverage for worthwhile and potentially life-saving
medical treatments that are still under investigation. At the same
time, it requires some level of proven medical value so that insurers
avoid paying for quack therapies.
Even though the medical community is divided as to the overall,
long-term efficacy of HDG-ABMT for breast cancer, it has reached a
236. See supra notes 191-98 and accompanying text see, eg, Vadrip v. Connecticut Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 566 So. 2d 434, 437 (La. App. 1990) (maintaining that experimental exclusion wa
ambiguous and therefore had to be construed against insurer, and in favor of coverage for liver
transplant).
237. SeeGottlich, supranote 205, at 1473 (explainingERISAs preemptive effecton state laws,
including common constructional rules used by state courts).
238. Gottlich, supra note 205, at 1473.
289. Seegenraly Fifis, supra note 118, at 797-98.
240. See, eg.,Johnson v. District 2 Marine Eng'rs BeneficialAss'n, 857 F.2d 514,516 (9th Cir.
1988) (stating that ambiguities must be resolved in favor of trustees' interpretation under
ERISA).
241. But see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm MuL Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (stating that lower court should not substitute its judgment for that of ERISA fiduciary);
Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Is., 846 F.2d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 1988) (refusing
to undertake de novo review when reviewing insurance company's coverage denial because ERISA
governed health plan).
242. Accord BELj, supra note 135, at 825 (proposing that courts should use demonstrated
likelihood of success standard when defining what constitutes experimental medical treatment).
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consensus that the short-term effects are favorable.24 3 For that
reason, most health professionals will agree that HDC-ABMT has some
proven medical value in the treatment of breast cancer.244 There-
fore, in applying a "primary purpose to benefit the patient" standard
to an undefined Experimental Exclusion, courts should conclude that
HDC-ABMT is not experimental for the treatment of breast can-
cer.24
5
In resolving coverage disputes, courts rely on expert testimony to
establish the value of HDC-ABMT for breast cancer. The following
four cases, Taylor v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan,246 Pirozzi v.
Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Virginia,247 Bueci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of
Connecticut,21 and Adams v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Maryland,
219
illustrate how some courts have reached decisions favorable to the
breast cancer patient by employing the equivalent of a "primary
purpose to benefit the patient" standard when weighing expert
medical testimony.
In Taylor v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan,"' Debra Taylor's
health insurer, Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan, refused to cover
HDC-ABMT treatment for her breast cancer, which had spread to
areas of her spine, based on an Experimental Exclusion.25 1  The
policy did not, however, define experimental. The Michigan Court
of Appeals accepted a lower court's determination that the term
243. See supra notes 96-110 and accompanying text (reporting that clinical trials comparing
HDC-ABMT and conventional chemotherapy show that HDC-ABMT delivers higher complete
response rates, but noting that it is too early to know long-term survival rates).
244. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (reporting that majority of oncologists polled
would recommend HDC-ABMT to breast cancer patients).
245. Earlier cases concluded, however, that HDC-ABMT for the treatment of breast cancer
was experimental. These cases addressed treatments undergone before 1989. See Sweeney v.
Gerber Prods. Co. Medical Benefits Plan, 728 F. Supp. 594,596 (D. Neb. 1989) (declaring that
"[t]here is no question that [HDC-ABMT] as a treatment for breast cancer, remains today a
treatment which is in an experimental and investigational stage"); Thomas v, Gulf Health Plan,
688 F. Supp. 590, 595 (S.D. Ala. 1988) (concluding that "[it is undisputed that, as It relates to
the treatment of breast cancer, [HDC-ABMT) is experimental").
These early cases involved health insurance policies that did not expressly incorporate
defining criteria with their Experimental Exclusions. Even had the courts applied a "primary
purpose to benefit patient standard," it is most likely that they would have reached the same
conclusion given the expert testimony at that time. In other words, in Thomas, not only did all
the experts believe that HDC-ABMT was experimental, but also both parties conceded this point.
688 F. Supp. at 592. In Sweeney, the court did not consider expert testimony, but deferred to
coverage decisionmakers. 728 F. Supp. at 596.
246. 517 N.W.2d 864 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
247. 741 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Va. 1990).
248. 764 F. Supp. 728 (D. Conn. 1991).
249. 757 F. Supp. 661 (D. Md. 1991).
250. 517 N.W.2d 864 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
251. Taylorv. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Mich., 517 N.W.2d 864,867 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
The health insurance policy did not cover "[b] enefits for care, services, supplies or devices which
are experimental or research in nature." Id.
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"experimental" was ambiguous because it could be understood in
different ways if not accompanied by defining criteria.2-2 A reason-
able policyholder could interpret the term to mean either a medical
procedure designed "solely for testing a hypothesis without contempla-
tion that any benefit whatsoever would be gained by the patient" or
"primarily for providing a benefit for the patient, but which would
have the side effect of testing a hypothesis."'
The appellate court found persuasive the expert testimony of
Taylor's treating oncologists,' who testified that with conventional
chemotherapy, her life expectancy would be measured in months,
whereas with HDG-ABMT she could be cancer-free for at least two to
three years with no need for additional treatment' m  Applying what
resembled a "primary purpose to benefit the patient" standard,"
the appellate court in Taylor affirmed the lower court's finding that
HDC-ABMT for the treatment of breast cancer was not experimen-
ta.1Y In doing so, the court went so far as to explicitly recognize
the superiority of HDGABMT over conventional treatments for breast
cancer.
s
A federal district court reached a similar result in Pirozzi v. Blue
Cross-Blue Shield of Vrginia. 9  The health insurance policy in
question contained an Experimental Exclusion, 2  but did not
define experimental. 21 Pamela Pirozzi, a Blue Cross-Blue Shield
policyholder, was a thirty-three-year-old mother of three children
when she was diagnosed with advanced breast cancer.2'  After
conventional chemotherapy263 and radiation treatments failed to
stop the spread of her breast cancer through her rib cage, Pirozzi's
252. Id. at 868-69.
253. Id at 869.
254. Id.
255. See id. The insurer's expert testified that with conventional chemotherapy, a cancer-free
outlook was zero percent. Id.
256. Id. The court stated that, "[although... research was an underl)ing purpose of the
procedure ... the primary purpose of the procedure ias to provide [the breast cancer patient]
her only opportunity to become free of cancer for a substantial period." Id.
257. Id. at 869-70 (recognizing HDC-ABMT as effective form of therapy for breast cancer,
and requiring insurer to cover costs of treatment).
258. Id at 869 (stating that breast cancer patients who are given HDC-AB.MT experience
better prognoses than those who choose conventional treatments).
259. 741 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Va. 1990).
260. Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Va., 741 F. Supp. 586, 588 (E.D. Va. 1990). The
Experimental Exclusion clause excluded "[e]xperimental or clinical investigative procedures;
services of no scientifically proven medical value; also services not in accordance with generally
accepted standards of medical practice." Id
261. Id. at 589-90 (explaining that plan did not even require certain success rate from
medical treatment to determine whether or not it was experimental).
262. See i4 at 587-88.
263. The Blue Cross plan covered Pirozzi's conventional chemotherapy. &e id at 588 n.4.
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treating physicians prescribed HDC-ABMT, concluding that it was her
"best chance for any type of meaningful survival." 264  The HDC-
ABMT procedure included a ten-day hospital stay, chemotherapy, a
bone marrow transplant, and follow-up medical care, at an approxi-
mate cost of $100,000.21 Blue Cross, claiming that the procedure
was still experimental and had not been conclusively proven to
increase survival rates, denied Pirozzi coverage.
26
The federal district court, applying de novo review under ERISA,267
relied heavily on expert testimony, first to resolve the meaning of the
term experimental and then to determine whether HDC-ABMT for
breast cancer was in fact experimental.21 Blue Cross' expert
testified, not as an oncologist but as an administrator, with respect to
plan coverage and technology assessment. 269 The expert, who was
responsible for rejecting Pirozzi's pre-authorization for HDC-ABMT
based his coverage denial on three factors: (1) the Blue Cross-Blue
Shield Association's December 1988 Uniform Medical Policy Memo-
randum, which concluded that HDG-ABMT was experimental; 2 70 (2)
his readings of published, peer-reviewed literature, which indicated
that there was no data demonstrating increased survival in breast
cancer patients who had undergone HDC-ABMT;27' and (3) a
research protocol for HDC-ABMT for breast cancer, which indicated
that the treatment was experimental.272
Oncologists testifying on behalf of Pirozzi responded that the most
recent data on the efficacy of HDG-ABMT for breast cancer was more
encouraging than that reflected by the published literature, a time lag
explained by the substantial delay inherent in publishing a completed
study.273 Specifically, they testified that the treatment leads to
higher median survival rates and tumor shrinkage than that achieved
264. Id. at 588.
265. See id
266. See id
267. 1& at 589 (finding that although plan conferred discretionary atithority to plan
administrator for "medically necessary provision," no discretion was imbued to construe
"experimental provision," and therefore administrator's decision was reviewed vithout
deference).
268. Id. at 590.
269. Id.
270. See id at 590-91. The Blue Cross-Blue Shield Association based its conclusion on five
criteria set forth in its Technology Evaluation Criteria (TEC), as discussed supra note 136.
271. See id. at 591 (stating number of patients who had received HDC-ABMT was too small
to draw conclusions).
272. See id. at 593.
273. See id. at 591-92 (citing studies where HDC-ABMT for breast cancer produced promisng
results); i. at 594 (noting that data from Dr. Stanley'Watidns, Pirozzi's oncologist, showed HDC-
ABMT to produce best results for patients with Stage IV metastic breast cancer).
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under standard chemotherapy. 4  In addition, even the highest
possible mortality rate for HDC-ABMT would not render the
treatment experimental.'7 Finally, they contended that use of
research protocols did not automatically indicate that the procedure
was experimental; instead, the protocol was necessary to collect data
to improve and refine the procedure.276
The court in Pirozzi rejected Blue Cross' application of the
Experimental Exclusion because its coverage denial was based on
criteria and recommendations from the Blue Cross Blue Shield
Association (BCBSA), which had not been expressly incorporated into
the health insurance policy." Additionally, the health insurance
policy did not establish that the insurer was compelled to adhere to
the recommendations of the BCBSA.2 s
Absent defining criteria, the court in Pirozzi was left to determine
whether HDC-ABMT for breast cancer was experimental under the
Blue Cross plan. First, the court found the fact that numerous
medical centers used the treatment to be convincing evidence that it
had scientific value and was generally accepted as a medical prac-
tice. 1 9  Second, the court concluded that the procedure demon-
strated tumor shrinkage that, in turn, correlated with increased
survival."o Third, the court regarded HDC-ABMT to be safe given
its low mortality rate."' Based on these findings, the court held
that HDC-ABMT was not an experimental treatment, and was
therefore not excluded by Pirozzi's Blue Cross plan.'
274. See ict at 592 (noting median survival rate for standard dose chemotherapy without
ABMT was only 12 months).
275. See ifL at 593. Testimony indicated that the mortality rate for HDCABMT for breast
cancer was actually four percent. but a 10-15% rate is presented to prospective patients and the
public to account for varying risk factors such as age. rd.
276. See id. For example, the testimony showed that although chemotherapy treatment for
testicular cancer is well-established, it is still being clinically evaluated in order to reduce toxicity
and increase dose efficacy. Id at 593 n.18.
277. Id. at 591.
278. &--i (noting that plan did not indicate that Blue Cross-Blue Shield Association criteria
was determinative of treatment status).
279. Id. According to the court in Pifta= major medical centers using HDC.ABMT for
treating breast cancer include:
Duke University, Fairfax County Hospital, George Washington University, Georgetown
University, Harvard UniversityJohns Hopkins University, Medical College of Virginia,
Houston's M.D. Anderson Hospital, University of Chicago, University of Michigan,
University of Nebraska, University of Texas-San Antonio, University of Virginia
Medical Center, University ofWi-sconsinYale University MedicalSchool, and all Florida
teaching hospitals.
Id.
280. IL at 594.
281. I&
282. Id
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After reaching this conclusion, the court cautioned that its decision
was "not a green light signalling a general expansion of coverage
under group health policies," and that "[p]urveyors of quack
remedies and fringe therapies should derive no comfort from this
decision. "21 Rather, the decision was confined to the specific,
expert medical testimony regarding a widely used state-of-the-art treat-
ment for breast cancer patients.2' The court suggested that it
would have taken a more deferential approach to the coverage denial
had the plan conferred broad discretion on the administrator.t
The fact remains, however, that the plan at issue lacked defining
criteria for the term "experimental."
Faced with such a plan, a court should determine whether a
particular treatment is experimental by applying the "primary purpose
to benefit the patient" standard. Critical to applying that test in
Pirozzi would be the strong expert testimony regarding the efficacy
and current use of HDC-ABMT. Therefore, even under a more
deferential standard of review, the court should still have concluded
that the treatment was not experimental.
This principle is exemplified by Bucci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of
Connecticut 286 in which a federal district court held that an insurer's
denial of benefits was arbitrary and capricious, notwithstanding a
deferential standard of review.287 Despite a mastectomy followed by
nine months of conventional chemotherapy, Kathleen Bucci's breast
cancer metastasized to her bones.2 8 Her doctors recommended
HDC-ABMT, but her insurer refused to pay, claiming that the
procedure fell within her policy's Experimental Exclusion.2 8 9 The
exclusion provided that the insurer "will not pay for services ...
which are experimental or investigational in nature; meaning any
treatment, [or] procedure.., not recognized as accepted medical
practice."
290
The court in Bucci viewed the exclusion as ambiguous because it did
not provide a set standard (such as a threshold ratio of statistical
success, a level of data, or a particular test) to define when a medical
procedure -was nonexperimental and accepted.29' The defendant
283. Md The court noted that its decision was based on testimony from Board-certified
specialists, not "self-proclaimed healers or figures from the fringes of medicine." Id. at 594-95.
284. Id. at 594.
285. Id
286. 764 F. Supp. 728 (D. Conn. 1991).
287. Bucci v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Conn., 764 F. Supp. 728, 733 (D. Conn. 1991).
288. See id at 730.
289. See i&. at 729.
290. Id.
291. See id at 732.
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insurer was aware that more than sixty other health insurers covered
HDC-ABMT for breast cancer, and Kathleen Bucci's oncologist
testified that the procedure yielded higher complete response and
disease-free rates than conventional chemotherapy.- Os Consequent-
ly, the oncologist maintained, HDC-ABMT was not experimental, but
an accepted procedure.' The court, noting that the absence of a
threshold of acceptability 5 in the exclusionary language gave the
insurer an unacceptable "floating standard which can rise or fall in
any fact situation," 5 held that the coverage denial was "arbitrary
and capricious."'
After weighing the expert testimony, a federal district court in
Adams v. Blue Crss & Blue Shield of Maryland --s reached a similar
conclusion, albeit in dicta.' For several reasons, the court conclud-
ed that the evidence presented at trial disproved the insurer's
conclusion that HDC-ABMT for breast cancer was experimental.'
First, the patient could expect longer disease-free survival with HDC-
ABMT than with conventional chemotherapy. 1  Second, the
patient would spend longer time "off therapy" after HDC-ABMT1l
thereby improving her overall quality of life. 3 The likelihood of
adverse side effects was substantially reduced during this off-therapy
292. Se id. at 731.
293. See id. at 730 (showing 59% complete response rate for HDC-ABMT versus 10-20% for
low dose chemotherapy, as well as a 20-30% disease-free rate for two years for HD C-AB.MT versus
0% for low dose chemotherapy).
294. See i at 731 (characterizing procedure as one accepted by doctors).
295. Id. at 732.
296. Id. at 733.
297. I&
298. 757 F. Supp. 661 (D. Md. 1991).
299. Adams v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Md., 757 F. Supp. 661, 676 (D. hid. 1991)
(finding that Blue Cross decision to deny benefits to breast cancer patients seeking I-D C.ABM T
treatment was "arbitrary and capricious").
300. Id. at 676-77 (characterizing HDC-ABMf" as generally accepted medical practice and
finding Blue Cross' decision to refuse coverage for treatment to be unreasonable).
301. Id. at 674 (noting dramatic results in disease-free survival rates of vwomen on -DC.
ABMT, particularly those in Stage H/Hl primary breast cancer, 70% of whom achieved diseae
free survival after 30 months, as compared with 20% survival rates in women on conventional
chemotherapy). The court observed*
[E]ven if a substantial number of those women were to die tomorrow and the overall
survival rate were to drop to the level of lowdose therapy, at any one point in time




303. Id. (interpreting benefits of HDC-ABMT to include decrease in time during which
patient experiences toxic side effects of chemotherapy and corresponding increase in patient's
quality of life).
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period, allowing the patient to spend more time outside the hospi-
tal. 4 In articulating why HDC-ABMT had proven medical value,
the court in Adams thus applied what resembled a "primary purpose
to benefit the patient" standard.'u5
As noted earlier, when an Experimental Exclusion does not provide
defining criteria, courts have considered it inherently ambiguous."06
In such instances, a court should weigh expert medical testimony,
apply a "primary purpose to benefit the patient" standard, and
ultimately make its own determination of whether or not a treatment
is experimental, 07 regardless of whether the insurers' plan adminis-
trators and coverage decisionmakers are entitled to deferential review
under ERISA. This approach thus effectively eliminates any deference
to coverage decisions made by plan administrators, thereby promoting
more uniformity in the outcomes of health insurance coverage
disputes."08 Additionally, it encourages those insurers that seek to
limit their cost exposure for truly experimental treatments to carefully
enumerate in their policies objective criteria for defining "experimen-
tal."309
2. Reasonable efforts not undertaken by insurer
Courts' inquiry should not end even when the exclusionary
language in a health insurance policy is clear and is accompanied with
defining criteria. Rather, the courts must still explore whether the
insurer undertook reasonable steps in arriving at its coverage
304. Id (referring to higher quality of life including reduced side effects, such as nausea and
hair loss resulting, for patients under HDC-ABMT).
305. Compare i&d with Taylor v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 517 N.W.2d 864, 869
(Mich. Ct App. 1994) (explaining primary purpose to benefit patient standard as one where
patient has opportunity to be free of cancer for "substantial period").
306. See supra note 235.
307. See Bucci v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Conn., 764 F. Supp. 728, 731-32 (D. Conn.
1991) (summarizing arguments of various experts and concluding that insurance company's
reasoning was unsubstantiated); Adams v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Md., 757 F. Supp. 661,
676 (D. Md. 1991) (concluding that HDC-ABMT was medically accepted after weighing
testimony of medical experts).
308. Otherwise, the following situation can theoretically result. Suppose patient A and
patient B have identical stages of breast cancer, are both seeking HDC-ABMTs, and both have
health insurance policies where the exclusionary language does not include the defining criteria.
Upon denial of coverage from their respective insurers, both patients seekremedies through the
courts. Although they appear to be similarly situated, it so happens that patient A's health
insurance policy is subject to a deferential standard of review whereas patient B's is not.
Consequently, the same court could potentially uphold the insurer's coverage denial for patient
A, and not for patient B. The difference in outcomes appears not only confusing, but unfair.
309. SeeHarris v. Mutual of Omaha Cos., 992 F.2d 706,713 n.4 (7th Cir. 1993) (pointing to
various case examples as underscoring need for insurers and policyholders to use "greater care
in their dealings," particularly where drafting of contracts is concerned).
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determination. An insurer has an obligation to investigate the
proposed treatment before making any such decision."' 0
In White v. Caterpillar, Inc.,311 a federal district court applied a
deferential standard of review to the insurer's coverage determination
with respect to the exclusionary language and defining criteria of
Betty White's health insurance policy121 Despite the policy's clarity
on this point, the court held that the insurer's decision to deny Betty
White coverage for HIDC-ABMT as a treatment for breast cancer was
"arbitrary and capricious.""' The court focused its analysis on the
insurer's failure to execute reasonable efforts for basing its coverage
denial. 4
The defining criteria in the health insurance policy stated: " ' [The
insurer] will use the reports of the Clinical Efficacy Assessment Project
of the American College of Physicians and the Diagnostic and
Therapeutic Assessment... of the American Medical Association as
a guide to determine whether a surgical procedure is ... generally
accepted . ... '"I" In 1985, the Diagnostic and Therapeutic Tech-
nology Assessment (DATTA) report considered HD C-ABMT for breast
cancer to be "investigational,""1 6 the functional equivalent of "exper-
imental." Five years later, however, the DATrA report found that
HDC-ABMT was appropriate, established, and promising for the
treatment of cancer, though it did not specifically address breast
cancer31 7 Relying primarily on the 1985 DATMA report instead of
the more recent 1990 DATTA report, the insurer denied Betty White
coverage.
3 18
The court in White held that the insurer had not made reasonable
efforts to research HDC-ABMT for treating breast cancer prior to
making the coverage decision 1 9 First, the insurer relied on the
310. See Butd, 764 F. Supp. at 732 (referring to need for insurance company to conduct
"inquiry" prior to refusing benefits); Anderson v. -MO Neb., No. A-92-489, 1993 WL 61839, at
*7 (Neb. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 1993) (holding that investigation of treatment is required prior to
denial of coverage on ground that treatment is "not medically necessary").
311. 765 F. Supp. 1418 (W.D. Mo.), afildZ 985 F.2d 564 (8th Cr. 1991).
312. White v. Caterpillar, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1418, 1420 (W.D. Mo.) (finding that health
policy confers discretion upon administrator to make eligibility determinations by saying that
administrator "shall have the sole and exclusive right to determine whether or not such
procedure is a generally accepted surgical operation") (quoting insurance plan involved in case),
afd, 985 F.2d 564 (8th Cir. 1991).
313. Id at 1423.
314. See ii at 1422.
315. Id- at 1420 (quoting insurance plan).
316. See i& at 1421.
317. See id,
318. See id at 1420-21 (discussing insurer's argument that 1985 findings were still accurate
because they were never revised).
319. Id. at 1422.
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outdated 1985 DATTA report, even when more current information
was available. 2° The more recent report should have, at the very
least, alerted the insurer to the need to inquire further.32 1 Second,
the insurer failed to read and consider four articles submitted by Betty
White that related to the treatment.'s Finally, the fact that the
insurer had made a phone call to another insurance company seeking
its recommendation on HDC-ABMT for breast cancer was insuffi-
cient." For these reasons, the court admonished the insurer for
"bury[ing] its head in the sand,""2 4 instead of engaging in reason-
able efforts to make a coverage determination,,
Reasonable efforts involve relevant inquiries and adequate research.
At the very minimum, reasonable efforts should include: (1) a full
evaluation of a policyholder's medical records and history; (2) a
review of all materials and related articles submitted to the insurer by
a policyholder and her treating oncologist; (3) an investigation into
recent medical literature, reports, and evidence; 26 (4) consultations
with experts in the relevant medical field; and (5) a comparison of
other insurance companies' coverage policies.'s When insurers fail
to execute these reasonable efforts, courts should not uphold their
coverage denials.
3. Conflict of interest
Courts must recognize when economic interests may have improp-
erly motivated a coverage denial. Coverage denials made by plan
administrators and coverage decisionmakers who operate under an
inherent conflict of interest should not be upheld, even if their
decisions are entitled to deferential review under ERISA. 2 1 This
320. Id. at 1421-22.
321. Id. (stating that "defendant steadfastly clung to the results of a five-year old study In
denying plaintiff coverage," and noting that 1990 DATTA study should have been accorded
more attention by insurer in reaching its decision).
322. Id. at 1422.
323. Id. at 1422 n.6.
324. Id. at 1422.
325. Id.
326. See White, 765 F. Supp. at 1421-22 (criticizing insurer's ill-advised decision to rely on
outdated study); cf. Hawkins v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, No. CIVAl:94CV6,19941WL 214262,
at *4 (W.D.N.C.Jan. 28, 1994) (pointing out that medical research is in constant state of flux,
and that, therefore, up-to-the-minute inquiries should be conducted); Bucci v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Conn., 764 F. Supp. 728,732 (D. Conn. 1991) (noting that medical information Is "not
static, but is developing").
327. SeeHeasleyv. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.d 1249, 1263 (3d Cir. 1993) (recommending
that "judgment of other insurers and medical bodies" should be considered in determining
whether procedure is experimental).
328. See supra notes 21--15 and accompanying text (discussing deference to plan
administrator's determination under"arbitrary and capricious" standard of review under ERISA
plans); see also Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 898 F.2d 1556, 1565-66 (1lth Cir.
1995] BREAST CANCER PATIENTS V. THEIR INSURERS 2075
conflict arises from the divergent interests to which a plan administra-
tor owes a duty to the beneficiaries of the policy'2 and loyalty to the
insurer.a Specifically, the plan administrator, who is employed by
the insurance company, can maximize the insurer's profits"1 by
exercising discretion to not pay claims, and thus operates under a
conflict of interest. 2 A policyholder's claim may not receive an
objective evaluation if the coverage review process involves such a
1990) (holding that insurer is presumed to be influenced by conflict of interest. unless proven
differently). But cf. F-restone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1939) (finding
that conflict of interest should be weighed as only "a cado[r] in determining whether there is
an abuse of discretion'") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 ant. d (1959))
(emphasis added); Bemards v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 987 F.2d 486,488 (8th Cir. 1993)
(arguing that construing ambiguities against insurer under common contract principles is not
appropriate in ERISA-governed plans (citing Finley v. Special Agents Mut. Benefit Ass'n, 957
F.2d 617, 619 (8th Cir. 1992))).
329. ERISA imposes a duty on the fiduciary of a health insurance policy to act "solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries... and for the exdusive purpose... ofproviding
benefits ... and defraying reasonable expenses." 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1938); =ir also
RESTATFMNT (SECOND) OF TRusTs, supra note 328, § 170(1) (delineating trustee's duty to
administer trust exclusively in beneficiaries' interest).
330. S,- ag., Bechtold v. Physicians Health Plan of N. Ind., 19 F.3d 322,325 (7th Cir. 1994)
(stating plaintiff's argument that insurer would gain greater profit by denying claim and
therefore administrator "was operating under a conflict of interest"); Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield United of Wis., 846 F.2d 416, 423 (7th Cir.) (noting that insurer's reliance on its own
advisory groups created likelihood of abuse), crt. denimd 488 US. 856 (1938); Calhoun v.
Complete Health Care, 860 F. Supp. 1494, 1500 (S.D. Ala. 1994) (stating that insurer saved
money, by increasing profits or avoiding losses, when it refused to cover policyholders' claims);
Hasty v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Health & Welfare Fund, 851 F. Supp. 1250,
1256 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (noting plaintiffs assertion that insurer was operating under conflict of
interest that impacted its decision to refuse coverage); Wilson v. Group Hospitalization &
Medical Sens., 791 F. Supp. 309, 312 (D.D.C. 1992) (finding that insurer's fiduciay role is in
constant conflictwith its role as profit-making entity); see alsojuy Instruction No. S116 requested
by Defendant, Fox v. Health Net (Cal. Super. Ct. 1993) (No. 219262) (on file with Tlze Ar,.eiran
Univeaity Lam Review). The defendant's requested jury instruction in Fax stated:
The insurer is bound to conduct itself with the utmost good faith for the benefit ofits
insured. However, the protection afforded by that relationship is not unlimited. The
insurer has no duty totally to disregard its own interests when they conflict with the
insured's interests. An insurer owes competing duties to other policyholders and
stockholders not to honor meridess claims.
Id The Foxjury instruction cited as authority the California case of Thompson v. Cannon, which
discussed the divided loyalties of insurance adjusters and the unreasonableness of expecting that
adjusters would work only in the insured's interests. Thompson v. Cannon, 274 Cal Rptr. 608,
610 (1990).
331. A conflict of interest arises only when a coverage denial avoids a direct expense to an
insurer, as opposed to a system that merely allocates its committed funds among beneficiaries.
Cf. Bee/avd, 19 F.3d at 325 (noting that insurer stood to gain profit from denying coverage,
thereby signalling conflict of interest).
332. See Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 898 F.2d 1556, 1561 (11th Cir. 1990)
(noting that because insurance company pays out to beneficiaries from its on assets, its
fiduciary role lies in perpetual conflict with its profit makling role as business), cert. dnied, 498
U.S. 1040 (1991); Wsm, 791 F. Supp. at 312 (discussing conflict of interest posed ty insurance
companies' two roles as fiduciary profit making business).
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conflict of interest, a factor that a reviewing court should weigh
heavilya"
Conflict of interest played a substantial role in Doe v. Group
Hospitalization & Medical Services, in which the Fourth Circuit
concluded that a health insurer "abused its discretion" by denying
HDC-ABMT coverage for a patient with multiple myelomas The
court afforded less deference to the insurer's coverage denial given
its clear financial interest: 336
[The insurer's] profit from the insurance contract depends on
whether the claims allowed exceed the assumed risks. To the
extent that [the insurer] has discretion to avoid paying claims, it
thereby promotes the potential for its own profit. That type of
conflict flows inherently from the nature of the relationship entered
into by the parties .... "'
Courts should follow the Fourth Circuit's approach and presume
that a decision made by an insurer while operating under a conflict
of interest is an abuse of discretion. The burden is on the plan
administrator to prove that self-interest and profits did not motivate
his or her decision.3 38 In line with that approach, many courts have
weighed the conflict of interest factor heavily against the insurer, even
when the plan administrator's decisions were entitled to defer-
ence. 3 9  Other courts have merely used it to buttress their findings
that the insurer's coverage denial was inappropriate."4°
333. Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Medical Servs., 3 F.3d 80,86-87 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating
that even careful, sensitive coverage decisionmaker may unconsciously favor profit interest of
insurance company over interest of beneficiaries, leaving beneficiaries less protected).
334. 3 F.3d 80 (4th Cir. 1993).
335. 1& at 89.
336. 1&
337. Id. at 86.
338. See Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 898 F.2d 1556, 1566 (11th Cir. 1990)
(holding that burden shifts to fiduciary to prove that self-interest did not taint its interpretation
of insurance plan provisions when beneficiary demonstrated substantial conflict of interest);
Arthurs v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 760 F. Supp. 1095, 1098-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (applying less
deferential standard of review because plan administrator had conflict of interest).
339. See, e.g., Doe, 3 F.3d at 87 (holding that although fiduciary's decision was entitled to
some deference, lesser deference was warranted in order to neutralize influences resulting from
conflict of interest when insurer and administrator of health benefits plan are same); Clark v.
K-Mart Corp., No. 91-3723,1992 WL 106935, at *8 (3d Cir. May 22,1992) (Scirica,J., dissenting)
(arguing that majority mistakenly applied arbitrary and capricious standard where less
deferential standard was more appropriate due to conflict of interest); Brown, 898 F.2d at 1566
(holding that Blue Cross' fiduciary duty conflicted with its profit making role, and therefore,
fiduciary could not act in exclusive best interest of beneficiaries); Boland v. King County Medical
Blue Shield, 798 F. Supp. 638, 643 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (holding that standard of review vas not
purely deferential due to conflict of interest, even though plan administrator had been granted
full discretionary authority by plan).
340. See, e.g., Anderson v. HMO Neb., No. A-92-489, 1993 WL 61839, at *8 (Neb. Ct App.
Mar. 9,1993) (bolstering its finding that coverage denial was arbitrary and capricious by alluding
to conflict between insurer's role as administrator and payor); Kekis v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
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-Ajury trial before a lower state court in California in Fox v. Health
Net of Calforias 1 dealt with the conflict of interest issue. This case
gained national recognition wa when the jury awarded $89 million
in damages to a policyholder, by far the largest amount ever levied
against an insurer for denial of medical benefits.' A substantial
portion of the case focused on the insurance company
decisionmaker's inherent conflict of interest, which stemmed from
economic incentives to deny coverage built into Health Net's
compensation structure.' The immense jury avrard, comprised of
$12.1 million in compensatory damages and $77 million in punitive
damages s sends a strong message to the health insurance industry
to revise its coverage review process, particularly by eliminating any
conflict of interest.
Viewed in light of the nationwide debate over health care reform,
the Fox case demonstrates how managed health care and cost
containment could lead to both decreased availability of health care
and lower quality care' 47 At age thirty-eight, Nelene Fox, a mother
of Utica-Watertown, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 571, 583 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (interpreting unclear terms in
favor of insured coupled where conflict of interest led to improper coverage denial); Bucci v
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Conn., 764 F. Supp. 728, 733 (D. Conn. 1991) (buttressing its
finding that benefits denial was arbitrary and capricious with conflict of interest factor because
"denial avoids a direct expense to [insurer], not merely an allocation of commited funds"); see
also Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of WIs., 846 F.2d 416, 423 (7th Cir. 1938)
(indicating that insurer's reliance on its own advisory groups created inherent risk of abuse);
Scalamnandre v. Oxford Health Plans (N.Y.), Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1050, 1060 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(mentioning that insurer was not entitled to broad discretion because it operated under conflict
of interest when it paid benefits out of its own assets).
341. No. 219692 (Cal. Super. Ct., Dec. 23, 1993), cited in Calformia fJy Orders HfO to Pay
$90 Miion to Estate of Cancer VTictim, 3 Health IL Rep. (BNA) 18, 19 (Jan. 6, 1994). Although
manycourts have struggled with insurance coveragefor breast cancer treatments, this case is one
of a very few to be tried before ajury. Id.
342. Seegnerafy Erik Eckholm, $89AMWlionAwarded Family 17o SuedH.M.O., N.Y. Tvms, Dec.
30, 1993, atAl; Tom Gorman,Jury Adds $77A ,tiRon toJudg menAgafi HMO, L.A. TIM, Dec.
29, 1993, atA1 (reporting thatjuy awarded $77 million in punitive damages and $12.1 million
in compensatory damages to family of breast cancer victim); Michael Meyer &Andrew Murr, Not
My Health Care, NEwVWEK, Jan. 10, 1994, at 36 (indicating thatjuxy award as "Aeup call" for
health care industry and Washington policymakers who debate how to balance demands for
innovative "high tech" medicine against rising costs); 'MIats A Life Ibth" - Health Insurance
Injustice (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 15, 1994) (portraying sentiments of family members,
doctors dealing with insurance company, and jury).
343. Eckhohn, supra note 342, at Al (positing that high award "has sent nervous tremors
through the health insurance industry"); cf HMO Seta Deiaokf-Tramen Lawsitd in Cali'arnia
Cancer Case, 3 Health L Rep. (BNA) 487, 487 (Apr. 14.1994) (reporting that Health Net aban-
doned appeal in favor of settlement for undisclosed sum).
344. SweFrandsj. Serbaroli, Demial of Paymen for Medical Trmt enLt Cmzernforlnsur4 N.Y.
LJ., Mar. 30, 1994, at 3, 4 (stating that "experimental" nature of HDC-ABMT was not major
issue injury deliberations).
345. Id.
346. See Meyer & Murr, supra note 342, at 36.
347. Cf Gorman, supra note 342 (suggesting implications that Fox v. He_,th Net may have for
health care industry).
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of three daughters, was diagnosed with breast cancer 43 Despite two
mastectomies and conventional chemotherapy, her cancer spread to
her bone marrow. 9  Fox's doctor informed her that she had at
most eight months to live with continued conventional chemotherapy,
but suggested that HDC-ABMT could provide a better quality of life
and a prolonged life expectancy, as well as the possibility of cure.
350
Fox agreed to undergo the procedure.3 1
When Fox became eligible for treatment at the University of
Southern California cancer center (U.S.C.), 52 her doctor wrote a
letter to her HMO, Health Net, 53 discussing the necessity of her
treatment.' Health Net, however, denied coverage, claiming HDC-
ABMT for breast cancer was experimental and would not be effective
because her cancer had reached advanced stages.355 A short time
later, Fox's doctor told her that he no longer recommended the
procedure. 56
Several days after the coverage denial, Health Net offered to pay for
Fox's procedure, but only if a specified transplant facility other than
U.S.C. approved her.3 57  In order to determine her eligibility at
another facility, Fox would have been forced to undergo more
extensive, lengthy testing, a delay that would carry the risk that her
cancer would spread further. If her cancer progressed during that
348. SeeTrial Brief for Plaintiffs at 2, Fox v. Health Net (Cal. Super. Ct. 1993) (No. 219692)
(on file with The American Univerity Law Review).
349. See id.
350. See id. at 2-3.
351. See id. at 3.
352. See id.
353. Health Net is a federally qualified Health Maintenance Organization that offers prepaid
health care plans to employers in California. See Trial Brief for Defendant at 2, Fox v, Health
Net (Cal. Super. Ct. 1993) (No. 219692) (on file with The American University Law Review).
Nelene Fox obtained health insurance through her husband's employer, the Temecula Unified
School District, which employed him as a public high school teacher. See Trial Brief for
Plaintiffs, supra note 348, at 2. Of the plans offered by his employer, Mr. Fox had selected
Health Net to be the comprehensive health care insurer for his family. &6 Trial Brief for
Defendants at 3.
354. SeeTrial Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 348, at 4. But seeTrial Brief for Defendant, supra
note 353, at 20 (clarifying that doctor's letters were "solely for the purpose of attempting to
assist [Nelene Fox] in obtaining insurance coverage for the treatment," and that doctor later
admitted his letters misrepresented nature of Fox's medical condition, as well as risks and
benefits of HDC-ABMT for her condition).
355. See Trial Brief for Defendant, supra note 353, at 11-12.
356. See Trial Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 348, at 3.
357. See Trial Brief for Defendant, supra note 353, at 14. Fox's family alleged that Health
Net's offer was motivated by stall tactics so that Fox's illness would spread and she would soon
become ineligible for HDC-ABMT at any facility. See Trial Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 348,
at 33. But see Trial Brief for Defendant, supra note 353, at 31 (stating that offer for second
opinion was "solel due to the concern of [Health Net's Vice President] that the treatment was
very risky for Mrs. Fox and that she may not have made a truly informed decision to undergo
it") (emphasis in original).
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period, she in turn risked becoming medically ineligible for HDC-
ABMT at any transplant facility.-as  For that reason, Fox decided to
proceed with the HDC-ABMT at U.S.C. on a self-pay basis.P9 Family
and friends helped raise the necessary funds through nationwide
public appeals, softball tournaments, garage sales, bake sales, art
auctions, dinner parties, and other fundraising events.
In their suit against Health Net Fox's family argued, among other
things, 61 that Fox's claim did not receive fair and objective review
because Health Net's coverage review process operated under a
conflict of interestOSt Fox's family alleged that her doctor's "change
of mind" was due to the Health Net's improper influence.,, A
bonus plan supplemented the salary of the Health Net executive
responsible for making coverage determinations, S6 under which the
Health Net coverage reviewer received a bonus beyond his salary
"based on reductions in medical loss ratio attributable to his
efforts."" In other words, Health Net's decision whether to cover
costly medical procedures, such as HIDC-ABMT, affected not only the
company's losses and medical loss ratios, but also the bonuses of the
individual's deciding whether to provide coverage.3 While the jury
358. Se Trial Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 348, at 33.
359. See Trial Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 348, at 5.
360. See Trial Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 348, at 4-5. But cf. Trial Brief for Defendant.
supra note 353, at 29-30 (emphasizing that fundraising activities began before Health Net was
contacted about coverage for HDC-ABMT).
361. In their lawsuit, Nelene Fox's family alleged breach of contract, breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing (bad faith denial of coverage), and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Trial Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 348, at 8. Nelene Fox died during the
pendency of this litigation. Fox v. Health Net, 37 AT.A L Rep. 178 (June 1994).
362. See Trial Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 348, at 34-35 (submitting that Health Net's
doctor who made coverage decision affecting plaintiff was its Vice President and Associate
Medical Director, and whose salary was supplemented by merit bonus plan based on Health
Net's financial condition).
363. Trial Brieffor Plaintiffs, supra note 348, atSl (indicating that doctor's recommendation
changed immediately following his conversation with HMO officials).
364. Tria Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 348, at 34.
365. See Trial Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 348. The following is an excerpt from a
deposition taken of Health Net's Medical Director.
Q. Do you believe by refusing requests for bone marrow transplants. (the coverage
decisionmaker] would benefit in any way by this plan?
A. Given the structure, yes, the incentive is there to deny services. Given the
individual [coverage decisionmaker] and the fact that he has a long-term iew, ,hich
says such practices cost you a tremendous amount down the line, I am convinced that
would never happen.
Trial Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 348, at 34-35.
366. See Trial Brief for Plaintiffi, supra note 348, at 34-35. Seg-mmLy Lzad IW~trn Evidenmc
of Tinandal Motive Asist Plaintiff in Bad Faith Tria! 8 INSIDE LMG., Apr. 1994, at 6 (discussing
HMO's bonus programs that influenced decision to reject breast cancer patients claim). But
cf Eckholm, supranote 342, at 1 (mentioning Health Net medical director's denial ofaccusation
that Health Net officials had financial incentive to withhold useful treatments).
2080 TBE AMElUCAN UNnvmriy LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:2029
apparently calculated punitive damages 67 to deter further abuses
specifically by Health Net,368 the exorbitant award further conveyed
a warning to all HMOs against providing financial incentives for
withholding treatments."
As this Comment has recommended, courts should heavily weigh
a conflict of interest against the insurer, and advise jurors to do the
same.370  This will compel insurers to modify their coverage
decisionmaking process so that any financial incentive to control costs,
which at the same time compromises patients' interests, would be
eliminated.37  This could be accomplished in either of two ways.
Insurers could designate independent committees, comprised of
medical professionals, to assess policyholders' claims. 72 Coverage
determinations made by the independent committee must be binding
on the insurer; otherwise, the conflict of interest will not be eliminat-
ed. Alternatively, insurers could structurally detach" the
decisionmaking process from the insurer's assets. From a policy
perspective, these changes would protect the policyholders by
ensuring an objective review of medical coverage claims.
C. Case Law Analysis-Insurer Prevails
For a variety of reasons, three circuit courts 73 and numerous
367. The jury instructions for punitive damages read as follows:
If you determine that punitive damages should be assessed against a defendant, in
arriving at the amount of such an award, you must consider:. (1) The reprehensibility
of the conduct of the defendant (2) The amount of punitive damages which will have
a deterrent effect on the defendant in the light of defendant's financial condition (3)
That the punitive damages must bear a reasonable relation to the injury, harm, or
damage actually suffered by the plaintiff.
Jury Instruction No. 14.72.2 (1989 Re-Revision) Fox v. Health Net (Cal. Super. Ct. 1993) (No.
219692) (on file with The American University Law Review).
368. See 'What a Life Worth, " supra note 342, at 5 (quotingjuror as saying "we're aware that
possibly they were saving money by denying the treatment and therefore there would be more
money for business").
369. See supra notes 342-46 and accompanying text.
370. See Heasley v. Belden & Blake Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1260 n.12 (3d Cir. 1993) (advising
that courts scrutinize more closely decisions by insurers acting under conflict of interest).
371. Cf Rodwin, supra note 185, at 605 (noting that managed care providers may reduce
physicians' income if number of referrals or tests ordered exceeds threshold costs that health
maintenance organization sets).
372. See Heasley, 2 F.3d at 1260 n.12 (suggesting that organization reference in insurance
policy should be independent to avoid conflict of interest); see also Grace P. Monaco & Rebecca
L. Burke, Insurer as Gatekeeper-Part Two: Policy Obstacles in Unproven Methods Litigation, 20 FORUM
400, 409-10 (1985) (discussing options for insurers in defining experimental treatments). But
cf. Neugebauer, supra note 219, at 83, 84 (noting that after Fox case was settled, Health Net
amended its plan specifically to exclude coverage of HDC-ABMT for breast cancer).
373. See Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins., 18 F.3d 1405, 1412 (7th Cir. 1994) (indicating that
despite court's compassion for patient, it was institutionally unequipped to decide larger social
question reserved for political branches and was empowered only to decide legal issues), Harris
v. Mutual of Omaha Cos., 992 F.2d 706, 713 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that denial of coverage
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federal district courts'7 4 have upheld insurers' coverage denials for
HDC-ABMT in the treatment of breast cancer. As discussed earlier,
this Comment argues that courts should uphold an insurers' coverage
denial only when all of the following three conditions have been
satisfied. (1) the policy contains reasonable criteria for defining
"experimental";-7 (2) reasonable efforts have been made on which
to base the coverage decision;s76  and (3) the coverage
decisionnaker operates under no conflict of interest." In the
following cases, courts have taken a different approach and upheld
the insurer's coverage denial because some, though not all, of these
conditions were fulfilled.
In Hasty v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and
Welfare Fund,"73 a federal district court found that an insurer's
decision to deny Loretta Hasty coverage for her breast cancer
treatment was not arbitrary and capricious."s The insurer, Central
States, was a not-for-profit trust fund, 0 which was governed and
administered by a Board of Trustees that was responsible for making
coverage determinations." The Board's coverage denial vras based
on an exclusionary clause in Hasty's health insurance policy that
stated that the insurance company would not pay for "care, treatment,
was not arbitrary and capricious, primarily because experimental excusion was defined); Clark
v. K-Mart Corp., No. 91-3723, 1992 WL 106935, at *6 (3d Cir. May 22, 1992) (agreeing with
insurer that HDC-ABMT was not yet established treatment for breast cancer); Holder v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 951 F.2d 89, 91 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding trial courts finding that
-DC-AB IT for breast cancer was experimental). But ef. Callinari, supra note 147, at 39-40
(arguing that outcomes in Third and Fifth Circuits are not really detrimental to breast cancer
patients).
374. S- eg., Hasty v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Health & Welfare Fund,
851 F. Supp. 1250, 1260 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (holding that insurer's decision to deny coverage %as
not "arbitrary and capricious"); Lowery v. Health Chicago, No. 92-C-7657, 1994 WL 194265. at
*6 (N.D. li. May 16, 1994) (holding that insurer's denial of coverage was proper under either
"arbitrary and capricious" or Ide snostandard of review); Uhrich v. Caterpillar Inc., No. 9340-
5271, 1993 WIL 478990, at *5 (N.D. II. Nov. 18, 1993) (holding that insurer did not abuse its
discretion in denying coverage for HDC-ABMT procedure); Arrington v. Group Hospitalization
& Medical Servs., 806 F. Supp. 287, 290 (D.D.C. 1992) (finding HDC.-A MT for breast cancer
dearly excluded under insurance policy's language).
375. Sre supra Part ILB.1.
376. See supra Part ILB.2.
377. See supra Part II.B.3.
378. 851 F. Supp. 1250 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
379. Hasty v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Health & Welfare Fund, 851 F.
Supp. 1250, 1260 (NJ). Ind. 1994). The court in Hasty found that the health insurance policy,
which constituted an employee welfare benefit plan subject to ERISA. id. at 1253, conferred
discretionary authority on the Board of Trustees, id. at 1255 (quoting insurance policy as stating
that insurer "is the only group having the authority to change or interpret any part of this
Plan"). Therefore, the Trustee's decision warranted a deferential standard of review. Id. at
125.
380. See i&L at 1253. All assets and income were used only to pay medical claims or defray
administrative expenses. &- id.
381. See id.
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services and supplies which are not unformly and professionally
endorsed by the general medical community as standard medical care,
including care, treatment, services, and supplies which are experimen-
tal in nature." 2
The Board of Trustees undertook reasonable efforts in arriving at
its decision.' First, Central States transmitted Hasty's medical
records to the Pittsburgh Cancer Institute, an independent, objective
third party, for evaluation.' The Institute reported that, given
Hasty's condition, the proposed treatment was not uniformly and
professionally endorsed by the medical community as standard
medical care.' In addition, the Board of Trustees reviewed all
materials relating to Hasty's medical records, as well as affidavits
submitted by her treating oncologist.16 Further, they considered
medical literature regarding the treatment, as well as the outcome of
prior litigationm7 The court concluded that overall, this compre-
hensive review, which involved information advocating positions both
for and against the proposed treatment,3 constituted reasonable
efforts on the part of the insurer or, more specifically, the Board of
Trustees.
In addition to noting the Board's reasonable efforts, 9 the court
in Hasty found that the Board of Trustees did not operate under any
conflict of interest."9 g The Board of Trustees was not both the
administrator and the insurer..9' Rather, the two were structurally
distinct; the Trustees represented the administrator and the insurer
was the Trust itself.92 Also, denial of benefits would not produce
profits, because the insurer was a not-for-profit entity. 93 Conse-
quently, the Board of Trustees had no incentive to deny benefits to
policyholders .3  Additionally, unlike the decisionmaker in Doe,
395
382. 1& at 1254.
383. See id at 1253 (remarking that coverage reviewers sat dovm with 66 page agenda and




387. See id. at 1253-54. These seven articles also discussed the proposed treatment's overall
acceptance within the medical community. See iti
388. I& at 1254.
389. Id. at 1258.
390. Id at 1256.
391. See id. at 1257.
392. See i&.
393. See id (noting that denial of benefits left more funds available for other claims).
394. Id.
395. Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Medical Servs., 3 F.3d 80 (4th Cir. 1993). In Doe Blue
Cross and Blue Shield of the National Capital area was both the administrator and the insurer.
See id. at 86; see supra notes 333-40 and accompanying text (discussing court's decision in Doe).
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the Board of Trustees' decisions to approve coverage would not
reduce funds from its own pockets."' 5 Instead, the Trustees acted
as "impartial judges."
s9
Nevertheless, this Comment maintains that when experimental
exclusions stand alone, unaccompanied by objective defining criteria,
the exclusions are inherently ambiguous. The Experimental
Exclusion in Hasty's policy did not contain defining criteria."s The
reviewing court should therefore have resolved the necessarily
ambiguous exclusion by weighing expert testimony and applying a
"primary purpose to benefit the patient" standard. The court refused,
however, to consider Hasty's evidence that the proposed treatment for
breast cancer was endorsed by the general medical community as
standard medical care.39 Instead, the court concluded that a
deferential standard of review was appropriate and simply deferred to
the conclusion reached by the Board," rather than making its own
determination °!
The health insurance policies before the Seventh Circuit in Fuja v.
Benefit Trust Lfe Insurance Co.,' and the Fifth Circuit in Holder v.
Prudential Insurance Company of America,40 3 did contain defining
criteria for disputed Experimental Exclusions.!4 The threshold
issue in Fujawas whether one of the defining criteria-"in connection
with medical or other research"-was itself ambiguous.P After
396. Compare Hasty, 851 F. Supp. at 1257 (noting that Board of Trustees do not lose funds
when claims are approved) uih Doe, 3 F.3d at 86 (finding Blue Cross' profits dependent upon
claims approved).
397. Hasty, 851 F. Supp. at 1258.
398. Swe i& at 1253 (citing language of policy).
399. L
400. I at 1259.
401. 1I
402. 18 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1994).
403. 951 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1992).
404. In Fuja, the policy only covered treatments
given in accordance with generally accepted principles of medical practice in the U.S.
at the time furnished; and that are appedovd for rdmbuemhet by te Healt Care Fnancing
Administration; and that are not deemed to be experimental, educational or
investigational in nature by any appropriate technological assessment body established
by any state or federal government, and that are not fumilk in connedion ueth nzedial
or other research.
Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 18 F.M 1405, 1408 (7th Cir. 1994).
In Hode, the policy provided that it would not cover
[alnything... not reasonably necessary for medical care of sickness or injury. To be
"reasonably necessary" a service ... must be ordered by a doctor and be conmonly and
customariy recognitedthroughout the doctor's profession as appropriate in the treaunent
of the diagnosed sickness or injury. It must neither be educational or eperir.ntai in
nature....
Holder v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 951 F.2d 89, 90 n.3 (5th Cir. 1992).
405. Fuja, 18 F.3d at 1409.
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concluding that it was not,4° the Seventh Circuit applied the
criterion to the Grace Fuja's request that her insurer cover her HDC-
ABMT treatment. 7  The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, did not
even pause to address whether the policy's criterion-"education or
experimental in nature"-was ambiguous. Instead, the court
proceeded with the case as if the policy language was clear."3
Finding that HDC-ABMT as a treatment for breast cancer was
legitimately precluded by Experimental Exclusions, both the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits denied coverage." 9 Both courts were persuaded
largely by the consent forms and protocols utilized in the administra-
tion of the policyholders' treatment.410  For instance, Fuja's proto-
cols and consent forms repeatedly invoked phrases such as "research
project," "research study," and noted that "safety and efficacy... will
be evaluated."4 ' Likewise, Wanda Holder's signed consent form
406. Id. at 1410.
407. Id. at 1412. The court determined that the Benefit Trust Insurance contract
unambiguously denied coverage for the HDC-ABMT treatment. Id.
408. Holder, 951 F.2d at 90-92 (beginning discussion by focusing on expert's opinion and trial
court's finding).
409. Fuja, 18 F.3d at 1411; Holder, 951 F.2d at 90-91. The Fifth Circuit in Holder emphasized
that its decision was based on the circumstances in 1987, leaving open the possibility that any
future litigation may turn in favor of the breast cancer patient. Holder, 951 F.2d at 91. The
court observed: "Of course, it is the nature of medical research that what may one day be
experimental may the next be state of the art treatment. Had [the insured cancer patient]
undergone a similar treatment more recently under an accepted protocol, this case may have
turned out differently." Id. The court went on to note: "Several recent studies and the cases
in which they have been applied to compel coverage of HDC-ABMT treatment for Stage IV
metastatic breast cancer lead to the conclusion that the treatment, under a different protocol
than that administered to [the cancer patient], may no longer be considered experimental."
Id. at 91 n.5.
410. See Fuja, 18 F.3d at 1411; Holder, 951 F.2d at 90.
411. Fuja, 18 F.3d at 1411; seeBrief for Appellant at 20-21, Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co.,
18 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1994) (No. 93-1150) (discussing evidence demonstrating that HDCABMT
falls within medical research criterion) (on file with The American University Law Review).
Appellant Benefit Trust stated that:
The protocol, under which [the treating oncologist] is currently the "principal
investigator," describes itself as "a study" and provides that"(o]ur studies have been on
of the first in this area of investigation ... " and that data "provide impetus for continued
investigation of high-dose intensification therapy in Stage IV breast cancer." [Grace
Fuja's] informed consent, which identifies (the treating oncologist] as the "Doctor(s)
Directing Research," is entitled: "Consent by Subject for Participation in Research
ProtocoL" It advises that "[y] ou are being asked to participate in a research study," and
that "li]n order to decide whether or not you want to be a part of this research study,
you should understand enough about its risks and benefits to make an informed
judgment" The "Purpose of Study," according to the informed consent, is "to use a
two-step approach in the treatment of advanced breast cancer," stating that "[tihe
safety and efficacy of this two-step approach in the treatment of breast cancer will be
evaluated." Under the "Agreement to Consent" provisions, it advises that "[t]he research
prject and the treatment procedures associated with it have been fully explained to me"
and that "I, the undersigned, hereby consent to participate as a subject in the above
described research projiet conducted at the University of Chicago Medical Center."
Clearly, then, the documentary evidence conclusively demonstrates that the HDC-
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described the treatment as an "experimental study"4 12 and her
protocol was given to only twenty women nationwide.
413
Several commentators have concluded that both Circuits' rulings
are overly generous to insurers.414 Insurers should be required to
enumerate objective standards and criteria against which a proposed
treatment can be measured. The phrases "educational or experimen-
tal in nature" and "in connection with medical or other research" do
not constitute a definite standard, and therefore are ambiguousll
In the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, health insurers are now free to
exploit such broad provisions,416 invoking them to deny coverage for
any treatment performed as part of a medical study or research, even
if the treatment is well-established. 417  While the Seventh Circuit
admitted that this result was conceivable, it found that the insurer
before it had not exploited the contract terms.1 Unfortunately,
the deferential nature in both the Fifth and Seventh Circuits' holdings
AB IT treatment is part and parcel of, and furnished in connection uith, medical
research.
Brief for Appellant at 20-21, Fuja (No. 93-1150) (alterations in original).
412. Hoder, 951 F.2d at 90 n.1.
413. I at 90.
414. Se Dave Lenckus, Cancer Coverage Dispu1e BUS. INS., Apr. 11. 1994, at 2. 36.
415. SeeFuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 809 F. Supp. 1333,1341 (N.D. IML 1992) (finding
that phrase "in connection with medical or other research" ambiguous because itvs "undefined
in the policy and defie(d] a single interpretation"), revud, 18 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1994). The
district court noted that this ambiguity was illustrated by the insurer's reimbursement for
standard chemotherapy even though treatment was "fumished in connection with medical or
other research." I&
416. But see Brief for Appellant at 28-29, supra note 411 (arguing that insurer cannot deny
coverage randomly and that insurer does not exploit broad medical research criterion). The
insurer argued:
First, . . . Benefit Trust has paid for [Grace Fujaes] standard-dose chemotherapy to
date, it is evident that Benefit Trust has in no uay attempted to give the phrase "in
connection with medical research" the kind of reading which the [district] court
suggests is possible. Second, there is no evidence that all cancer treatment, let alone
all treatment for all kinds of disease, is research and, therefore, falls within the phrase
"in connection with medical research." In fact, [the treating oncologist] stated that
[Grace Fuja's] initial cancer treatment itself was not part ofresearch; that more cancer
treatment is actually given in a community setting than in an academic medical setting;
and that even in an academic medical setting, some breast cancer treatments are not
part of research. Consequently, the District Court had absolutely no factual basis to
suggest that Benefit Trust reads, or could reasonably read, the phrase "in connection
with medical research" to deny coverage "in virtually any instance."
M.
417. SeeFuja, 809 F. Supp. at 1341. The court further hypothesized:
If an orthopedic surgeon either decided to conduct a time-study of how quickly she
could apply casts to the broken bones of her patients or decided to publish results of
how quickly the plaster hardened on those casts, [the insurer] could invoke the "in
connection with medical research" clause to deny coverage for the common treatment
of applying a cast to a broken ann.
i
418. Fuja, 18 F.3d at 1410.
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creates little, if any, incentive for insurers to revise and clarify their
policies.
D. Discrimination Claims
An increasing number of breast-cancer plaintiffs are alleging that
insurers' refusal to cover HDC-ABMT constitutes discrimination in
violation of state human rights laws,419 Title VII of the federal Civil
Rights Act,42 and/or the Americans with Disabilities Act.41 In
1993, for instance, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New
York City filed a lawsuit against an insurance company, Empire Blue
Cross and Blue Shield, for refusing to cover transplants for cancer pa-
tients.' Many of those patients were breast cancer patients receiv-
ing HDC with blood product support, a procedure analogous to HDC-
ABMT. According to Memorial, Empire covered HDC with blood
product support for cancers "that have a disproportionate incidence
among males (e.g., testicular cancer), and cancers that have a gender
neutral incidence (e.g., lymphoma)," yet refused to pay for analogous
cancer treatments that have "a disproportionately high incidence
419. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Complaint at 17-18, Bougie v. Gillette Health Care Plan (D. Minn.,
filed Oct. 11, 1994) (No. 4-94-CV-883) (on file with The American University LawReview) (alleging
that insurer's refusal to provide coverage for HDC-ABMT in treatment of breast cancer
"constitutes discriminatory treatment against and has a discriminatory impact on women ats a
sex" in violation of Minnesota Human Rights Act).
420. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to-15 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see, e.g., Plaintiffs Brief at 2-9, Reger
v. Espy, 836 F. Supp. 869 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (No. 1:93-CV-2213-RLV) (arguing that insurer
discriminated against women by failing to cover treatment for breast cancer); Plaintipfs
Complaint at 16-17, Bougie (N6. 4-94-CV-883) (alleging that coverage denial violated Civil Rights
Act).
421. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12110-12112 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see, e.g., Dodd v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Ass'n, 835 F. Supp. 888,891 (E.D. Va. 1993) (rejecting breast cancer patient's claim that
plan violated Americans with Disabilities Act); Plaintiffs Complaint at 15-16, Bougi (No. 4-94-CV-
885) (alleging that insurer's acts of covering HDC-ABMT for some types of diseases, but not for
breast cancer, "constitute[d] wrongful disability-based discrimination in violation of Americans
with Disabilities Act").
422. See PlaintifFs Complaint at 1, Memorial Hosp. for Cancer & Allied Diseases v. Empire
Blue Cross & Blue Shield (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed Aug. 19, 1993) (No. 93-2911) [hereinafter
Plaintiff's Complaint for Memorial] (on file with The American University Law Review); see also
Memorial Hosp. for Cancer & Allied Disease v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 18 Employee
Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1911-12 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1993) (discussing original state court filing).
That same year, the State of Texas, led by Attorney General Dan Morales, filed a lawsult
against Prudential Insurance Company ofAmerica seeking injunctive relief to prevent Prudential
from continuing to deny coverage for HDC-ABMT to breast cancer patients. See Plaintiffs
Original Petition in the Nature of Quo Warranto and Application for Injunction at 4, 12, Texas
v. Prudential (Dist. Ct. Travis County Tex. 1993) (No. 93-11381). The lawsuit vas subsequently
settled so that Prudential has to cover this treatment in all pending and future claims. See
Office of the Attorney General Press Release, Morales Settles Lawsuit with Prudential Over
Breast Cancer Treatment, Mar. 21, 1994 (on file with TheAmerican University Law Review); see also
Office of the Attorney General Press Release, Morales Sues Prudential Insurance Company's
Policies Forbid Life-Saving Cancer Drug, Sept. 23,1993 (discussing Prudential's coverage denial)
(on file with The American University Law Review).
423. See Plaintiffs Complaint for Memoria supra note 422.
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among females, such as breast cancer." 4 Memorial's complaint
concluded, among other things, s that this gender correlation in
coverage was discriminatory 8 in violation of the New York State
Human Rights Law and the Civil Rights Laws of the Administrative
Code of New York City.' As of 1995, the case was still pending,
and settlement negotiations were ongoing.4
To date, Reger v. LEpy I is the only reported decision to rule on
a gender discrimination claim involving HDC-ABMT for breast cancer.
Bonnie Reger was a federal employee' insured by Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Georgia." Her policy explicitly excluded as experi-
mental coverage for HDC-ABMT for breast cancer.' The plan did,
however, cover HDC-ABMT for five other cancers.P
Reger filed suit in federal district court, alleging that the plan's
facially neutraP- exclusion violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 because it had a disparate impact on females.' Two
factors were critical to this claim. First, over ninety-nine percent of all
breast cancers occur in womenYA Second, breast cancer is the most
424. Sew Plaindffs Complaint for Memoria4 supra note 422; cf. Decdamton ofJay P. Klarnet at
2, O'Connell v. King County Medical Blue Shield (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1992) (No. 92-2-11265-5)
(asserting that results of HDC-ABMT for breast cancer are comparable and possibly superior to
HDC-ABMT for testicular germ cell cancer); Respondent's Brief at 49-50, King County Medical
Blue Shield v. O'ConneU (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (No. 31949-0-I) (arguing that because health
insurance plan covered cancers that tend to occur more often in males, such as l)-mphoma and
leukemia, whereas "women's cancers," such as breast and epithelial ovarian cancer, were
considered experimental, it discriminated against women).
425. Plaintff's Complaintfor Memorida supra note 422, at 11-16 (alleging breach of contract,
breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of state insurance lavs).
426. Plaintif's Complaint for Memorial supra note 422, at 16.
427. Plaintiff's Complaintfor AMemoal, supra note 422, at 16.
428. Telephone Interview with counsel for Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center (Jan.
11, 1995).
429. 836 F. Supp. 869 (NJ). Ga. 1993).
430. SeReger v. Espy, 836 F. Supp. 869, 870 (NJ). Ga. 1993).
431. Id. (noting that Blue Cross offered insurance to federal employees pursuant to contract
with Office of Personnel Mianagement as authorized by Federal Employees Health Benefits Act).
432. See id. at 871 (mentioning that insurers excluded coverage for HDGABMT for breast
cancer because available data was inconclusive as to whether treatment ims superior to standard
chemotherapy). The plan did not cover
[s]ervices or supplies for or related to surgical transplant procedures for artificial or
human organ/tissue transplants not listed as specifically covered such as breast cancer
.... Related services or supplies include administration of high dose chemotherapy
when supported by transplant procedures.
Id.
433. See i (noting coverage for acute lymphocytic or non-lymphocytic leukemia, advanced
Hodgkin's lymphoma, advanced non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, advanced neuroblastoma, and
testicular, mediastinal, retroperitoneal, and ovarian germ cell tumors).
434. Se id. at 873.
435. Se id. at 870.
436. SeePlaintift's Response in Opposition to Federal Defendant's Partal Motion to Dismiss
at 3, Reger v. Espy, 836 F. Supp. 869 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (on file with The Areaiean Unive ty Law
Ree).
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commonly occurring cancer in women in the United States and is the
most common reason for performing HDC-ABMT.
437
The court rejected Reger's claim on the ground that Blue Cross'
policy excluded from coverage HDC-ABMTs for most types of cancers,
only one of which was breast cancer." On the whole, the preclu-
sion of coverage for most cancers affected men and women equal-
ly.1 9 Therefore, the court in Reger held that the health insurance
policy's facially neutral exclusion did not have a disparate impact on
women.
440
In a subsequent motion, Reger objected to the court's consider-
ation that more than one hundred forms of cancer are excluded from
the plan's coverage." 1  She claimed that only those cancers for
which HDC-ABMT has proven to be medically valuable (such as
breast, ovarian, testicular, leukemia, Hodgkin's and non-Hodgkin's
lymphoma, and multiple myeloma) were relevant.442  Of these, the
plan excluded only breast cancer and multiple myeloma.443 Accord-
ing to Reger, while multiple myeloma affects men and women equal-
ly,44 breast cancer overwhelmingly affects women, causing the
policy's exclusion to have an unlawful disparate impact on wom-
en.4 45
In light of the Supreme Court's reasoning in General Electric
Company v. Gilbert,40 gender discrimination claims relating to the
exclusion of HDC-ABMT for the treatment of breast cancer may not
ultimately prevail. 7  Gilbert involved an insurance package that
excluded disabilities arising from pregnancy.4' The Court reasoned
437. See id.
438. Reger, 836 F. Supp. at 872 & n.4 (noting that there are more than 100 types of cancers,
most of which were not covered by plan).
439. See id, at 872-73.
440. Id at 873.
441. Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Federal Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss,
supra note 436, at 4.
442. Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Federal Defendant's Partial Motion to Dimiss,
supra note 436, at 4.
443. Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Federal Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss,
supra note 436, at 6.
444. Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Federal Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss,
supra note 436, at 6.
445. Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Federal Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss,
supra note 436, at 7.
446. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
447. See also Geduldig v. Aielo, 417 U.S. 484,497 (1974) (holding that pregnancy exclusion
from disabilities plan did not violate Equal Protection Clause of 14th Amendment). Although
Congress rejected the particular results in Gilbert and Geduldig through the 1978 Pregnancy
Discrimination amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982), the
Supreme Court's reasoning still applies to a gender-based disparate impact challenge.
448. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 127 (1976).
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that the insurance package was facially nondiscriminatory because
"'[t]here is no risk from which men are protected and women are
not Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected and
men are not."'" The Court, finding no proof that the insurance
package was worth more to men than to women, found no gender-
based discriminatory effect.' Thus, the Court held that failure to
cover pregnancy-related disabilities did not constitute gender
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.41
E. Breast Cancer Syndrome and Prophylactic Mastectomy
Prophylactic (also known as preventive) mastectomies, which involve
the surgical removal of a breast or both breasts to prevent the onset
of cancer,452 are controversial' and rare.' Even so, women at
high risk for developing breast cancer sometimes choose to have their
"healthy" breasts surgically removed." They want to lead a life free
from the fear of breast cancer,"5 or at the very least, they want to
substantially reduce their risks.'
Many physicians will not recommend this procedure. A prophylac-
tic mastectomy does not guarantee that a women will never develop
449. M at 138 (quoting Geduldi 417 U.S. at 49"-97).
450. M
451. Id at 145-46.
452. S&eJane E. Brody, Why Cancer-Fiee Women Have Breasts Removed, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1993,
at C13; see also Katskee v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Neb., 515 N.W.2d 645, 652 (Neb. 1994)
(mentioning that surgery was prophylactic to prevent onset of cancer).
453. See WallyJ. Temple et al., Technicda C nsideratiomsforPr qoiVacMasteetoy in Patilnts at
High Risk for Breast Cancer 161 AM. J. SURGERY 413, 413-14 (1991) (noting controversy
surrounding question of whether total removal of all breast tissue is necessary to prevent
cancer); Irene L Wapnir et al., A Reappraisal of Thopxy'acyic Masttdoi, 171 GNECOLOGY &
OwSrnrscs 171, 172 (1990) (noting controversy surrounding prophylactic mastectomy has
heightened due to "further understanding of the biology of carcinoma of the breast, human
genetics and the risk of carcinoma of the breast in benign disease); Lane D. Ziegler & Stephen
S. Kroll, Pfimary Breast CancerAflerProphylactifastetdory, 14A&LJ. CLNCAL ONCOLOGY451,453
(1991) (discussing controversial nature of prophylactic mastectomy).
454. See Carol Ann Campbell, CWatingCancem BERGEN REC., May 15,1994, atAI,A8 (noting
that only several hundred women per year choose prophylactic mastectomies).
455. Se generally Sandra G. Boodman, Gambingon Radical SuMr, WASH. POSTJan. 5, 1993,
(Health), at 11, 13, 15, 17 (recounting personal stories of women who opted to have
prophylactic mastectomies); Brody, supra note 452, at C13 (discussing risk factors that motivate
women to have prophylactic mastectomies).
456. See Wapnir et aL, supra note 453, at 178 (stating that cancerphobia continually
influences decision to undergo prophylactic mastectomies).
457. See Ziegler & Krol, supra note 453, at 453 (reporting that risk of breast cancer after
prophylactic mastectomy is 1.18% as compared to average womman's lifetime risk of7-8%). Se
generaUy LATOUR, supranote 61, at396-400 (discussing personal accounts ofwomen who choose
prophylactic mastectomy).
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breast cancer.' Further, some argue that no proof exists to suggest
that a prophylactic mastectomy is superior to less extreme and
disfiguring alternatives, such as mammographic screening, self-
examination, and regular examinations by a physician.459 Cosmetic
dissatisfaction and medical complications are additional drawbacks to
the procedure.46
Yet, for some women, a prophylactic mastectomy is appropriate.
For example, it may be well suited for those women who are in high
risk categories."6l The most potent high risk factors include a
women's family history462 and whether she has inherited the breast
cancer gene.4 a Women falling into these high risk categories
458. See LOVE, supra note 59, at 371 (cautioning that cancer may develop in tissues left
behind after mastectomy); see also Ziegler & Kroll, supra note 453, at 451 (illustrating case where
doctor diagnosed woman with breast cancer despite her bilateral prophylactic mastectomies 18
years earlier); Boodman, supra note 455, at 13 (quoting Dr. Susan Love's statement that "[tihere
have been no studies, and there's no data to show that doing [a prophylactic mastectomy]
decreases your risk .... It makes intuitive sense that it should, but a lot of things in medicine
that are later proven wrong or harmful like [diethylstilbestrol, the anti-miscarriage drug later
found to cause cancer,] made sense at the time.").
459. See Wapnir et al., supra note 453, at 178-80 (arguing that prophylactic mastectomles are
not necessarily best option, especially in light of psychological and aesthetic consequences of
surgery). But cf. Malcolm Gladwell, How Safe Are YourBreasts?, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 24, 1994, at
22, 24 (noting National Cancer Institute's declaration that there is no evidence showing routine
mammography results in "statistically significant reduction in mortality").
460. SeeHeinz H. Bohmert, SubcutaneousMastectomy: Advantages and Problems, in CONTROVER-
SiES IN BRa.sr DISEASE: DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT 235, 247-55 (Sharon Gundfest-
Broniatowski & Caldwell B. Esselstyn,Jr. eds., 1988) (discussing unsatisfactory cosmetic results
and infections caused by prophylactic mastectomies).
461. See Victor G. Vogel & Anita C. Yeomans, Evaluation of Risk and Preventive Approaches to
Breast Cancer, 45 CANCER BULL. 489, 489-91 (1993) (listing family history, benign breast disease,
lobular carcinoma in situ, diet, and estrogen replacement therapy as risk factors for breast
cancer); RESOURCE LIST, supra note 6, at 29-30 (summarizing risk factors, such as age, family
history, early menstruation, late menopause, and poor diet); Sandra G. Boodman, Fear of Breast
Cancer, WASH. PosT, Jan. 5, 1993, (Health), at 10, 12 (mentioning that hormonal factors due to
early menstruation, late menopause, or late pregnancy elevate risk of breast cancer); Geoffrey
Cowley et al., In Pursuit of a Terrible Killer, NEWSWYEEK, Dec. 10, 1990, at 66, 67 (listing family
history, diet, alcohol consumption, increased estrogen exposure, including early menstruation
and late menopause, as risk factors for breast cancer); see also Isabelle Romieu et al., Oral
Contraceptives and Breast Cancer Review and Meta-Analysis, 66 CANCER 2253, 2261-62 (1990)
(concluding that use of oral contraceptives for long period increased risk for breast cancer).
But see Pamela Murray et al., Oral Contraceptive Use in Women with a Family History of Breast Cancer,
73 OBnTTcs & GYNECOLOGY 977, 977 (1989) (reporting no evidence of increased risk for
breast cancer with use of oral contraceptives).
462. See Ziegler & Kroll, supra note 453, at 452 (stating that women who have two or more
immediate relatives diagnosed with breast cancer, particularly if relatives were'premenopausal
and had bilateral breast cancer, have up to 50% chance of developing breast cancer In their
lifetimes); Boodman, supra note 461, at 12 (stating that risk increases in proportion to number
of first-degree relatives with breast cancer).
463. See Michael Waildholz, Feud Brewing Over Breast-Cancer Gene Patent, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17,
1994, at B1 (mentioning that five percent of breast cancer cases are caused by inheriting
mutated form of breast cancer gene, called BRCA1); see also Boodman, supra note 461, at 12
(distinguishing between genetic and hereditary risk).
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sometimes may suffer from "breast cancer syndrome,"f4M in which
women experience stress and anxiety over the substantial likelihood
of developing the disease.465 Such stress and anxiety is similar to
what courts have recognized as "cancer-phobia," typically stemming
from exposure to cancerous chemicals.41
Advances in both gene technology467 and understanding of the
biology of breast cancer, which enable medical professionals to more
accurately identify those women who are at higher risk of developing
breast cancer, pose far-reaching implications for health insur-
ance. 9  Among them is whether an insurer should pay for a
prophylactic mastectomy.40 Payment often depends on whether the
procedure is considered medically necessary.41 In addition, the
insurer may consider how substantial the likelihood of developing
breast cancer must be before it is obligated to pay. 7
The issue is beginning to surface in the courts as well. 41 When
Sindie Katskee's doctors recommended removing her uterus, ovaries,
464. See Ziegler & Kroll, supra note 453, at 452 (defining "familial breast cancer s)ydrome"
as family with two or more immediate family members affected by breast cancer, usually before
age of 45); see also Katskee v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Neb., 515 N.Wd 645, 651 (Neb.
1994) (noting that women diagnosed with syndrome have at least 505o chance of developing
breast cancer, whereas unaffected women have only 1.A risk).
465. See Katee 515 N.W2d at 651-52.
466. See ag., Cobum v. Sun Chem. Corp., No. 88-0120, 1989 W. 83518, at *1 (E.D. Pajuly
24, 1989) (noting plaintifFs allegation that hazardous waste facility's negligence resulted in
"cancer-phobia"); Gergel v. Chemlawn Serv. Corp., No. 87-1138,1938 WL 71312, at 01 (E.D. Pa.
July5,1988) (discussing plaintif's fear of cancer due to exposure of dangerous chemicals); Bush
v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 84-936, 1986 NL 15243, at 08 (E.D. La. Dec. 30, 1986) (discussing
seaman's claim for damages of mental anguish due to "cancer phobia" when soaked with toxic
chemicals); Mauro v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 542 A.2d 16,24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1988) (discussing plaintiff's fear of cancer arising from asbestos exposure), aJ'4 561 A.2d 257,
258 (N.J. 1989).
467. Se generaly Cowley, supra note 58, at 46-52 (describing search for breast cancer gene,
BRCA1); J. Madeleine Nash, Stopping Cancer in Its TradL% TIWE, Apr. 25, 1994, at 54, 56
(discussing progress of gene technology in combatting cancer cells).
468. See generaUy R. Steven Brown, Genetic Revotdior Rapid Ackanees in Genei Are Affecting
State Insurance, Health and Criminaljustice Poldes (1993) (warning about breakdown of insurance
system if insurers deny coverage because of person's genetic risks), reprinted in Biomdiard Ethics
and U.S. Public Poliqy: Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resourm 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. 14, 15 (1993).
469. See id. at 15 (describing concern that knowledge of increased risk uill lead insurers to
deny coverage to individuals after genetic testing).
470. See infra notes 473-95 and accompanying text.
471. See infra notes 473-95 and accompanying text.
472. See infra notes 473-95 and accompanying text.
473. See Katskee v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Neb., 515 N.W.d 645, 653 (Neb. 1994)
(holding that genetic condition is illness within meaning of insurance policy);Anderson v. HIO
Neb., No. A-92-489, 1993 WL 61839, at *8 (Neb. App. Mar. 9, 1993) (concluding that medical
evidence established prophylactic bilateral mastectomywus appropriate reatment), rev on othir
grounds, 505 N.W.2d 700 (Neb. 1993).
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and fallopian tubes474  due to breast-ovarian carcinoma syn-
drome,47 her insurer insisted that the procedure was not covered
by her policy. 6  Specifically, the insurer determined that Katskee
did not have an illness as defined by her policy.477 In Katskee v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Nebraska,47 the Supreme Court of Nebraska
reviewed that determination.479
Applying a plain-and-ordinary-meaning test to the term "illness,"
480
the court held in favor of Katskee.81 The court reasoned that
because Katskee's genetic makeup consisted of hereditary cancer,
482
her condition was "a deviation from what is considered a normal,
healthy physical state."' Her breast-ovarian carcinoma syndrome
was therefore an illness within the meaning of the policy.
The same court in Anderson v. HMO Nebraska,4  heard a case
involving thirty-three-year-old Cindy Anderson, who had fibrocystic
disease in her breasts in addition to having a family history of breast
cancer.485 Given this condition, her doctors recommended a
prophylactic mastectomy.4sn Her insurer denied coverage based on
474. See Katske4 515 N.W.2d at 647. Although this case involved removal of reproductive
organs rather than prophylactic removal of the breasts, the issues raised and analysis presented
are relevant to a discussion of prophylactic mastectomy.
475. See id. at 647, 651 (noting that oncologist diagnosed genetic condition, breast-ovarian
carcinoma syndrome, whereby Sindie Katskee had 50% chance of developing breast cancer).
476. See id. at 648-49 (explaining that insurer denied coverage because treatment was not
"medically necessary," which was defined in policy as "[a]ppropriate for the symptoms and
diagnosis of the patient's Illness, Injury or Pregnancy").
477. Id. at 649 (noting that insurer defined illness as "bodily disorder or disease").
478. 515 N.W.2d 645 (Neb. 1994).
479. Id. at 649.
480. Id. at 651. The court defined illness as
any abnormal condition of the body or its components of such a degree that In Its
natural progression would be expected to be problematic; a deviation from the healthy
or normal state affecting the functions or tissues of the body; an inherent defect of the
body; or a morbid physical or mental state which deviates from or interrupts the
normal structure or function of any part, organ, or system of the body and which is
manifested by a characteristic set of symptoms and signs.
Id.
481. Id at 653.
482. Id at 651. Sindie Katskee's condition was detected by tracing instances of hereditary
cancer in her family history. At the time of her diagnosis, no conclusive physical test existed
that could identify a cancer gene, though Katskee's doctor stated that research was progressing
in that direction. See id.
483. Id. at 652.
484. No. A-92-489, 1993 WL 61839 (Neb. App. Mar. 9, 1993), reu'd on other grounds, 505
N.W.2d 700 (Neb. 1993).
485. See Anderson v. HMO Neb., No. A-92-489, 1993 WL 61839, at *2 (Neb. App. Mar. 9,
1993) (mentioning that distortions of breast are caused by fibrocystic disease and will diminish
ability to detect breast cancer even with routine surveillance), rev'd on other grounds, 505 NW,2d
700 (Neb. 1993).
486. See id.
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its view that the procedure was not medically necessary- and was
experimental. s The insurer insisted that Anderson did not have
an illness, despite her family history of breast cancer, her fibrocystic
disease, and her "cancer-phobia."' Just because Anderson had a
predisposition to breast cancer, they argued, did not necessarily mean
she would develop the disease, a prerequisite to coverage.4
The court rejected the insurer's medical evidence, 9' reasoning
that a danger would exist if she did not have a prophylactic mastecto-
my. The court concluded that the procedure was therefore
appropriate and in accordance with local standards of medical
practice,' and held that the insurer must cover the costs in-
volved. °4
Courts should approach coverage disputes for prophylactic
mastectomnies in the same fashion as with HDC-ABMTs.4P Courts
should weigh expert testimony and medical literature against a
"primary purpose to benefit the patient" standard.4 95 Courts should
also inquire whether the insurer engaged in reasonable efforts to
arrive at its coverage decision,49 and whether the insurer vras
operating under a conflict of interest 4 If the insurer fails to meet
any one of these requirements, courts should rule against the insurer.
III. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
Legislatures are better equipped to meaningfully resolve tough
health care issues than are courts. This Comment recommends that,
to be effective, legislation must embody the legitimate interests of
487. See id. at *3 (restating insurer's conclusion that breast remoml wias not appropriate
before patient was diagnosed with breast cancer).
488. Seeid.
489. See id.
490. See i& at *8.
491. Id- (finding that insurer did not present sufficient evidence to show that prophylactic
mastectomy was not medically necessary).
492. IH
493. Id. (referring to opinions of three doctors ovenhelmingly supporting procedure for
Anderson).
494. IM. The court did not reach the issue of whether cancer-phobia alone constitutes an
illness. Id.
495. See supra Part 1.B (describingjudidal treatment of BDC-.BMT cases).
496. See supra Part II.B.1 (suggesting adoption of this standard by courts).
497. See supra Part ILB.2 (explaining inquiry into insurers' efforts to establish reasonable
basis for coverage determinations).
498. See supra Part II.B.3 (detailing conflict of interest concerns in insurance corverge
decisions).
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both the insurance industry and breast cancer patients.499 Further,
legislation should be couched in general, far-reaching terms, so that
it applies not only to treatments for breast cancer, but also to
emerging medical treatments in other disciplines of medicine.
5 00
A. State Legislation
In response to the growing controversy surrounding insurance
coverage of HDC-ABMT for breast cancer, several states have
intervened and enacted legislation. They include Minnesota,50 1
Georgia,"0 2  Massachusetts,"0 3  New Hampshire,"4  Rhode Is-
land,55 Virginia,.0 6 and Florida."°7 Similar legislation is pending
in other states, including New York,
0 3 Ohio,0 9 California, 1"
New Jersey,"' Louisiana,1 2  Connecticut, 13  and Missouri.614
Legislative action addressing this issue has taken four approaches: (1)
mandates;515 (2) multi-tier systems; 516 (3) devising committees to
mandate coverage;517 and (4) establishing criteria for coverage of
cancer therapies. 8
499. See infra notes 531-34 and accompanying text (exposing dangers of ignoring concerns
of insurance companies).
500. See infra Part HI.A3 (recommending committee system as model for future medical
issues).
501. 1995 Minn. House File 1742, 79th Legis. Reg. Sess. (to be codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 62A307).
502. See 1995 Ga. H.B. 369, 143d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1995-96) available in WL, State-
Bills, Georgia Bill Tracking (indicating enactment of bill).
503. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 32A, § 17A (West Supp. I 1994).
504. N.H. REv. SrAT. ANN. § 415:18-c (Supp. 1994).
505. RI. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-36.2 (1994).
506. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3418.1:1 (Michie 1994).
507. FLA. STAT. ch. 627.4236 (Supp. 1992).
508. 1993 N.Y. Assembly B. 11533, 215th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1994).
509. 1993 Ohio H.B. 592, 120th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1993-94).
510. 1993 Cal. Assembly B. 3654, Reg. Sess. (1994); 1993 Cal. Assembly B. 3752, Reg. Sess,
(1994).
511. 1994 N.J. Assembly B. 1997, 206th Legis. 1st Reg. Sess. (1994); 1994 NJ. S.B. 1320,
206th Legis., 1st Sess. (1994).
512. 1995 La. H.B. 1222, Reg. Sess. (1995).
513. 1995 Conn. H.B. 6100, Reg. Sess. (1995).
514. 1995 Mo. S.B. 27, 88th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1995); 1995 Mo. H.B. 339, 88th
Gen. Assembly (1995).
515. See infra Part III1.
516. See infra Part IA.2.
517. See infra Part ImA3.
518. See infra Part II.A.4.
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1. Mandating HD -ABMT for breast cancer
Mandates bar insurers from denying coverage for particular medical
treatments under Experimental Exclusions. To date, Minnesota,51 9
Massachusetts5" and New Hampshire"' are the only states to pass
legislation mandating that insurers cover HDC-ABMT for breast
cancer. Similar proposals are pending in Califomia,- New
York,5 3 Connecticut 24 and Ohio.52 All of the proposed bills,
519. 1995 Min. House File 1742, 79th Legis. Reg. Sess. (to be codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 62A.307). The bill reads:
Every health plan... must provide... coverage for the treatment of breast cancer by
high-dose chemotherapy with autologous bone marrow transplantation and for
expenses arising from the treatment.
I; see GovmwrSigns BillRequiring Coverage of Bone Marrow Transp nl Health Care Daily (BNA)
d3 (June 12, 1995) (stating bill has taken effect).
520. The Massachusetts statute reads:
[Insurers must provide] coverage for a bone marrow transplant for persons who have
been diagnosed with breast cancer that has progressed to metastatic disease provided,
however, that said person shall meet the criteria established by the department of
public health. The department of public health shall promulgate rules and regulations
establishing criteria for eligibility for coverage hereunderwhich shall be consistent with
medical research protocols reviewed and approved by the National Cancer Institute.
Mass. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32A, § 17A (West Supp. 1994).
521. The New Hampshire statute reads: "[Insurers must provide] coverage for expenses
arising from the treatment of breast cancer by autologous bone marrow transplants according
to protocols reviewed and approved by the National Cancer Institute." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 415:18-c (Supp. 1994).
522. See 1993 Cal. Assembly B. 3572, Reg. Sess. (1993-94). The bill requires health insurers
to "provide coverage for experimental procedures and treatment for breast cancer when the
procedure or treatment is provided within a clinical trial," according to the following criteria:
(A) Treatment is provided with a therapeutic intent.
(B) Treatment is provided pursuant to a clinical trial that has been approved by the
National Cancer Institute, or any of its cancer centers, cooperative groups, or
community clinical oncologyprograms; the Food and DrugAdministration in the
form of an investigational new drug exemption; the Department of Defense; the
Department of Veterans Affairs; or a qualified nongovernmental research entity
as identified in the guidelines for National Cancer Institute cancer center support
grants.
(C) The proposed therapy has been reviewed and approved by a qualified Institution-
al Review Board.
(D) The facility and personnel providing the treatment are capable of doing so by
virtue of their experience or training.
(E) There is no noninvestigational therapy that is dearly superior to the protocol
treatnent.
(F) The available clinical or predinical data provide a reasonable expectation that the
protocol treatment will be at least as efficacious as noninvestigational therapy.
I.
523. 1993 N.Y.Assembly B. 11533, 215th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1994). The NewYork
bill states:
Every [health insurer] ... shall include coverage for a bone marrow transplant or
transplants for persons who have been diagnosed with breast cancer;, provided,
however, that said person shall meet the criteria established by the Department of
Health. The Department of Health shall promulgate rules ... which shall be
consistent with medical research protocols reviewed and approved by the National
Cancer Institute.
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as well as the Minnesota and New Hampshire statutes, cover all
women with breast cancer.2 I The Massachusetts mandate, however,
applies only to women with metastatic breast cancer."
All of the mandates require HDC-ABMTs to be performed in
clinical trials approved by or consistent with either the National
Cancer Institute or another governmental or qualified nongovernmen-
tal research entity. 28 The clinical trial requirement not only
enhances data collection efforts and research, but also ensures that
women receive proper treatment."2
Although the adoption of mandates for HDC-ABMT coverage is a
major victory for breast cancer activists, as a policy matter mandates
are short-sighted in that they completely ignore the insurance
industry's legitimate concems.:14° First, mandates severely distort the
marketplace,53 ' causing premiums to rise.8 2 Second, the prolifera-
tion of mandates increases the likelihood that employers will switch
to an ERISA self-funded plan, which is exempt from state man-
dates."' Third, the genre of mandates sets a dangerous precedent,
524. 1995 Conn. H.B. 6100, Reg. Sess. (1995) ("requir[ing] the payment for bone marrow
transplantation as a treatment for breast cancer").
525. 1993 Ohio H.B. 592, 120th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1993-94). This bill requires all
insurers to provide "benefits for the expenses arising from the treatment of breast cancer by
autologous bone marrow transplants according to protocols reviewed and approved by the
National Cancer Institute." Id.
526. See supra notes 519-25 (quoting text of state legislation).
527. See supra note 520 (quoting text of Massachusetts statute). In practice, this distinction
may make no substantial difference because HDC-ABMTs are typically used to treat breast cancer
that has already metastasized.
528. See supra notes 519-25 (quoting specific requirements in each mandate).
529. See 1993 Cal. Assembly B. 3572, Reg. Sess. (1993-94) (discussing importance of clinical
trials in determination of treatment effectiveness). But see Gallinari, supra note 147, at 41-42
(stating that requiring protocols to be approved by NCI is problematic because many reputable
protocols do not have formal NCI approval).
530. Arguably, mandating insurance coverage for HDCABMT in the treatment of breast
cancer is not unfair to insurers because insurers presumably had ample opportunity to lobby
legislatures to voice their views against general mandates, and to show that HDC-ABMT in the
treatment of breast cancer is experimental. Despite the insurance industry's efforts, legislatures
still mandated specific coverage of this disease. In other words, the assertion that legislatures,
reacting to emotional whims, blindly support mandates for health insurance for breast cancer
treatments is debatable.
531. Cf. NEWJERSEY Bus. & INDUS. ASS'N, THE CASE AGAINST MANDATED HEALTH INSURANCE
BENEFITS (1983) (urging legislatures to reject mandating benefits because it distorts
marketplace). But see Thomas G. McGuire & John T. Montgomery, Mandated Mental Health
Benefits in Private Health Insurance, 7J. HEALTH POL, POLY & L., 380, 382-86 (1982) (discussing
how mandates correct inefficiencies in market, notably mental health benefits).
532. SeeJON GABEL & GAIL JENSEN, HEALTH INS. ASS'N OF AM., RESEARCH BuLLETIN: THE
PRICE OF STATE MANDATED BENEFITS 11-12 (1989) (arguing that mandated benefits increased
price of family coverage); see also Cova, supra note 2, at 744 (asserting that coverage of expensive,
unproven technologies increases costs of covering other treatments known to be effective,
thereby increasing premiums).
533. See GABEL &JENSEN, supra note 532, at 15-16 (arguing that employers will self-insure
when faced with increasing mandates); PUBUC POL'Y INST. OF N.Y. STATE, INC., CURE, OR CAUSE?
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in that future coverage mandates may involve medical procedures that
are truly experimental, in that they have not yet successfully and fully
completed any scientific trials."
2. Multi-tier system
A multi-tier system operates as a type of "opt-in" approach. For
example, in Virginia,s insurers must offer coverage for HDC-ABM1T
for breast cancer.5s  Policyholders, however, must also expressly
request the coverage and pay higher premiums for it.5"7 The
legislation reads, in pertinent part:
[Insurers] shall offer and make available coveragv under such policy,..
. for the treatment of breast cancer by dose-intensive chemothera-
py/autologous bone marrow transplants or stem cell transplants
when pursuant to protocols approved by the institutional review
board of any United States medical teaching college including, but
not limited to, National Cancer Institute protocols that have been
favorably reviewed and utilized by hematologists or oncologists
experienced in dose-intensive chemotherapy/autologous bone
marrow transplants or stem cell transplants.5"
Georgia legislators also passed a bill requiring that insurers make
available coverage for bone marrow transplants for the treatment of
breast cancer."9 Similar legislation has been introduced in New
Jersey, Louisiana,' and Missouri.a
How GOvER N MANDATES Lnir AccEss TO HEALTH INSURANCE 16-17 (1939) (asserting that
mandates cause companies to self-insure, thus causing fewer people to be covered for mandated
services).
534. See Breast Cancer Treatment Legislation Causes Contr=,ersy (NPR radio broadcastJan. 15,
1994) (stating that Massachusetts' mandate removes traditional dividing line between coverage
for experimental and nonexperimental treatments).
535. See VA. CODE. ANN. § 38.2-3418.1:1 (Michie 1994) (requiring that insurers provide
coverage for treatment of breast cancer by HDC-ABMT, which shall not be subject to greater
copayment than that applicable to other coverage provided by insurers).
536. IM
537. SeeAnna Billingsley, Allen Puts Signature on Brast Caner Bil RC-IOND TDIMS, Apr. 21,
1994, at A7 (describing how bill received widespread bipartisan support); s= also Paul E. Kalb,
Controlling Health Care Costs By Controlling Teehnoto&V: A Private CntradualAppwajz, 99 YALE UJ.
1109, 1120 (1990) (arguing that insurers should offer more than one coverage option to
accommodate those consumers who are willing to pay higher price for additional coverage).
538. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3418.1:1 (emphasis added).
539. See 1995 Ga. H.B. 369, 143d Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1995-96) available inWL, State-
Bills, Georgia Bill Tracking (indicating that H.B. 369 passed both House and Senate, and ius
signed by Governor in April 1995).
540. 1994 N.J. Assembly B. 1997, 206th Legis., Ist Reg. Sess. (1994). The bill requires that
all insurers
offer to provide coverage for the treatment of'cancer by dose-intensive chemothera-
py/autologous bone marrow transplants or stem cell transplants when performed
pursuant to protocols approved by the institutional review board of the United States
medical teaching college including, but not limited to, National Cancer Institute
protocols favorably reviewed and utilized by hematologists or oncologists experienced
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This approach recognizes the interests of both the insurance
company and the breast cancer patient.' A multi-tiered system
offers standard care to all policyholders, while providing the option
of additional, nonstandard care.514 As such, premiums will increase
only for those policyholders who desire access to nonstandard,
experimental treatments.' In addition, an option to purchase
additional coverage elevates the perceived bargaining power of the
policyholder. This, however, may harm many policyholders if courts
choose not to presume that the health insurance policy is an adhesion
contract 54 Consequently, the policyholder may not be entitled to
protections afforded in an adhesion contract, such as construing
ambiguities against the insurer.5
7
Admittedly, a multi-tier system has other potential drawbacks. The
approach places a substantial burden on consumers to request,
research, and understand complex insurance coverage options.
Because individuals often purchase a coverage option ignorantly or
without full information, they have equal bargaining power with the
insurer in only the most technical sense.m Moreover, the multi-tier
in dose-intensive chemotherapy/autologous bone marrow transplants or stem cell
transplants.
Id.
541. 1995 La. H.B. 12221, Reg. Sess. (1995). It reads, in pertinent part:
[All insurance policies, plans, and contracts] shall include coverage for the expenses
for the treatment of breast cancer by autologous bone marrow transplants, according
to the protocols reviewed and approved by the National Cancer Institute.
Id
542. 1995 Mo. S.B. No. 27, 88th Legis., 1st Reg. Sess. (1995). It reads, in pertinent part:
Each insurer... shall offer and make available coverage under such policy... for the
treatment of breast cancer by dose-intensive chemotherapy/autologous bone marrow
transplants or stem cell transplants when performed pursuant to nationally accepted
peer review protocols utilized by breast cancer treatment centers experienced in dose-
intensive chemotherapy/autologous bone marrow transplants or stem cell transplants,Id.
543. Se e.g., Neil M. Cohen, Cohen Bone-Marrow Cancer Treatment Bill Advances (July 6, 1994)
(press release) (on file with The American University Law Review). Neil Cohen, a New Jersey
Assemblyman and sponsor of the NewJersey bill, stated: "In an effort to seek broad support for
this measure, we have addressed the concerns of the business community." Id.
544. See Insurers in VirginiaMust CoverExperimentalBreast CancerTreatment, BNA HEALTHCARE
DAILY, Apr. 20, 1994, at 2.
545. See Kalb, supra note 537, at 1122-23.
546. SeeKalb, supra note 537, at 1125 (insisting that courts should abandon presumption that
all health insurance policies are adhesion contracts).
547. See Kalb, supra note 537, at 1125-26 (suggesting how courts should interpret health
insurance contracts under multi-tier approach).
548. To alleviate any potential information gap, legislation should also require that health
insurance plans inform prospective policyholders of how their choice may be affected.
Legislation currently proposed in California, for instance, addresses this issue. See 1993 Cal.
Assembly B. 3654, Reg. Sess. (1993-94) (requiring that information be provided to prospective
enrollees of any health care service plan regarding whether, and to what extent, insurance plan
covers bone marrow treatment for breast cancer). It suggests that the following notice be
conspicuously placed in every policy. "PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION SO
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legislation does not cap the premiums an insurer may charge for
additional coverage.' As such, a policyholder who wants additional
coverage due to her family history of breast cancer may still be unable
to afford such coverage. A related effect is that those who purchase
the lowest priced option may be subject to lesser quality health
care.55 Despite these drawbacks, a multi-tiered approach adequate-
ly addresses concerns of both breast cancer patients and insurers and
is preferable to general mandates.
3. Devising committees to mandate coverage
In order to resolve the question of whether insurers should provide
coverage for HDG-ABMT, Judge John L. Coffey of the Seventh
Circuit, in Fuja v. Benefit Trust Lfe Insurance,' recommended
establishing "regional cooperative committees comprised of
oncologists, internists, surgeons, experts in medical ethics, medical
school administrators, economists, representatives of the insurance
industry, patient advocates and politicians."" 2 Judge Coffey's
suggestion closely matches legislation enacted in Florida.
Florida's statute mandates that health insurance policies cover all
bone marrow transplants for specifically designated cancers.
YOU WILL KNOW WHETHER THIS PLAN GUARANTEES COVERAGE OF EXPERBIMENTAL
TREAT-MT, SUCH AS BONE MARROW TRANSPLANT TREATMIENT FOR BREAST
CANCER PATIENTS." I&
549. But cf Kab, supra note 537, at 1123 (asserting that systemwvide cost reductions would
result under multi-tier insurance scheme).
550. But see Kalb, supra note 537, at 1124 (arguing that consumers buying lowest-priced
option might receive better care than current insurance scheme because all covered procedures
would have proven medical value).
551. 18 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1994).
552. Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Ins., 18 F.3d 1405, 1412 (7th Cir. 1994).
553. See FIA. STAT. ch. 627.4236 (Supp. 1992). It reads, in pertinent part:
(2) An insurer may not exclude coverage for bone marrow transplant proedure... if
the particular use of the bone marrow transplant procedure is determined to be...
not operimentaipursuant to stubstion (3).
(3) (a) The Secretary of Health and Rehabilitative Services must adopt rules specifying
the bone marrow transplant procedures that are accepted .... The rules must be
based upon recommendations of an advisory panel appointed by the secretar,
composed o
1) One adult oncologist, . . . recommended by the Florida Medical Association;
2) One pediatric oncologist... recommended by the Florida Pediatric Society;,
3) One representative of the J. Hillis iller Health Center at the University of
Florida;
4) One representative of the H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute,
Inc.;
5) One consumer representative, ... recommended by the Insurance Commis-
sioner,
6) One representative of the Health Insurance Association of America;
7) Two representatives of health insurers, one of whom represents the Insurer
with the largest Florida health insurance premium volume and one of whom
represents the insurer with the second largest Florida health insuance
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These cancers are chosen by a committee,5" Florida's Bone Marrow
Transplant Advisory Panel.5 The committee is comprised of both
oncologists and insurance representatives. 56 Through this process,
Florida's approach, unlike the mandates in Massachusetts, Minnesota
and New Hampshire, takes into consideration the insurance industry's
interests.
Eighteen months after Florida enacted this statute, the Advisory
Panel recommended mandatory coverage of bone marrow transplants
for breast cancer 5 7 The recommendations stipulated that trans-
plants for Stage IV breast cancer must be conducted as part of clinical
trials.5 As of this writing, that recommendation was awaiting final
approval from Florida's Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services. 59
Like a multi-tier approach, Florida's legislation embraces the
interests of both the insurance industry and the breast cancer patient.
Although the legislation addresses only bone marrow transplants, it
could serve as a model for emerging medical treatments. For
example, for new treatments of heart disease, the panel members
could be composed of cardiologists, instead of oncologists.
4. Establishing explicit criteria for coverage of cancer therapies
Unlike legislation in other states that specifically addresses HDC-
ABMTs, Rhode Island's broad approach allows for the evolution of all
cancer therapies." The Rhode Island statute requires that all
health insurance organizations cover experimental cancer therapies,
provided, however, that certain delineated criteria are met. 1 These
criteria include stipulations that governmental organizations approve
treatment pursuant to Phase III and IV clinical trials, and that there
is no existing superior alternative treatment. 6 2  Also, the statute
premium volume; and
8) One representative of the insurer with the largest Florida small group health
insurance premium volume ....
Id. (emphasis added).
554. Id.
555. See Carol Gentry, Marrow Transplants to Receive Coverage, ST. PrVSBURG TIMES, July 21,
1994, at IA (reporting that Florida's Bone Marrow Transplant Advisory Panel compiled list of
cancers for which insurers should pay for treatment's costs).
556. See FLA. STAT. ch. 627.4236.
557. See Gentry, supra note 555, at IA.
558. See Gentry, supra note 555, at 9A.
559. See Gentry, supra note 555, at IA.
560. SeeR.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-1836.2 (1994) (requiring that insurers provide coverage for new
cancer therapies still under investigation).
561. See id.
562. Id. The relevant section of the Rhode Island statute reads:
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insists that patients meet all protocol requirementsP5 Finally, the
procedure must be performed in appropriate facilities with experi-
enced personnel.5 6
In essence, this legislation preempts any criteria for defining
applicable Experimental Exclusions that are enumerated in a health
[C]overage shall be extended to new cancer therapies still under investigation when
the following circumstances are present
(a) Treatment is being provided pursuant to Phase M or IV clinical trial which has
been approved by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in cooperation with the
National Cancer Institute (NCI); Community clinical oncology programs; the Food
and Drug Administration in the form of an Investigational New Drug (IND)
exemption; the Department of Veterans' Affairs; or a qualified nongovernmental
research entity as identified in the guidelines for NCI cancer center support grants;
and
(b) The proposed therapy has been reviewed and approved by a qualified
institutional review board (IRB); and
(c) The facility and personnel providing the treatment are capable of doing so by
virtue of their experience, training, and volume of patients treated to maintain
expertise; and
(d) The patients receiving the investigational treatment meet all protocol require-
ments; and
(e) There is no dearly superior, noninvestigational alternative to the protocol
treatment; and
(f) The available clinical or preclinical data provide a reasonable expectation that




564. Id Legislation should recognize the importance of appropriate facilities. &eRelease
and Compromise Settlement Agreement, Texas v. Prudential Ins. Co., No. 93-11381 (Dist. C.
Travis County Tex. Mar. 9, 1994) Exhibit A (on file with 77L Amairan Univesi) Law Reiew)
(requiring that each HDC-ABMT cancer treatment facility meet NCI or American Society of
Clinical Oncology guidelines). The guidelines state:
1. Perform at least ten to twenty bone marrow transplants per year;
2. Designated transplant unit with two or more designated transplant beds;
3. Protocol for cryopreservation of autologous hematopoietic stem cells;
4. The transplant unit must have in place facilities and a policy for the required
isolation (e.g., high pressure, filtered air, or laminar air-flowv rooms);
5. Twenty-four hour laboratory and radiology support, which must include red cells,
platelets, and other blood components;
6. Physicians performing the procedure at the institution must have documented
experience;
7. There must be a broad range of subspecialty consultants in both medical and
surgical specialties which should be immediately available;
8. Nurse to patient ratio of 2:1;
9. Full-time bone marrow support transplant coordinators and adequate support from
social services;
10. The unit must maintain a registry of all transplants performed, and compare
outcomes with other centers;
11. Physicians performing the procedure should report their data to available registries
(e.g., International Bone Marrow Transplants Registry) and, when appropriate,
publish important observations in the medical literature.
IId ee general The Ammican Sodet of ncakl Oncolo and Ameia So of He=mWoj
Recommended Citeia for the Peifomance ofBon Marra Tra np&ML% 81. CLINICAL 0NCOLO0Y 563,
563-64 (1990) (emphasizing importance of facilities, nursing team, transplant ph)sicians, and
institutional support when performing bone marrow transplants).
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insurance policy. Insurers, however, still must include defining
criteria for Experimental Exclusions, as this legislation applies solely
to cancer therapies." Although Rhode Island's statute does not
specifically include the insurance industry in determining the
necessary criteria, it adequately protects the industry's interests. The
criteria are demanding, thereby eliminating potentially abusive
demands for coverage of wasteful, harmful, or ineffective therapies.
B. Federal Policy
Not only have state legislatures recognized the importance of
treating breast cancer with HDG-ABMT, but so too has the federal
government through its health benefits to all federal employees. The
Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA) -I authorizes the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to contract with private
insurance companies to provide health benefits to all federal
employees.567 OPM has final authority to decide benefits and exclu-
sions in all FEHBA plans.5" Many of the insurance plans provided
by carriers that OPM contracts with explicitly limit coverage for HDC-
ABMTs to a set of specific diseases, which does not include breast
cancer.569 OPM has accordingly denied policyholders coverage for
HDC-ABMTs for breast cancer,7 ' a practice upheld by the
courts.
5 7 1
565. See RI. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-36.2.
566. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8914 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (outlining regulations regarding health
insurance coverage and other benefits for federal employees).
567. See id. §§ 8902(a)-8903 (1988).
568. 1&. § 8902(d). SeeArrington v. Group Hospitalization & Medical Servs., 806 F. Supp.
287, 289 (D.D.C. 1992) (finding that district court must defer to OPM's decisions regarding such
matters, unless court finds OPM's decision clearly erroneous or inconsistent with terms of Its
contract plan or regulations).
569. See Caudill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.C., 999 F.2d 74, 80 (4th Cir. 1993)
(explaining that breast cancer is not listed as covered forABMTs); Arington, 806 F. Supp. at 288
(explaining that HDC-ABMT for breast cancer is dearly excluded under insurance plan); sce also
Letter from James B. King, Director, Office of Personnel Management, to Congreswioman
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chair, Subcommittee on Compensation and Employee Benefits 3 (Oct.
22, 1993) (on file with The American University Law Review). Director King stated:
OPM does not mandate the coverage by all carriers because HDC/ABMT treatment
of breast cancer has not yet proven to be as, or more effective than, traditional
treatment... HDC/ABMT has a higher treatment related mortality rate, a higher
rate of nonmortal toxicity, and a higher rate of side effects .... [OPM] will not
hesitate to modify [its] coverage requirements as soon as reliable clinical evidence
indicates that this treatment is an effective as conventional treatment for breast cancer.
Id.
570. See Caudi 4 999 F.2d at 80 (finding that unlisted transplants and high dose chemothera-
pywere specifically excluded); Reger v. Espy, 836 F. Supp. 869,871 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (noting that
HDC-ABMT coverage for breast cancer vras specifically excluded under policy).
571. See Caudill, 999 F.2d at 80; Nesseim v. Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 995 F.2d 804, 808
(8th Cir. 1993); Reger, 836 F. Supp. at 872.
1995] BREAST CANCER PATIENTS V. THEM INSURERS 2103
A major development, however, is a new OPM policy, which took
effect in 1995,' that requires all plans to cover HDC-ABMT for
breast cancer 7 8 At a minimum, all plans must cover non-randomized
clinical trials." This policy reversal represents a victory for those
advocating that HDC-ABMT is not an experimental treatment for
breast cancer.
Closer examination of the OPM policy reveals, however, that this
coverage expansion contains some limitations for women receiving
treatment through randomied clinical trials. These limitations depend
on the particular plan sold to the federal employee. For example, if
the federal employee's plan is from the Government Employees
Hospital Association, coverage is limited to clinical trials at designated
facilities. 5  In other words, if a federal employee with such a plan
receives a HDC-ABMT for breast cancer in a nondesignated facility,
no benefits will be paid.576
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The legislature, through public hearings, has ample access to the
medical profession, the insurance industry, and breast cancer interest
groups. It is therefore the most appropriate institution for determin-
ing whether insurers should provide coverage for emerging medical
treatments. Legislation should account for the legitimate, yet
competing interests, of both the insurance industry and the breast
cancer patient. Legislation that sets forth a multi-tier system, or
enumerates objective criteria against which new treatments can be
572. SeeAlan Bavley, Choie in HeatM Co erage?, KAA.S Cm'YSTr, Oct. 2,1994, atAl; Mike
Causey, For Some, a Healihy Choiae WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1994, at D2.
573. See Letter from James B. King, Director, Office of Personnel Management, to
Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chair, Subcommittee on Compensation and Employee
Benefits I (Sept. 29,1994) (on file with The Ameian UnivrsityLawRoim) [hereinafter Sept.
Letter] (stating that OPM has "decided to require all FEHB plans to provide coverage
immediately for HDC/ABfT for the treatment of breast cancer, multiple myeloma and
epithelial ovarian cancer"); s also Causey, supra note 572.
574. See Sept. Letter, supra note 573.
575. See Fax from OPM, "Summary of Mandated FEHB Coverage for HDC/ABMT to
Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton (Sept. 1994) (on file with TArirkcan Unhmil e Law
Review) [hereinafter Fax from OPMI]. The American Postal Workers Union (APWU) Health
Plan, National Association of Letter Carriers (NALO) Health Benefit Plan, Postmasters Benefit
Plan, Alliance Health Benefit Plan, and Mail Handlers Benefit Plan contain no special limits and
therefore will cover the procedure. Id Under the Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) Benefit Plan,
however, coverage is provided through clinical trials "limited to protocols approved and funded
by the National Cancer Institute (NCI) and performed at NCI-approved facilities." Id In the
absence of an available clinical trial, the Plan will provide the same level of coverage as for any
other covered transplant. Id.; se also Nancy Chockley & Kathleen Eie, iita Gn'aeet Standards
andResolution., LEGALTIMEs, Dec. 19,1994, at24 (analyzing government health care reform and
controversy surrounding coverage of HDC-ABMT).
576. Fax from OPM, supra note 575.
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measured, or establishes a committee comprised of all relevant
interest groups to make coverage determinations for health insurance,
more effectively accounts for these competing interests than does a
general mandate.
Until legislative approaches are enacted, however, courts must
resolve disputes between insurers and breast cancer patients regarding
coverage of HDC-ABMT. It is not enough for courts to examine the
terms .of a disputed health insurance policy. Instead, they must look
beyond the face of the contract and scrutinize the process by which
coverage determinations are made. Courts should 'uphold an
insurer's coverage denial for HDC-ABMT for breast cancer that is
based on an Experimental Exclusion only when: (1) the policy clearly
defines "experimental" through objective criteria; (2) the insurer does
not operate under a conflict of interest; and (3) the insurer executes
reasonable efforts on which to base its coverage decision. Unless all
of these requirements are adequately satisfied, coverage denials
should not be upheld, even if the insurer is entitled to deference
under ERISA. Unchecked deference to coverage decisionmakers and
plan administrators under ERISA perpetuates, if not actively con-
dones, abusive conduct by insurers.
A. Defining Experimental Through Objective Criteria
Courts should compel an insurer to define Experimental Exclusions
clearly in its policy through objective, unambiguous criteria. Insurers
have many options in attempting to satisfy this requirement:
" Require formal endorsements from national medical organiza-
tions (e.g., the National Institutes of Health, American Medical
Association, or American Society of Clinical Oncology) or
governmental bodies (e.g., the Food and Drug Administration or
Medicare);
" Expressly exclude or include treatments involved in Phase I, II,
III, or IV clinical trials;
" Insist that research protocols be consistent with procedures
endorsed by a nationally recognized medical organization;
• Insist that board certified physicians and nurses perform the
medical treatment in appropriate facilities;
" Require that the proposed medical treatment be reviewed and
approved by a qualified institutional review board;
" Require that the proposed medical treatment be received
favorably by the most recent medical conferences and peer-
reviewed literature;
" Insist that there exists no therapy that is clearly superior to the
proposed treatment; and/or
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* Require that the primary purpose of the treatment is therapeutic,
with research merely a collateral goal.
In the absence of such defining criteria, courts should view an
Experimental Exclusion as inherently ambiguous. If the policy is
subject to state law, ambiguities must be construed against the insurer
in accordance with rules of contract construction. If the policy is
subject to ERISA, the court should resolve the ambiguity by making
its own determination as to whether or not a treatment is experimen-
tal. This determination should be made through de novo review
without deferring to the ERISA plan administrator. To do this, courts
must independently weigh medical expert testimony and literature.
In conducting de novo review, courts should measure the proposed
treatment against a "primary purpose to benefit the patient" standard.
If the primary purpose is for research or education, then the court
should deem the proposed treatment to be experimental. Otherwise,
if the primary purpose is to benefit the patient, and research is merely
collateral, then the proposed treatment is not experimental.
A "primary purpose to benefit the patient" standard ensures
coverage for treatments that are still under investigation, while at the
same time requiring that these treatments have some proven medical
value. This value, however, may be substantially lower than would be
required had the insurer enumerated objective criteria with higher
standards. Yet the patient, not the insurer, should benefit from any
ambiguities in a policy. When this standard is applied specifically to
HDC-ABMT for breast cancer, courts should conclude that the
treatment is in fact not experimental, given the medical community's
consensus that at least the short-term effects of the treatment are
favorable.
B. No Conflict of Interest
Courts should not uphold a coverage denial if the insurer is
operating under a conflict of interest Insurers must be forced to
modify their decisionmaking process in order to ensure an objective
coverage review. This could be achieved in several ways:
* Immediately eliminate any internal bonus scheme (whereby plan
administrators have incentives to keep costs down through
coverage denials or, in the case of HMOs, eliminating referrals
to specialists); instead, implement schemes that discourage
administrators from making inappropriate decisions;
* Designate an independent committee, consisting of medical
experts, to make binding coverage determinations on a case-by-
case basis; if the insurer is free to reject the findings of the
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independent committee, then the conflict of interest has not
been fully eliminated; and/or
Structurally detach its coverage pool of funds from any profit-
maximizing aims of the business, such as by establishing a trust.
Any of these modifications should ensure a more objective review by
a neutral, disinterested third party. Such modifications will not only
provide the policyholder with additional protections, but will also
absolve the insurance industry of villainous depictions by the
media,577 and from public criticisms that insurers care solely about
profits and not people.7"
C. Reasonable Efforts
Courts should not uphold an insurer's coverage decision if the
insurer did not execute reasonable efforts in arriving at its coverage
determination. First and foremost, coverage decisions should be
made only by competent medical directors, preferably those who are
board certified and experienced in the specific discipline of medicine
that governs the proposed treatment, such as oncologists in the case
of HDC-ABMT for breast cancer."' 9 Accordingly, courts should be
immediately suspect of coverage decisionmakers who are retired
physicians and have not treated patients for a substantial period of
time, or who are not specialists in the relevant area of medicine.
Reasonable efforts include making all relevant inquiries and
researching all pertinent data and literature regarding the treatment
in question. Examples include the following:
" Reviewing thoroughly all materials submitted by a policyholder
and her physician, which may include a policyholder's medical
records, letters, and articles in support of the proposed treat-
ment;
" Conferring with specialists in the proposed treatment area about
the appropriateness of the proposed treatment specifically in
relation to the policyholder's condition; and/or
" Consulting the official positions of nationally recognized medical
organizations.
Most important, insurers must not rely on outdated materials.
577. See Robin E. Margolis, Federal Courts Still Split on Autologous Bone Marrmo Transplants, 11
HEALTH SPAN 20, 24 (Dec. 1992) (mentioning how insurers are portrayed villainously by media
when insurers assert technicalities and exclusion clauses).
578. Il; see alsoWilliam M. Sage, Easy Targets,hcult Issues, LEGAL TIMEsJuly 4, 1994, at 26
(noting that insurers' profit motives have led them to be classified as villains and as principal
cause for health care crisis).
579. SeeLeonhardtv. Holden Bus. Forms Co., 828 F. Supp. 657,669 (D. Minn. 1993) (noting
that insurer relied on information from internist who was "not board-certified in either oncology
or hematology" when denying coverage for ABMT).
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A reasonable efforts requirement will encourage insurers to give a
full and fair review to each claim on a case-by-case basis. Any
potential that the insurer will deny coverage in a "rubber stamp"
fashion will be diminished, if not eliminated entirely.
CONCLUSION
HDC-ABMTs are being increasingly used in the treatment of breast
cancer. To oncologists and their patients with breast cancer, this is
a "state-of-the-art" treatment that offers hope for a cure where none
previously existed. To some insurance companies and other health
professionals, this is an "experimental" treatment, the efficacy of
which is still unknown. As such, HDC-ABMTs in the treatment of
breast cancer have become one of the most controversial emerging
medical technologies today.
In the meantime, insurers are claiming that HDC-ABMTs for breast
cancer fall within the Experimental Exclusions set forth in their
health insurance policies, and consequently, are refusing to pay for
the treatment. Women, who are being denied this health coverage,
are fighting their insurers both through their state legislatures and in
the courts. Various legislation has been either proposed or enacted
in several states.
In the absence of legislation, however, courts must be prepared to
resolve these disputes between insurers and breast cancer patients.
Courts should require insurers to clearly define Experimental
Exclusions through objective criteria. Moreover, courts should
require that insurers revise their coverage decisionmaking process to
ensure that reasonable efforts are executed, and to eliminate any
existing conflict of interest. Requiring objective criteria, no conflict
of interest, and reasonable effects will instill more equity into a system
where unequal bargaining power exists, ultimately providing greater
protection for the policyholder, while simultaneously achieving the
insurer's goal of eliminating harmful, wasteful treatments. Consistent,
uniform court decisions promoting these aims will help transform the
relationship between a breast cancer patient and her insurer from one
of conflict to one of cooperation. After all, neither insurers nor
breast cancer patients can afford more battles.
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